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March 2018

— This Month —

The Evolving Role Of Signal Corps Tactical Officers

- Part 1 of 6 -

–  The Civil War: A New Role For A New Form Of Warfare —


Our Association is a not-for-profit fraternal organization. Its purpose is a) to foster camaraderie among the graduates of Signal Corps Officer Candidate School classes of the World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War eras, b) to organize and offer scholarships and other assistance for the families of Officer and Enlisted OCS cadre who are in need, and c) to archive for posterity the stories and history of all of the Signal Corps OCS Officers who served this great country. We are open to ALL former Army Signal Corps OCS graduates, their families and friends, as well as other officers, enlisted men, those interested in military history, and the general public. Please, come join us. For more information about our Association, to see a list of our Officers and Directors, or for contact details, click on the OCS Association link at left.

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Today's Signal Corps Officer - Facing A More Complex, Robust & Lethal Battlefield

 ArmySignalOCS Editor

Technological Advances In Tactical Weaponry Call For A New Form Of Signal Corps Tactical Officer

It’s amazing how sloppy people can be with the English language. Take the words strategy and tactics. Over and over again we find dictionaries and wikis using one term to define the other, where the usage of both is wrong. Wikipedia’s Military Tactics page defines military tactics as “the science and art of organizing a military force, and the techniques for combining and using weapons and military units to engage and defeat an enemy in battle.”

Now, what the hell does that mean?

First of all, strategy involves “science and art,” not tactics—and even then only minimally. Second, a military “technique” is a strategic item, not a tactical one, even though the word technique suggests otherwise. Military techniques become tactical only when they are implemented… until then, they are little more than strategic options that a field commander can take. Or put another way, the actual process of implementing a military technique is what makes it tactical.

Take for example the eight classic maneuvers of warfare. While usually referred to as tactics, they are in reality strategic approaches that can be taken in order to attain a military goal. As we said, they become tactical only when they are being implemented.

And therein lies the heart of the difference between tactics and strategies. Strategies represent what you wish to accomplish. Tactics represent those steps you actually take to accomplish your goal(s).

For our purposes, we care about the difference between these two because as the nature of war changes, the role of those Officers that oversee strategic goals versus tactical efforts has become more and more important. This is especially the case in the Signal Corps, where the job Signal Corps Officers have to do has had to change to keep up with the opportunities new forms of armament have brought to combat field commanders. More specifically, as new forms of armament have come into existence, their availability has given new opportunities to field commanders to achieve their strategic goals, by implementing new tactics never before seen or envisioned.

Take the case of the drone, and how it has created the need for a new form of Signal Corps Tactical Officer.

Drone supportWhether you consider drones new forms of armament or something else, there is no doubt that they have brought new opportunity to field commanders. To be able to reconnoiter a city block of tightly woven mud-brick buildings in Fallujah, without having to walk the actual street and risk getting your head shot off, is a gift from heaven. Drones, more properly known as mid-sized unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), can do this, and in the process provide critical tactical help to the lowly grunt tasked with reconning and clearing the area.

Similarly, if the grunt on the street is able to pull out of his backpack a personal drone, no larger than half a loaf of bread, and have it fly through the front door of one of those houses, to see if there are any bad guys inside, is an even better skill to have, especially if that drone is also capable of dropping a grenade behind it as it exits the building.

Is the use of such a drone tactical, or strategic? Are such drones little more than new forms of armament, and therefore tactical in nature; or do they form the foundation of a new way of strategic thinking… such as the kind that would likely come into play if not just the grunt on the ground, but higher echelons of command far removed from the battlefield could see in real time camera footage of what the drone is seeing?

Having RTE (real time environment) access in the rear to voice, data and video of what is going on on the street, could easily result in equally real time changes, say at Brigade level, in the overal strategy governing the combat situation. In such a case, a drone would cease being a tactical implement whose purpose is to help the shooter on the ground accomplish his mission, and become instead a central part of strategy formation at Brigade level.

Or would it?

To answer this question one would have to know how local commanders would manage such a scenario. That is, what kind of a command structure would be needed to incorporate such a seemingly simple form of new armament—personal drones—into Battalion or Brigade driven field combat operations?

Regardless of what the answer is, our guess is that 1) such a scenario is coming to the field of battle soon, if it hasn't already arrived, and 2) that somewhere along the way the Signal Corps will have to get involved. Why? Because underneath everything this entire mess depends on the use of new forms of technology… forms that are controlled by even newer forms of communication. And when communication technology comes into the picture, it’s usually best to get the Signal Corps involved.

This would especially be the case with forms of communication that are personal in nature (such as a grunt-carried, camera enabled drone) capable of being fully network from the grunt standing outside of the mud-brick building’s front door, to the highest level Pentagon strategy formation office… including everyone along the way that might need to be involved.

See our point? As war fighting techniques become modernized through the use of newer forms of combat, brought to the field through the introduction of newer tactical devices, pressure will be put on developing new strategies able to maximize the use of those tactical devices. When this happens a corresponding need will develop for new command positions in  the field, to manage the tactical elements of this revolution in how field combat is fought. Or put another way, rear echelon command will need to develop better strategic means to take advantage of the newer tactical forms of combat that are coming along, which in turn is going to force the Army to have to deal with the fact that new field command positions—relating to tactics—will be needed… if combat is to be both modernized and perfected through the tactical use of the devices being developed.

In our mind, since nearly all of the new tactical combat devices being developed need to be “networked” to extract maximum benefit from them, this means that the Army is going to need to bring the Signal Corps into the picture, and redefine the role of the Signal Corps Tactical Officer.

How? How about by having Signal Corps Tactical Officers assigned at the Company level, and charged with enabling fully networked fire team, squad and platoon level tactical combat? And by fully networked, we mean just that… up to and including integrating squad level fire teams with the global Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN–T) architecture.

This month we begin a series of 6 articles on this topic: the role of a Signal Corps Tactical Officer. We’ll begin with an overview of how Signal Corps Tactical Officers came into being in the first place… back in the Civil War, and we’ll follow their progress through the roll the Army played in America’s opening of the west, through the Spanish American War, and the Philippines Insurrection. There we'll stop for this month.

Next month we'll continue the story with a review of the work Tactical Signal Officers did in WWI. That article will be followed in the following month by a look at the mission Signal Corps Tactical Officers played in WWII. In the 4th month we'll take a look at Signal Corps Tactical Officers during the Korean War, followed in the 5th month by the Vietnam War. In the 6th month we'll wrap things up with a summary article on how we see the role of Signal Corps Tactical Officers going forward.

We hope you will join us each month throughout the coming summer, and enjoy our analysis of Signal Corps Tactical Officers and their changing role in war fighting today.


The Evolving Role Of Signal Corps Tactical Officers

Signal Corps Tactical Officer

- Part 1 of 6 -

There is no doubt that combat is changing. For the most part this is being brought about because of advancements in technology. Advancements in technology make it possible to field new forms of armament, which in turn open up whole new tactical approaches that can be applied in combat. Changing tactics in turn require that commanders skilled in different forms of combat discipline be placed in combat leadership roles. And as disciplines change, the types of soldiers needed on the front line, and throughout the supporting echelons, need to change too.

One can see an example of this by looking at the tactic based around envelopment. Envelopment is a form of tactics that has been around since the Battle of Rocroi, which was fought on May 19, 1643.

In this battle the French army scored a victory over the Spanish Army, only five days after the accession of Louis XIV of France to the throne. Coming late in the Thirty Years' War, the Battle of Rocroi is today considered the turning point in the use of battlefield tactics to overcome combat weaknesses. The reason is that Rocroi made the case that envelopment—a new tactical approach designed to break the stalemate that usually resulted from head-to-head combat—was proven to offer better odds of success than traditional forms of field combat. Yet even though the concept of envelopment proved its worth, and went on to become one of the more accepted forms of tactical combat, in the Battle of Rocroi the maneuver itself still fell short of its goal, as the French suffered enormous casualties in trying to apply it.

Why did the French suffer such casualties? It was because while the tactic held value and won the day for the French, in order to apply it properly the French still had to fumble around behind the enemy’s lines to find those objectives in the enemy’s rear that were worth seizing, to stymie the enemy’s retreat. In other words, lack of intelligence as regards the enemy’s battlefield layout limited the success the tactic could bring. What caused this lack of intelligence? The answer was an inability on the part of the French to communicate from one part of the field to the other that information the combat commanders needed to know, in real time, to discern the enemy’s status. Lack of information then denigrated the value of tactical envelopment as a means for winning the battle.

Imagine then how much more powerful this new form of tactics would have been back then if the French had access to the kind of routine intelligence one gathers today from field deployed drones? And how much more valuable that information would have been if it could have been communicated in real time to every French field commander engaged in the fight?

Mini-DroneOur point here is simple: advancements in technology makes it possible for new forms of armament—such as drones that communicate through voice and video in real time—to be brought to the battlefield, such that they in turn can enable the definition and creation of even newer forms of tactics, for use on the battlefield, provided that field commanders are able—when they are using these technologies—to differentiate between when a new approach to combat represents the application of a new tactic, versus the appliance of a new strategy.

In all of this though there is a rub: are the changes that are taking place in how combat is being fought being driven by new arms forcing field commanders to develop new tactics more suited to the arms that are coming along, or by strategies that are being redefined to take advantage of the modern arms supported tactics… and how does a field commander know where he stands in the decision making process that underwrites all of this?

This is an important question because while changes in tactics are one thing, changes in strategy are another… and the risk of loss of a battle—or the entire war—is greater when a strategy is changed than when a tactic is tweaked.

Continued Right Page, Top

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For us to answer this question we must first define the difference between tactics and strategy, then look at how modern combat tactics derive their value from real time communication underwritten by field gathered intelligence, summarized and interpreted for the combat commander by a tactics focused field Officer. Or in other words, how today’s modern Army should begin to look to training and posting at every level in the combat architecture what we will call Signal Corps Tactical Officers, even in those units that traditionally never had Signals Officers posted in them.

Tactics Versus Strategy

strategy vs TacticsTo a person, every one of our readers thinks he understands the difference between tactics and strategy. How could they not, considering that nearly all of our readers served as U.S. Army Signal Corps field commanders at one point in time in their life?

Ask them and they will tell you that strategy is more concrete and long-term than tactics… and that tactics can change with little notice, based on how successful a commander’s strategy is. If the goal is to keep local villagers from supporting enemy guerillas with nighttime driven food deliveries, then the commander’s tactics must deal with intercepting or otherwise disrupting the delivery of those food supplies.

One method of doing this is to mount nighttime patrols, or set up ambush points near those places where a food drop is likely to take place. But if this is done, what exactly is happening? Is a strategy being defined, or is a tactic being implemented. That is, is the nighttime patrol a strategy or a tactic? And why do we even care?

The answer is both, because strategy and tactics work together as means to an end. If your strategy is to stop nighttime supplies to the enemy, one key component of your strategy would be to decide where the nighttime supply route is likely to be found. The tactics used to support this strategy would involve deciding what kind of gear your troops should carry with them as they recon the likely supply route, what kind of armament they will take with them, how long it would take to get there, how they would setup their defenses once they are on the scene, and how they would handle any encounter with the enemy.

One can see from this that while different entities, strategy and tactics must always be in-line with one another. Young combat commanders often fail to see this, only to end up finding themselves enamored with a particular tactical approach that, while fun to implement, fails to accomplish the objective because it does not line up with the strategy. Commanders must remember then that it’s the strategy that should inform the tactics to be used, not the other way around. Using our earlier examples of drones, one can see from this how the availability of a new piece of armament (the drone) could easily lead a local field commander to develop a tactic for the use of that armament, without any regard for whether the strategic goal is accomplished or not.

In terms of the pedantics of these two words, there are quite a few differences. However, in short, strategy describes the destination and how you are going to get there, and tactics describe the specific actions and steps you are going to take to get there. Here we expound on the differences and similarities between the two, and explain how you can track the progress of each.

Strategic Vs. Tactical Progress

Strategy vs TacticsAbout 2,500 years ago, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote “The Art of War.” In it he said, “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Yet despite the implication of these words, the two are not at odds with each another. In fact, they are on the same team, both serving the goal of accomplishing the mission.

Strategy defines your long-term goals and how you’re planning to achieve them. In other words, your strategy gives you the path you need to follow in order to achieve your organization’s mission.

Tactics are much more concrete and are often oriented toward smaller steps and shorter timeframes along the way. They involve best practices, specific plans, resources, etc. In many ways, they can be thought of as “initiatives.”

Of critical importance in all of this is the fact that strategy and tactics must always be in-line with one another. It’s for this reason that as the U.S. Army introduces more modern, networked forms of armament to the battlefield, there is a need for a number of Tactical Combat Commanders familiar with the technology and communication infrastructure involved to be spread throughout the units concerned, to oversee how the use of these improved arms fits into the equation of developing and employing newer forms of tactics to leverage the improved arms towards accomplishment of the mission. In other words, to oversee across the entire battlefield, both at the front and in the rear, within combat units as well as units that play little to no role in the actual combat, how the information derived from the use of newer forms of arms, the result of their use, and the tactics they enable, serve to accomplish the mission.

As to how to determine if any benefit ensues—that is, if the intended strategy is being accomplished or not, that will come from tracking and measuring the use of the armament and the application of the tactics most suited to the situation. And again, the Tactical Combat Commanders we envision being needed to enable this new form of warfare should take on this responsibility too.

Let us look at how to measure strategic and tactical success. 

Tracking Implementation Progress

Communication is the glueIn order to measure progress towards a strategic goal, one must first define that goal. Once that is done, then a set of key performance indicators (KPI) must be identified, where progress in attaining the KPIs serves to indicate progress in attaining the mission.

For the sake of an example, let’s say the mission is to interdict supplies being moved by the enemy, along a border area near a particular combat zone. In such a case the organization’s overarching mission would be to stop the flow of supplies in the area in question. Lots of tactics could be developed to try and accomplish this goal, however the truth is that unless someone knows how many supplies are getting through now, there will be no way of knowing if the interdiction tactics are working or not. Thus, while it may be easy to define the strategy, defining tactics that stand a chance of achieving the mission will be impossible if more data is not available as to how well the enemy is achieving its goal of moving their supplies from one place to another.

It’s thus imperative that a set of basic facts about the then current situation be known before a strategy can be developed to achieve the goal. Even then however, without detailed specifics on the whole matter of what kind, how many and how supplies are being moved by the enemy, it is going to be impossible to judge if the tactics being developed will work or not.

The solution to this is again, the introduction of a series of Tactical Combat Commanders into the organizational chart. Specifically, these men should be placed in all of the various units that play a role in this solution, including non-combat units. And again, since their role embraces all elements of the solution, from strategy formation to tactical plans, the introduction of new forms of networked arms with data gathering and communication capabilities, and the responsibility to both define and measure progress towards the mission’s KPIs, they should be given pride of place in the decision making process. By this we mean that their job should be to work with the Field Combat Commander(s) to flesh out the strategy and mission, put numbers to the current situation so that those tasked with implementing the tactics agreed upon can measure their progress, assign KPIs that denote the unit’s progress towards the mission, and then implement the plan… recommending along the way to the Field Combat Commander changes to the tactics as progress towards the KPIs indicates.

Finally, just to clarify the concept of KPIs. Key performance indicators are more geared toward tracking a unit’s progress towards accomplishing its strategy, or mission. If the unit’s strategy is succeeding, it means that the unit is making progress towards its high level mission. In this regard, KPIs should be defined in ways that suggest what more needs to be done to further progress towards the high level goal the unit has set. If KPI progress appears to be faltering, then this knowledge should be used to redefine or change the unit’s tactics, not its strategy. In simple terms, field commanders should work with their Tactical Combat Commander(s) to develop new tactical paths to success, not a new strategy

As regards tactics, it’s more about proper prior planning and the selection of the components that will make up the tactics than anything else. For example, tactics typically have a start and end date or time, allocated resources, and a number of milestones and action items that are defined as a means to achieving the tactical goal. In cases such as this, it is imperative that each member of the combat team understands which elements of the tactics they are accountable for, and how to exercise command over the work they are to do. In this way, while defining and measuring KPIs that relate to strategic issues may prove something of an art, tracking progress towards a tactical goal will be easy as the very definition of the tactic itself will give you the concrete steps you need to track to achieve your strategy.

In summary, what we see here is that as more modern forms of combat, armament, strategy formation and tactics are introduced into the Army, a new level of command and control will need to be developed to manage this new, integrated form of combat operations. Specifically, the fact that all of these elements will be linked via networked, real time, voice, video, communication, intelligence gathering, data platforms and AI (Artificial Intelligence) decision making suggests that the new operational oversight that is needed should come from the Signal Corps, as it is the only branch of service whose discipline extends across all of these areas.

Note that we are not talking here of the “command” part of command and control (C2), but of the control part. And even then, we are not suggesting that there be a Signal Corps supplied “control” officer attached at the hip to the combat commander, but instead a series of “operation control officers” working at every level of command, including those units that do little more than support field operations. These control officers would serve the purpose of making sure that the information the combat commanders in the field need is supplied, and that the best tactical solution for the problem at hand be defined and supported when the combat commander is ready to implement it.

Again then, our recommendation is that the kind of integrated, coordinated support that is needed to field newer forms of armament and combat tactics come in the form of Signal Corps Tactical Officers—i.e. operation control officers—who would be assigned to work at every level of the field combat structure, from Platoons to Brigades, in any and all places that touch the formation and implementation of strategies and tactics. And just to be certain we make our point, in our mind this includes both combat as well as non-combat units and field maneuver groups as well.

One of the reasons for this is that a combat unit’s strategy, to be effective, must be consistent. It is therefore imperative that everyone throughout the entire war fighting organization charged with accomplishing a combat mission understand it, because only in this way will they know how the tactics they’re a part of are contributing to the organization’s mission, as a whole. A series of easily approached Signal Corps Tactical Officers spread throughout a Division sized unit or larger can help keep everyone marching to the same drum. And if such a unit’s overall mission begins to falter, these same Signal Corps Tactical Officers can help the Combat Commanders redirect their efforts, through the definition and introduction of new tactics based on the use of state of the arts armament and strategic thinking.

To see how the Signal Corps can accomplish this, it may be useful to understand the history of how Signal Corps Tactical Officers evolved, from their first missions during the Civil War until today. Let us look then at how Signal Corps Tactical Officers developed from the time when communication first hit the battlefield, up to now.

The Civil War

The Civil WarAs most of our readers know, the Army staff position of Signal Officer was established in 1860. Major Albert J. Myer became the first Signal Officer in charge of the Army Signal Department, and at the time he was the only such Signal Corps Officer in the entire Army. Not surprisingly, his role was to spearhead the use of signaling to improve command and control within the Union Army.

Initially, the only work he did was to have men from the combat arms sent to him for training in how to send signals from one combat arms signalman to another. Seemingly simple on the surface, the actual training provided standardized the duties and method of signaling around the use of Myer's patented “Improved System of Signaling." Since training was provided to field personnel expected to be in the thick of the fighting, we can see that from its inception the Signal Corps—or rather, those men who performed signaling duties from within their unit—were technical and combat trained personnel. This meant that for all practical purposes this new fledgling of a service was centered around the use and application of technology; new technologies. I.e. it was a technical service formed within a combat arm.

Along the way in creating an ability to provide signaling in the field of battle the bifurcation of signal men from front line soldiers became more and more pronounced. As the signalmen improved on their duties, they devised new policies and tactics of their own, which they then proceeded to implement. This further set them apart from the infantry “shooters” that they stood and worked beside every day. One result of this was that unit field commanders tended to overlook signalmen when it came to promotion, to the point that when a man was detailed for signal duties he could pretty much kiss goodbye the chance to be promoted to the Officer level, or receive any consideration whatsoever for advancement.

Major Myer saw this and pushed to have his signalmen moved into a new, formally recognized segment of the Army, called the Signal Corps. In such a unit he could provide the men with promotions, formal unit assignment and leadership positions, while at the same time instilling in them the discipline and training needed to make flagmen based signaling a valuable combat tactical asset. And thus it was that Myer petitioned the Secretary of War in 1860 to form a separate Signal Corps.

The need to re-designate the Signal Corps as a separately commanded unit able to support all field combat commands was brought home to roost in the battle of Bull Run, where because of the lack of available signalmen on the part of the Union Army the Confederate forces attained an impressive victory. Specifically, the lack of available signalmen in the field left many Union Army field combat commanders with no real time information on what the Confederates were up to. And to make matters worse, in those cases where flagmen were available, the fact that they were assigned to specific commanders meant that their commanders were reluctant to “lend” these extra flagmen to a neighboring commander, in need of information on enemy formations and activities.

Again, the result was a defeat for the Union Army… but a win for Myer. The lack of available signaling resources on the battlefield made it clear to Union Army leaders that the Signal Corps, as a separate unit able to support all field commanders, must be stood up, posthaste. With this demand by Union leaders for more signalmen, Congress was forced to establish the Signal Corps as a separate branch of the U.S. Army, in March 1863.

From this early lesson we should learn that as more advanced technologies bring to today’s battlefield even more advanced forms of armament, which in turn drives a need for improved forms of combat tactics, the Army should not overlook the need to integrate within its full panoply of combat and non-combat commands closer involvement on the part of the Signal Corps, to help Combat Commanders form better strategic and tactical alternatives for consideration… based on the real time data and information an integrated Signal Command has at its disposal.

Back in Myer’s time the Signal Corps that resulted was comprised of one Chief Signal Officer, a Colonel, one Lieutenant Colonel and two Majors. Extending this into the field, the Signal Corps was authorized to provide each Army Corps and every Military Department with one Captain and anywhere from one to eight Lieutenants. Supporting every commissioned officer was an NCO in command of six Privates First and/or Second Class.

For our purposes today, we see a Signal Corps Tactical Officer of appropriate rank being needed to serve alongside of every Field Commander involved in front line combat, as well as any and all combat situations that call for the applications of modern tactics that can benefit from improved field intelligence, whether that occurs on the field of combat, or in a rear echelon supporting unit.

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