This is Part II of a two part story originally started in February 2013. This part is continued from the March 2013 Home Page. To go to an archived version of that page, click here: March 2013 Home Page Archive. To return to this month's actual Home Page, click on the Signal Corps orange Home Page menu item in the upper left corner of this page. To go to Part I of this story, click here: February 2013 Home Page Archive

continuing...

Much like shouting from horse to horse as the Cavalry rode along, the problem wasn’t communicating from one chopper to another… it was helping the boys on the ground communicate back to HQ in the rear... to call in fire support or otherwise report and coordinate their activities. The introduction of the helicopter, and the propensity for commanders to use it as their airborne HQ, both made this problem more acute as well as provided a means to overcome it. With the HQ effectively split between rear echelon locations and a mobile spot somewhere in the air underneath the commander’s helicopter seat, the solution to providing everyone with communication was simple: move the commo hub from the ground up into the air too, and from that location then proceed to build an FM radio net able to act both as a mobile communication hub as well as an airborne relay for any ground communication unit unable to reach the rest of the units involved.

Airborne FM radio nets – such a simple solution to such a big problem… except of course that the TOE didn’t provide for any such thing.

No matter… the Signal Corps boys in Vietnam would build them anyway.

As these systems took shape the equipment brought together and how it was distributed across the battle area typically revolved around each combat commander’s personal approach to battle. Some wanted to be on the ground with their troops. Others liked to be above them, swooping in for clear views of the action and moving troops around as needed to control the battle space. Still others spent their time both in the air and on the ground, and depended on rear echelon HQ people to parse their commands to bring fire and troops to bear on the enemy. To suit their individual needs Signaleers built complex networks of distributed systems with some of the equipment in the air acting as a relay, while other parts of it were distributed both in the commander’s own helicopter as well as back at HQ. Most important, in doing all of this the Signal guys became adept at moving equipment around in real time to create new hubs, nodes, links, relays and shifting command posts… all while the battle was underway.

As the structure of these FM radio nets took shape one could expect to see each combat commander in a helicopter of his own, equipped with two AN/VRC-12 series radios with a radio operator stuck in for insurance. If he was a Division commander, he usually kept his radios on the Division and Brigade nets. Sometimes it was necessary for lower level commanders on the ground to have access to these nets too. If so, and if the jungle or terrain made it impossible to link to them, then another helicopter was employed to act as a relay for both the airborne and ground commanders.[1]

At the same time, usually with the help of the radio operator, an airborne Division commander would monitor the various maneuver Battalion nets involved in the campaign. To do this the Signal boys again had to come up with a field expedient solution. To solve this problem they disassembled the command helicopter console to make room for a third AN/VRC-12. This one was set up with push-button tuning for preselected channels, thus making it easy for the commander or his aide to shift between the various Brigades and Battalions. With a few quick clicks a commander could monitor or command his Brigade through the second radio, while at the same time giving maneuver commands to his Battalions through the third radio.

Back in the first part of this article (posted on February's Home Page) we looked closely at Major General William E. DePuy's combat operations during the battle of EL PASO II, in which he used an airborne communication platform to control his troops. If one looks at the extent of the combat area DePuy’s 1st Infantry Division was responsible for, one can see that even with an airborne steed there was more territory to cover than his Division was capable of managing from a logistics and support standpoint. This meant that not only did DePuy have to be maneuverable, but so did his communication system(s). Because of the large region he and his horse covered, the communication systems set up to support him had to be dependable beyond measure. Or, in other words, the FM net built had to be able to maneuver as he did, galloping from one place to another as DePuy faced the Indians.

In the case of FM nets, central to the concept of reliability is the creation of a relay or retransmission station able to cover as much of the territory involved as possible. In DePuy’s case the choice was either to create an airborne version, or find a mountain somewhere where its height, line of sight and ability to be secured made it more optimal than a constantly hovering chopper. Fortunately, Nui Ba Den presented itself for this purpose, and the Signaleers picked it.

On this forsaken rock pile they built an automatic retransmission station able to act unattended to keep the net functioning. To make sure Charlie wasn’t tempted to come over and unplug the equipment, the position was fortified. More than just being a nice added touch, fortifying Nui Ba Den was a necessity as except for the postage stamp area where the signal site sat the enemy controlled the rest of the hill. Strangely, as was to prove the case with many other mountain top signal sites in Vietnam, for some reason Charlie was willing to share these precipices with the U.S. Army’s Signaleers. Only on rare occasions were combat operations mounted against these easy target signal sites, it seeming that the rest of the time both the NVA and V.C. were satisfied to leave things as they were, and share the surrounding ground. In the case of Nui Ba Den, the height of this absurdity even carried over to both sides sharing a common waterhole.

Clever as the Signaleers were that scrambled to come up with solutions to support expanded airborne combat operations, they deserved only part of the credit. The rest of the credit belonged to commanders like General DePuy, who understood not just the need for reliable communications but the extra time and authority his Signaleers needed to assure that it was there when he needed to depend on it. Without good, solid communications to support Division level, constantly shifting, highly mobile ops the whole system of command and control would have broken down. If that happened, then no matter how quickly DePuy’s steed got him and his Big Red One to the place of action, the result would more often than not have turned out like that of Custer.

Instead, being aware of the need for planning as well as command and control, whenever intelligence indicated an enemy buildup that seemed valuable enough to go after General DePuy would assemble a real-time, on-demand conference—without regard for the hour of the day—and lay out for his key staff officers his intentions. Among these advisors DePuy always included the Division Signal Officer. More importantly, under instructions from  DePuy the final selection of the forward command post location for each engagement of the enemy was made by G-3 and the signal officer… together. DePuy then gave his approval, but only after assuring that the selection would have the capacity for the communications needed to support the operation. An astute commander, DePuy made sure everything at his disposal was ready before taking his Fighting First into combat… including assuring that sufficient helicopter support had been assigned to the commo guys, to make sure they were able to get their required equipment to where it was needed.

Thus, with the combined effort of a group of local Signaleers hell bent on coming up with field solutions to meet their Division commander’s need, and a commander who gave high priority to his signal Battalion’s requests, the 1st Infantry Division was always able to get the communication it needed where it was needed, when it was needed, for as long as it was needed. 

 

             

Footnotes

[1] The AN/VRC-12 (and later the AN/VRC-43 through VRC-49) is a combat-proven vehicular radio set used in Vietnam both in ground vehicles (from Jeeps to armor) and helicopters. Its strength came in its ability to support multiple tactical deployment roles because of its facility to be assembled into different configurations for different uses. The radio transmitter-receiver provided 920 VHF/FM voice channels in the 30-76 MHz range and consisted of three major units: Receiver-Transmitter RT-246A/VRC with a channel-presetting capability (10 pushbuttons), Manual Receiver-Transmitter RT-524A/VRC with built-in loudspeaker, and an Auxiliary Receiver R-442A/VRC.  - To return to your place in the text click here:

Sources

U.S.  Army in WWII, The War In The Pacific, Victory In Papua, Samuel Milner.

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