Continued from the September 2012 Home Page. To go to an archived version of that page click here: September 2012 Home Page Archive. To return to this month's actual Home Page click on the Signal Corps orange Home Page menu item in the upper left corner of this page.

continuing... 

Seen from this perspective where China holds moral supremacy and has the right to monopolize the accepted view of history, with even Korea’s interpretation of history taking precedence over Japan’s, Japan’s views on what islands it has a right to become little more than fodder for argument; an argument where the sides are defined in terms of those that support history based on the Sino-centric order of Asia and those who would use the international system that China claims is being foisted on it by the west. If one adds to this the historical fact of Japan’s occupation of Manchukuo in 1931 and its alignment as a puppet state, Japan’s occupation of Korea, and the various other occupations and atrocities Japan committed to the former Sino-centric countries during WWII, one can see why so much anxiety and national passion exists within this group today.

For China, adding to the insult of having been occupied by an unworthy culture from the lower world is the enormous embarrassment that comes from having its dignity trashed when China was unable to protect its tribute states from Japan’s aggression in the early 20th century. In one fell swoop Japan demonstrated to all of Asia that China was unworthy of sitting at the center of its own Sino-centric order. For a thin skinned people like the Chinese this loss of face is impossible to accept… they simply have to do something to regain their dignity. Taking control of the islands of the Yellow and South China Sea is one way to do that; and of course, it doesn’t hurt that this area happens to be sitting on one of the world’s largest untapped oil fields.

With regard to Japan’s position within Asia, on the whole, with all that Japan has done to the countries of Asia, one can understand the anger many of these countries still harbor towards Japan. It is this anger that makes it so difficult for countries like America to bring the lesser sized countries of Asia and especially Southeast Asia into alignment with Japan, in a common defense against either China’s muscle flexing naval activities or its economic bullying.

Looking at Korea, it’s clear the North Koreans have tossed their lot in with China, accepting their traditional role as a vassal state of the Middle Kingdom. In return China has opted to side with this subordinate state of the Chinese empire against just about every on-comer, including the U.S. This can be seen in China’s refusal to elbow North Korea into alignment with the world’s demands as regards either its nuclear weapon development program, its periodic tweaking of South Korea’s nose by sinking a boat here and there, lobbing artillery shells at Yeonpyeong island, or its upsetting both South Korea and Japan by launching “orbital satellite” missiles over their territory.

South Korea on the other hand is caught in the middle. It clearly does not want to act like it is subservient to China (although its economy is becoming more so with each passing day), yet it does not want to too visibly side with the other countries of Asia either… especially Japan, against whom South Korea holds a never ending list of grievances for its past imperial war making and occupation.

Japan too, not because it was left off the list of countries China blessed as civilized states worthy of receiving tribute from, but because of the audacity of even creating such a list, holds enough frustration with China to last two eternities. And the same can be said for the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and half a dozen others. All have their grievances with China, all with Japan, and most with each other.

The Bully Arrives

The difficulty this creates for the U.S. military in trying to pull these countries together to “contain” China is colossal. One reason is that while some of these countries might be inclined to side with America, China exists in two worlds, and the countries of Asia are never sure which one of the two Chinas they are facing. Because of this they are unsure as to whether to side with the U.S. (and let Japan become part of the process by U.S. dictate) on an issue involving China, stand by the wayside, or quietly side with China. In terms of the two faces China presents, the confusion centers around this: on any particular topic they never know if the China they are dealing with is showing its ancient face, the one that says China is the Middle Kingdom and the country to whom all others should pay tribute (or hell will befall them), or its modern face, that of the clumsy, overweight, constantly whining, yet muscle bound kid down the block. The one that means well and seems prone to share both his candy and pocket change with them, but just can’t seem to get it together when it comes to playing nicely with the other kids on the block.

While the countries of Asia fret about which face China is flashing at any point in time, from our perspective the U.S. military should see that they are one and the same. That is, even the mild one of the clumsy kid down the block hides a child that will lose its temper and throw its weight around if it doesn’t get its own way. Worse, one never knows what will cause this ill tempered kid to become a bully and threaten the other kids. Will it be because it is not included in the games the other kids on the block are playing (think: joint oil exploration efforts like Vietnam and the Philippines are considering), or because a piece of candy it thinks is rightfully its own is claimed by another (think: the Senkaku Islands)?

Either way, when this bully decides it has been wronged it has the capacity to upset the whole neighborhood. Sticking with the neighborhood analogy, bullies that have been wronged normally patrol their neighborhood looking for someone to pick on. They roam the streets seeking out a less strong neighbor to push around until the point is made to all that if things don’t go their way everyone is in trouble. In China’s case the streets are the passage ways of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, “String of Pearls,” and the Lombok Strait. The less strong neighbors are Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei, all of whom are claimants to the disputed Spratley and Senkaku Islands, as well as Australia, Singapore, India, and most of western Europe, all of whom will most decidedly suffer if the sea lanes that pass through the South China sea are disrupted if and when a confrontation takes place over China’s claiming control over the islands these lanes pass through.

To counter this China’s neighbors—especially Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam—must decide how to deal with China’s flexing of its sea born muscle. Specifically, they must decide how to handle China’s increasing propensity to regularly position both naval and army forces in any region of the South China Sea it wants to, and then use these military assets to tweak the noses of any neighbors that happen to pass by. If they don’t find a way to counter this attitude then this kind of roaming of the neighborhood looking for a fight to pick is eventually going to lead to a few fisticuffs, and if not a bloody nose at least a bruised ego on someone's part. Considering the players involved, a bruised ego in this part of the world is more than likely to lead to an exchange of fire at some not to distant point in time.

Creating the means to avoid this confrontation is where Japan comes in and both should and must play a major role in the Pivot Strategy. But it will need the help of America’s Army and Navy to do so.[1]

Before looking at what the U.S. military and Army in particular should do when it comes to reengaging with Japan to support the Pivot Strategy, let’s look at what Japan is doing on its own to counter China’s increasingly hegemonic activities in its back yard.

Not surprisingly, while Japan’s past may have portrayed a bull in a china shop (no pun intended) approach to the world, today its people hold an antiviolence mind set tied to a pacifist constitution. Because of this its reaction to both China and North Korea’s increasing aggression has been milquetoast at best. To date Japan has talked a lot about how it needs to take aggressive action, but done little more than shift the deployment of some of its military southward, closer to the Yellow Sea and the Senkaku Islands. Included in this has been the strengthening of security around the Nansei (Southwestern) Islands of Okinawa Prefecture, by adopting a new concept called the "Dynamic Defense Force." This approach is supposed to signal to China that Japan is ready to counter China's growing activities in the East China Sea. Ready, yes; but actually doing anything, no.

The “sister” countries that also lay claim to the disputed islands will tell you that they too have begun to take steps to put China on notice that they will not sit idly by while China rewrites history to support its claims of ownership. In their case they will say that they have set about acquiring greater offshore naval capabilities.

Well, if you consider repainting an old U.S. Coast Guard cutter with the colors of the Philippine Navy acquiring a greater offshore capability, then I guess you should be satisfied with the actions the sister countries are taking. For our part, for both Japan and the other claimants, all of their actions amount not to much ado about nothing, but to little ado about a lot. If one looks close enough what one will see is that they are waiting for the United States to do something. In their view, as the region’s dominant military power the U.S. should step forward to provide a counterbalance to China’s growing power.

Reader’s of this series of articles will understand that while that may be what’s expected, it likely is not going to happen without some clever maneuvering on the military’s part. One reason is the Obama Doctrine (see companion piece to this article). The other reason is that military budget cuts have reduced America’s capacity to respond to events like this. In fact, it might be said that both China and North Korea’s new confrontational stance may have been triggered by their recognition that America’s military is economically weaker than it has ever been in modern history, and that the Obama Doctrine foretells a much lighter and less effective footprint for America in Asia than what would have been expected in the past. That being the case they are likely thinking now is the time to strike to gain control over the disputed territories.

So while Japan and its sister countries run around as (again, no pun intended) in a Chinese fire drill, waiting for America to come and put out the fire, China and North Korea continue to make headway towards their respective goals. In China’s case this means control of the islands it lays claim to, the navigation routes that determine its ability to assure a constant supply of oil to its military, dominance over the countries that border its periphery, the ability to use North Korea as a foil against U.S. actions, and an ability to occupy the choke points that will determine the outcome of any land wars in Asia (all combined, “A2AD”).[2] In North Korea’s case it means acquisition of nuclear weapons, ICBMs, and the ability to hold China to ransom for economic support in return for a) acting as a foil to stymie U.S. intentions whenever China needs to deflect U.S. interest from one topic to another, and b) a vassal state that will vote in the U.N. in China’s favor on all world matters.[3]

Considering all of this, Japan and its sister countries may be right that only America can solve this problem. But how? Having a Pivot Strategy is one thing. Implementing it in partnership with the U.S. military is another. Expecting the military to achieve success in a Sino-centric part of the world where the bully on the street is still someone to be feared is yet another. Just what exactly should the U.S. military do?

Changing Priorities Lead To New Military Imperatives

Our answer would be to say that the U.S. should build a coalition that includes Japan and its sister states, and use this coalition to push, shoulder to shoulder, back against China. Recognizing that we have just spent several pages explaining that many of the sister states still despise Japan for its war time atrocities and occupation of their countries, as well as harbor sympathetic feelings for the peaceful days of the old Sino-centric model, the reader would be right in thinking that it is going to be nigh impossible to bring these various countries into a military partnership alongside of an armed Japan, even if it is led by the U.S. and designed to protect their interests against China’s power projection. But the truth is, it has to be done.

Among all of the countries of Asia (save Thailand, a country that has never been conquered or occupied) only Japan has a frame of reference strong enough to stand up to the superiority complex that the Chinese have. All of the others, even pugnacious little Vietnam that stood and fought toe to toe with China in 1979, in a border war that cost 30,000 KIA, knows that in the end it is no match for the bullying neighbor to its north.

Japan however feels that it has not just the economic and military might to equal China’s, but perhaps more importantly an imperial past better than that of China and therefore the right to claim the mantle of pre-eminence that China feels belongs to it. Simply put, Japan feels that it is the elite country of Asia, not China. In fact, its people look down their nose at both China and Korea. And strangely, as long as the Japanese continue to walk with an air of indignation at having to have been unfortunate enough to end up living on a little island in the middle of so many lowly and unworthy neighbors, it will earn the respect of those very same neighbors, to the extent that if it treads softly-softly they will follow her lead.

That’s the strange thing about countries harboring airs of superiority. While a country like the Philippines may abhor the air of superiority the Japanese or Chinese hold in relation to them, in the end it’s mighty comforting to know that they believe so strongly in themselves if you are going to have to depend on them to save your country.

With this in mind it is easy to see that while old animosities still live well within the minds of the Filipinos, Vietnamese, South Koreans, and others of Southeast Asia, so too does their admiration for Japan’s indomitable spirit and feeling of pre-eminence over its neighbors. In crafting an anti A2AD response to China, if America’s military is careful it can turn this oddity to its advantage.

The way to do this is to make Japan the coalescing foundation—think of a platform—upon which all of the other smaller countries gather to hear, discuss, modify, agree, and act with respect to the U.S. military’s recommendations concerning China and Korea. Continuing with this visual representation, think of all of the countries involved (including Japan) sitting at a table of military allies, where each country is equal to the other, but where the table and gathering sits atop the “stable foundation” that Japan provides. Similar perhaps to King Arthur’s Round Table where all of the knights and the King himself sat in equality, but the decisions the group made drew strength from the availability of the King’s castle, empire and military assets.

Such a coalition, with Japan as the predominant country providing locus vis, fortitudo, sapientia, the others might, having the goal of projecting their combined military power to parry China’s thrusts into their region, be able to accomplish the task. This is especially so if America's military has an advisory seat at the table to provide the right sort of NSS, NDS, NMS and JOpsC guidance. Coming together to act both in unison as well as individually in partnership with America’s military, under Japan’s economic umbrella, supported by Japan’s logistical strength, these countries could act either independently or collectively to project power to protect their regional claims. In doing so they would always be assured that even when they acted independently they had the U.S. military by their side, the strength of the coalition behind them, the economic and logistical support of Japan, and its mantle of pre-eminence too to portray the righteousness of their actions. Such an approach might be sufficient to confound both China and Korea’s aberrant behavior without leading to active acts of fire. And if it did, all parties would know that China would be facing down the collective mass of the countries of Asia.

No doubt a coalition of this type wouldn’t let Japan take a military lead, due to her behavior in WWII, but if America nudges them sufficiently they will accept Japan as a better than equal whose intellectual and realpolitik guidance they should follow. At the same time these countries could provide their own military manpower instead of Japans, while, again, accepting Japan’s gracious logistical and financial support as well as words of encouragement as to the righteousness of their mutual cause. The role Japan should play then should be one related to administration and logistics, underwritten with moral leadership (think: power, courage, wisdom) stemming from the better elements of its imperial past. It’s goal should be threefold: a) to encourage and create a non-threatening, cohesive unified response to China’s power projection by bringing the other countries of Asia together under its wing, b) to then turn over the stage it has created to America's military to develop the joint strategy that will be followed, and to lead the military aspects of this venture, and c) to support the overall effort with financial, administrative and logistical activities commensurate with the manpower investments the other countries make. Such an approach will be seen by the other countries as based on equality, with recognition being given to each country’s contribution in proportion to its own unique strengths and capabilities. With Japan as the support base on which all others act, the U.S. assuming the military lead, and the others participating as equals, China can not help but notice that it has been outmaneuvered.

I've Heard This Song Before

If all of this sounds vaguely familiar it’s because it is. In an earlier time the Japanese put together a nearly identical arrangement and called it The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (大東亜共栄圏; Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken). It was a concept created and promulgated during the Shōwa era by the government and military of the Empire of Japan. Yes, that one. The one that bombed Pearl Harbor.

Back then, the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere eventually led to war with America and ultimately the world. Today, one would hope that would not be the case. Still while there are similarities there are also important differences.

In the old Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan provided the military muscle and the other countries of Asia provided the economic, financial and logistical support (at gunpoint) to the program. This time it will be the countries of southeast Asia that provide the military muscle and Japan that provides the economic, financial and logistical support to them. Also, back then the Co-Prosperity Sphere was established to muscle the west (think: Britain, the Dutch, Germans and Spanish) out of Asia, leaving Asia for the Asians, with Japan gaining access and control over the spoils the Europeans left behind as they went home. This time no one will be enjoying the spoils of another country’s demise, as the intent is merely to maintain the status quo in terms of keeping China from doing just that to the group’s members. With this in mind, rather than think of this new grouping as another Co-Prosperity Sphere, it might be better to use the slightly altered term Co-security Sphere and also make the point that even as a Co-security Sphere this organization’s purpose and intent is vastly different than the old SEATO group that closed shop in 1977.

What Are We Trying To Do, And How Are We Going To Do It?

As to how such an organization could be set up the answer is that while State Department diplomatic support is necessary, since the real purpose of the organization is to project military power to the Chinese, the entire entity must be set up and managed by the U.S. military. And while on the surface much of the friction in Asia looks to be of a sea born kind, thus suggesting that the required response should be primarily naval in nature and that the U.S. Navy should lead the charge (...or rather, steam full speed ahead), we would posit otherwise.

From our perspective the task is not one of keeping the navigation lanes open by patrolling the Yellow Sea and pushing China' navy aside whenever you run across her, but of occupying the islands that control the approaches and passages to those sea lanes. Navy patrols invite confrontation... taking a Pawn or two as in the game of chess. Occupation of a home country's islands by itself however, especially where ownership has been established under international law, suggests little more than a power projection move, much like the Bishop and Knight provide in chess... an ability to reach beyond their square, without really leaving their square For this to work though one must have feet on the ground, not sounding leads in the water. That is, the square must be occupied. And while the reader might say o.k. then, let the Navy patrol the seas while you use their Marines to occupy those islands that need a shore-born presence, we would say that approach won’t work either.

Here’s the problem: yes, the U.S. Navy is critical to an undertaking of this type. They are the only branch of service with the capabilities to take on the wide ranging naval work involved. Their professionalism, deep seated knowledge of the facts of the case, thorough understanding of the players involved and the casus beli that led to the current state of events is beyond question. At this stage, they are the only experts sitting in America’s corner. But, they don’t have a ground force capable of supporting their needs or of working with the ground forces that will be placed into the equation by the other countries in this Co-security Sphere. This is especially the case when it comes to Japan. If Japan is involved, and she must be, the Marines won't work.

Why? Because the U.S. Marines, through either lack of recognition or negligence on the part of both their commanders and those in the Navy, have over the past 50 years burned their bridges with the Japanese public to the extent that they can’t be repaired in our lifetime. And since Japan is not only integral to the success of this program, but sets the moral high tone for the other countries too, it is imperative that Japan be able to work with the U.S. provided land component of this military assemblage. And while the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) themselves may be able to work with the U.S. Marines, without the wholehearted backing of the Japanese people the entire program will fail.

What’s the problem here, you are asking. Since when have the Marines had their reputation trashed with the Japanese public?

The answer is since MacArthur left Japan and the Navy, Air Force and Marines failed to recognize that their subsequent actions trampled on the sensibilities and sensitivities of the Japanese people. In simple terms, the portion of the U.S. military that oversaw relations with their host, Japan, have done a miserable job of keeping the natives happy, and left a bad taste in the mouth of the Japanese public for anything having to do with the U.S. military.

Yes, we know… Japan was defeated in WWII and our presence there stemmed from an occupation program, not an effort to create a love fest between the Japanese people and the U.S. military. But that was 67 years ago. Surely, sometime during this past period the guys overseeing the occupation of Japan noticed that our presence there was no longer needed to “keep the peace”? If so, then why are we there?

Yes, yes, we know that answer too… to project military power, as a point of presence in Asia, to bring stability to the region, and on and on. It’s for all of the same reasons that we maintain military bases in other countries. But again, surely, someone should have noticed that the way you treat the natives when you are occupying their country after defeating them at war is different than the way you treat a country that graciously hosts your military in order to bring regional stability to their part of the world?

One thing you most definitely do not do when working with a host country versus an occupied country is place your military right smack in the middle of their cities, or take up some of the most valuable real estate the country has.

Yes, yes, yes again… we know that the bases we occupy in Japan today were at the time of original occupation out in the middle of nowhere, and that it’s the towns that grew out to the bases, and not the bases that moved into town. But who cares? The result is the same: today we occupy some of the best prime real estate in Japan… and we stubbornly refuse to move out of those bases and give the space back to the Japanese people.

So what happens when you put your Air Force and Marines in the middle of a city? Bars, clubs and prostitution grows up around them. Local schoolgirls fall in love with American swabbies, flight boys and leathernecks, to the consternation and embarrassment of their fathers and mothers. Local boys feel threatened, jealous, and angry by the competition these foreigners with money in their pocket cause. And the odd schoolgirl or two gets raped.

It ain’t pretty. And it’s been going on at a fevered pitch for 67 years now.

The net result is that regardless of why we didn’t move our bases, or who is right or wrong on this issue, the people of Japan (and Okinawa especially) are disgusted with the U.S. military’s presence in their country. For our purpose here, this makes it nearly impossible for the U.S. Marines, Navy or Air Force to build a close enough relationship with the people of Japan to have the citizenry as a whole embrace the kind of strategy the Co-security Sphere concept envisions.

Building Ties That Bind

One reason is that for the Co-security concept to work, tactically, the U.S. military is going to have to build much closer ties to the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) than we have ever had before. Close ties are needed, as the strategic approach to be used for each individual campaign of confrontation against China and/or Korea is going to have to be developed by the U.S. military. In effect, this means that quasi-political Japanese "policy" will be being made by the U.S. military, but implemented by the JSDF. Seen from a different perspective, the JSDF must become the surrogate of the U.S. military for the program to work. It must provide all of the non-lethal support required to sustain a combined allied set of military arms, where the allies include some 7 key countries in addition to Japan. In this case the U.S. military and the other six countries would provide the lethal element of this equation, while Japan provided the logistical support.[4]

As an example, if the Philippines decided to initiate a standoff with China somewhere in the Spratly Islands, and the Co-security Sphere agreed to the tactical steps that would be taken (presumed here to be for muscle flexing purposes, tending towards confrontation but far short of actually going hot), then the Philippines and the U.S. Army/Navy would provide the manpower while Japan provided the logistics to enable that manpower to revert to kinetic action if the need arose.

In an example like this, Japan’s presence in the mix in all manners short of actual fighting is crucial to the projection of a substantial and effective unified front against China. If America’s military does everything, then this becomes a U.S.–versus–China confrontation. If however the Philippines takes the lead, with the backing of Japan and the other allied countries, and America comes along merely for the ride to observe and perhaps give a little moral support to its allies, then the confrontation will be between the Philippines and China, with the support of Japan and the other countries of Asia being given to the Philippine’s moral cause. What it won’t be is a confrontation initiated by America with China.

Japan’s role in this process is vital. Without the image of Japan standing side by side with the Philippines the power projection would just be projection… with no power. Yet because we know that the Allies in the Co-security Sphere will not let Japan enter the fray with loaded weapons unless they absolutely need her (due to her long history of aggression against these very same countries), Japan’s role has to be to provide the military logistics, not armed manpower. Boiling everything down to its lowest common denominator, the proposed Co-security Sphere Alliance is little more than a rework of the old U.S.–Japan “shield and spear” concept where Japan was responsible for providing the “shield” to defend the Japanese home territories while the US was to act as the “spear” that attacked Japan’s attackers (see interactive graphic at right). Under this new Co-security Sphere approach all that has changed is that more countries have been brought into the picture, to fight alongside of the U.S., while Japan is being asked to broadened its shield to include the disputed territories and sister countries as well, but only as a last resort.

As to what kind of military logistics are involved in the previous example, consider transportation of the armed soldiers, refueling of U.S. and Philippine warships in the region, un-armed reconnaissance over-flights, et cetera. More than just shipping a few hundred Toyotas to the war zone as they did in Iraq, this time Japan is going to have to wear their military uniforms and take an active but unarmed place in the battlespace. For this example, if the U.S. Army ends up sitting on an island in the Spratleys in support of the Philippines’ tactics, the food it eats and the tents it sleeps under, while being its own, will be brought to them by the GSDF. Essentially, whenever a U.S. Officer turns to his side to order anything other than military action or live fire, he will be directing a Japanese staff officer to get it done. Their presence and active involvement in everything short of armed conflict is essential to making the point to China that the people standing up to it and saying that China’s policy of aggression must stop are the countries of Asia.

For the U.S. military involved this will mean a closer working relationship with the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF than was ever experienced in the past. In raw terms it might see the involvement of, say, 6–8 uniformed JSDF support personnel for every 3 U.S. military personnel. The operational headquarters for an activity like this will be virtually crawling with Japanese support staff, albeit they will be being commanded by U.S. military Officers. And while the purpose of the Co-security Sphere would be to resolve the China–North Korea problem without armed conflict, if a localized confrontation did become hot it would be the U.S. and Allied militaries that would be doing the shooting, with Japan providing unarmed but on the ground, in the fight, uniformed logistical support. To set something like this up requires that the Japanese people wholeheartedly embrace the concept. If it's portrayed as Japan standing up to China they will. If however they sense that the whole exercise amounts to little more than sending Japanese boys to fight along side of U.S. Marines, they won't.

Returning to our earlier point, getting all of this done will require that the U.S. military first repair its damaged image with the Japanese public, and then make sure that a) the Marines don't take a lead role, and b) the program is seen as a Southeast Asia effort where the involvement of America's military becomes one of providing strategic guidance, and, of course, military assistance if needed.

Why is repairing the damage necessary? Because just as the Co-Security Sphere Allies view China as the bully in this story, the Japanese public sees the American military as a bully within their own country. Overturning this view is critical to getting the Japanese people to support their Diet when it votes to move the JSDF from their cozy position confined to the islands of Japan and heretofore not permitted to be deployed abroad to a position where they act under U.S. command in foreign lands, all in support of the “lesser” members of the Co-security Sphere.

It’s a fine line to walk, but it can be walked if America’s military can repair its image with the Japanese public.

Building A New Relationship With Japan

As to how to do this, the first step should be to reduce the absolute number of American troops on the main island of Okinawa to as small a number as possible. Note that we did not say send them home, all we said was get them off of the main island. As to who will do their work if they are removed the answer is in the 4th paragraph above: the JSDF. If the people that live in the vicinity of Kadena Air Base, Camp Foster, the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Camp Hansen, Camp Schwab, Torii Station, and Camp Kinser saw, as we suggested above, 8 uniformed JSDF personnel for every 3 U.S. military personnel their impression of what goes on at these bases would change. This is especially true if the 8 JSDF lived with their families off base and were an active part of the local social order. Under such a situation the image conveyed would be that of a set of Japanese bases hosting the occasional U.S. serviceman, rather than the other way around.[5]

Considering that in the Prefecture of Okinawa there are an additional 7 other bases to those listed above, totaling 14 U.S. bases occupying 233 square kilometers (90 square miles) of land, amounting to fully 18% of the main island, and that of the 40,000 American forces in Japan two-thirds of them are in the Prefecture of Okinawa, opting to continue with this travesty and expect to be welcomed with open arms is foolish. And in case anyone has missed the point as to why the locals feel we have worn out our welcome, it is because between 1972 and 2009 there were 5,634 criminal offenses committed by US servicemen, including 25 murders, 385 burglaries, 25 arsons, 127 rapes, 306 assaults and 2,827 thefts. And while it may not be true, and it’s likely undeserved, whether we like it or not the local populace attributes this crime wave to the Marines more so than any other branch.[6]

As to where to put the U.S. military that are removed from the main island of Okinawa, it may not be the most economical thing to do, but it is clearly possible to move them to one of the contested Senkaku Islands where, with the Japanese government’s help and funding, one or more of the islands can be expanded to provide a standalone base for the U.S. to “occupy.” Taking an approach like this would not only resolve the Okinawa controversy but would make a major statement to China about Japan’s intentions regarding the Senkakus, especially if the island expansion effort was seen as an undertaking of the government of Japan rather than the U.S.

As to whether it is feasible to expand one of the uninhabited Japanese islands so that it is large enough to serve as a U.S. military base or not, there is no doubt it is. Japan already proved this when it built the Kansai International Airport on a manmade island south of Osaka. While it is only 4 square miles in size, it nevertheless handles some 120,000 aircraft movements a year (328 per day). This traffic level is more than Kadena Air Base itself handles on a daily basis.

If two or three of these were appended to one of the Senkaku Islands, and the U.S. Army and Air Force moved onto it (the Navy can continue to occupy its port facilities), and the Okinawa bases scaled back to 15% or less of their current sizes, and then populated with the 8-to-3 ratio of Japanese to U.S. troops discussed above, the whole issue of how to resolve the Okinawa problem would disappear. Instead what would be seen would be a Japanese military presence in a series of much smaller military posts on the main island of Okinawa, backed up with a joint Japanese–U.S. presence on a series of new, manmade islands constructed in the middle of the very same but contested islands that Japan claims it owns anyway. Stated another way, if we’re going to develop a set of military policies to support the Pivot Strategy, and use the U.S. military to implement them, and therein take a stand against both China and North Korea’s aggressiveness, then damned it let’s get serious about it and take that stand. Get the U.S. military out of Okinawa and put them on the pieces of rock that matter: the ones everyone is arguing over.

As to why the U.S. Army should take the lead in this effort to implement a new series of military tactics to support the Pivot Strategy, although the prospects are remote today that China will either mount conventional military attacks against the sea-lanes in question or try to take control over a disputed island or two for the foreseeable future, the possibility cannot be ruled out that hostilities could break out between China and one of the Asian states in the South China Sea in the future, perhaps as a result of an incident that spins out of control. If such a scenario takes place China might seek to discourage U.S. military involvement by raising the costs of conflict enough to weaken U.S. resolve. The Chinese could calculate, whether correctly or not, that the United States might hesitate to place its naval carriers at risk, and that China’s growing cruise and ballistic missile capabilities would provide Beijing with a credible “sea denial” option.

Because of this natural proclivity to see the U.S. Navy as the primary opponent that China faces it might be best to remove this threat/temptation and, depending on your point of view, either substitute the U.S. Army (via its presence on a disputed island or two) or buttress the U.S. Navy’s presence and capabilities by paralleling their efforts with those of an Army regiment or two on a couple of islands in the middle of those all important sea lanes. If such a presence were made known not by the U.S. but by a Co-security Sphere Alliance of the nations of Asia (the ones that lay claim to the islands involved) and through whose waters the navigable sea lanes pass, with Japan as the provisional head, then it would be clear that the only way to resolve this problem is by negotiation and friendly discussion amongst the claimants, instead of by bullying.

U.S. Action Items

Using the concept of a Co-security Sphere composed of like minded allies the strategic military imperatives the U.S. military and the U.S. Army in particular must embrace if they are to support the new Pivot Strategy include the following.

● First and foremost the U.S. government and especially the U.S. military advisors and commanders that undertake the exercise to migrate Japan towards a new relationship with both the U.S. and the other claimants to the disputed territories must understand that it’s not the U.S.’ place to pass judgment on whether China’s claims to the disputed territories have merit or not. The reason is that the dispute stems from different views of a shared history to which the United States was not a participant. Instead, without encouraging any of the allies in this dispute to take a harder stand than they are comfortable with, the U.S. must a) bring to bear its maximum diplomatic and military efforts towards diffusing the tensions that exists, not increasing them, and b) allow those tensions to ratchet up support for its allies' claims to their territories only to the extent that international law supports those claims.

At the same time the U.S. must do its best to refocus the attention of the Co-security Sphere members on their own central security interests, building among the group a means to share the responsibility for insuring each other’s future, with Japan as the acknowledged platform that supports the group but otherwise no more than a co-equal. In this regard the U.S. Army can play a major role as it brings into place the military officers of each country, as training, doctrine and operational matters are reviewed and developed among them with regard to the group’s shared roles, missions, and capabilities. During these exchange engagements the U.S. can work to help Japan’s leading officer corps come to grips with, confront and diffuse the historical issues that are at the root of the aversion many of the allies still feel towards Japan. If this is not done, the alliance will fail to realize its full potential.

South Korea presents just such an example, where the U.S. can help the Japanese understand why, for example, the comfort women issue simply will not go away without some sort of recognition from Japan’s military of its responsibility in this regard. As to what kind of “recognition” Japan’s military can take, among a group of equals and like minded officers all focused on working together to deal with China, informal talk and admissions of culpability from the Japanese may go further than political hyperbole and public apologies coming from Japan’s Diet. Towards this end the U.S. Army’s senior Officers can help encourage a frank and even, although private, discussion among the officers involved, without taking sides.

● As the U.S. military makes headway in creating closer bonds between Japan and the military representatives of the other allied members, U.S. Officers should encourage these same Japanese officers to expand their engagement in regional forums so that the growing strength of the Co-security Sphere alliance can be broadcast to and felt by all. Such an approach will assure that not just in the short term but also over the long term the other countries of this part of the world will know that this group is prepared to paper over its past differences and work together towards a mutually respectful relationship among themselves and as a group towards all others. This knowledge, once it permeates the world, will check any thoughts other countries have about taking a stance against any one member of the group. Important among the countries that should be reached out to by the Japanese military corps even more so than has been done in the past are Australia, India, Thailand, and the countries of Latin America.

● To assure that the headway the U.S. military makes in helping Japan build closer ties to the militaries of its sister countries continues, America’s military leaders should encourage Japan to demonstrate its commitment to upholding its role within the Co-security Sphere as the provider of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as well as logistical support, by working to expand its capacity in these areas. One way Japan can do this is by not only demonstrating its competence in these areas but also working to share these capabilities on both a bilateral and multilateral basis with the group’s members.

In terms of acquiring competence in these areas, wherever possible the U.S. should transfer its own best of class military technique and technology to Japan on these matters. In working to impress the members of the coalition of its intent and ability to contribute to the defense of the group through these actions Japan will be making a giant leap forward in placing the rancor of the past firmly in the past, allowing all of the members and Japan itself to move on towards building new relations for the 21st century and beyond.

This latter effort is needed as in the event of a serious confrontation with either China or North Korea the allies will require a more vigorous, collective, and interoperable set of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and operations than they have ever needed before. Additionally these ISR capabilities will need to be able to extend well beyond Japan’s territory into areas it has not previously roamed on a regular basis, including those of its sister countries. As the ISR and logistical platform of the Co-security Sphere, demonstrating that it is serious about doing this work and being a responsible member of the organization will allow the Co-security Sphere to respond in full cooperation to any event that threatens its security, whether in peacetime, during tension, or in event of crisis or war. The U.S. military that directs the Co-security Sphere’s efforts not only can help Japan do this, but they must take responsiblity for getting it done.

● A Co-security Sphere approach to managing the China–North Korea issue is going to require a level of joint interoperability with Japan unlike anything that has occurred to date. The U.S. military Officers assigned to this task must not only accept the challenge of creating new bi-lateral relations with the JSDF, but also dedicate themselves to its success. In fact, accomplishing this task should be at the core of their duties. In all ways they must be measured and graded on their success in helping Japan build new military-to-military ties with the sister country allies, in a way that projects a unified front to China and North Korea. More than just being an internal DOD effort, the Departments of Defense and State must press to a) give the U.S. military the autonomy and budget it needs to succeed, b) support it in all they say and do, and as importantly c) lobby the Japanese Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to do the same. In a time of budgetary constraints leaving this effort to lower level officials or trying to do it on the cheap will lead to disaster and possible armed conflict with China when some lower level U.S. official acts irrationally.

● Training of the forces of the Co-security Sphere in combined arms operation is critical. While the intent is certainly not to take action that leads to actual fighting between the opposing parties, the Co-security Sphere militaries must be up to the challenge if it happens. To assure this is so the U.S. military needs to improve the quality of its bilateral defense exercises. It can do this by bringing into play all sorts and number of likely scenarios that might reflect real life outcomes. For example, rather than depend for training on military bases and airfields the Co-security Sphere should mount exercises that use the hundreds of civilian airports that are sprinkled among the member countries, not to mention the islands that are being contested. By adding to this joint Co-security Sphere exercises that use U.S. facilities in Guam and allied facilities in Australia the militaries involved can learn to work together more closely than China’s own PLAGF, PLAN, PLAAF, SAC, and PAP do.[7]

● While not an important part of the Co-security Sphere’s strategic military objectives the existence of this group provides good reason for the U.S. military to expand joint development efforts towards improved as well as future weapons. Where the military goals of the Co-security Sphere program show weakness in terms of equipment held by the various countries involved an effort should be made to design and produce in these countries the near-term armament that is needed. If joint Japanese–U.S. research is done to develop, say, a better integrated form of military communication that uses the unique mobile frequencies and transmission methods (such as FOMA and CDMA) of Southeast Asia, the resulting product designs should be manufactured in the sister countries. This coming together to meld research and manufacturing amongst the group will again help to build ties between the various militaries in ways that overcome the antagonisms of the past.

As to whether all of this is really necessary or not, yes it is. First, Southeast Asia will never be stable and at peace until the rancor stemming from Japan’s WWII activities is put to bed once and for all. That means somebody must take the lead in helping all of these countries resolve their differences on this matter. To leave things to fester as, from time to time, they do now, only plays into China’s hand.

Second, Secretary of State Clinton is right in perceiving a need to develop a Pivot Strategy that begins now to address the growing weight of China and the intransigence of North Korea. Within that Pivot Strategy the U.S. military must play a role, because as we have said before the imperatives that drive the need to pivot come from military matters. If the U.S. military is to play such a role then it must rethink its relations with all of the countries of Asia. Key among them is Japan. America’s military relations with Japan need to be made better, closer, stronger, and deeper. That being the case, the U.S. military must rehabilitate its damaged image in the eyes of the Japanese people, while at the same time it helps bring the Japanese military into closer cooperation and partnership with the other countries of Asia. Giving the U.S. Army an expanded role in this area will help by letting the over exposed U.S. Marines, Navy and Air Force step out of the Japanese limelight for a while, and focus on their job instead of defending themselves against political and social criticism from Japan’s own talking heads.

And if these reasons do not present a strong enough case to get the U.S. military to act to develop a set of strategic policies and tactical actions to take to help this troubled part of the world remain calm, one only need read what the Chinese say their position is on these issues. The Chinese have been unequivocal in making their stance known on the status of the Spratlys. They have said that their South China Sea claims are a matter of national sovereignty, pride and principle, over which absolutely no compromise is possible.

Quoting from a recent Rand Corporation report,

Chinese scholars and academics with close ties to the Chinese government echo this view. As one said: “Regional countries have occupied China’s islands and reefs, carved up its sea areas, and looted its marine resources,” adding that China’s moves in recent years are a “long-overdue and legitimate action to protect its territorial integrity.” If China lost such territory, “the legitimacy of the communist regime would be questioned.” Echoing this sentiment, another Chinese academic said: “The Spratly issue is about what is China, and what is China’s space.” Simply put, any Chinese leader considering compromise on the issue would have to take account of the likely adverse reaction of key domestic audiences.[8]

Conclusion

It seems clear from the above that the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) are prepared to go to war, even against the United States, to take possession of these islands rather than risk a people's revolution that would displace them as the ruling government. Wouldn't we do the same if China tried to take one of the Hawaiian Islands, and the American people were so upset with our own leader's inability to defend the islands that they threatened to dismantle our executive-legislative-judicial form of government and replace it with a different form? Considering this then, are we prepared today to back a set of Southeast Asian countries like those outlined above in order to avoid such a war?

If we would rather avoid a direct war with China, it might be better to back them now than duck the issue. That, after all, is what the Pivot Strategy is about: taking aggressive diplomatic action today, supported by low level but nevertheless convincing military posturing, to try to settle the land grab that is going on rather than wait for war to develop. For the military's part, if we pivot and get busy building a Japan-centric coalition we may be able, with the right enlightened guidance from our own military, to cause the coalition to dissuade China from hostile actions.

   Strategically: The military imperatives we must undertake are these:

● Expand the military's efforts in Asia by embracing the Pivot Strategy.

● Expect and structure the senior level of our military in Asia to take an active interest in not just military affairs in the region, but also those political affairs that can only be influenced through military channels.

● Restore and refresh our military's bruised relations and public image with these key countries in Asia: Japan, the Philippines, South Korea.

● With the following new countries, build new, vibrant and close relations: Vietnam, Myanmar

● Work with these and the other countries listed above to lower tensions among them, especially over the contested islands. Focus on the military, but look for opportunities to support State Department efforts to do the same on the civilian side of the equation.

● Convince the Asian military and government leaders involved that a concerted effort that has all of these countries acting in unison to present a unified face to China is better than each of them trying to "go it alone."

● Present to China the face of a concerned ally of these countries, indicating that while we will not take a stand on who own what islands, we will defend to the last standing man the stand our allies take.

   Tactically: The military actions we must undertake are these:

● Move our bases out of the cities in Japan.

● For any bases that remain, assure that they 1) remain only because the JSDF wants to use them, and 2) are perceived by the public as having been converted to JSDF bases. In this regard, insure that U.S. staffing on these bases does not exceed 3 U.S. troops for every 8 JSDF.

● Work with the allied countries to create and form a military centric Co-security Sphere. Encourage the governments of these countries to form a similar political support organization among themselves. If they fail to do this or back away because of the obviousness of its purpose being to confront China, at a minimum convince them that for their own defense they need to allow their military to participate in the Co-security Sphere effort.

● Establish and operate a specialized program similar to the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) system, where the effort is focused almost exclusively on how the allies can collectively project power, determination, and competence to China, in defense of the islands they claim title to.

● Establish a program to conduct an ongoing set of joint exercises that utilize all of the claimed territories of the allied states. Focus on drills and exercises that use civilian airports, ports, other non-military land and sea areas, and as much as possible the disputed territories. On this last point, do not use those islands claimed directly by China but instead use those territories that are part of, say, the Spratley Islands, and clearly belong to the Philippines. (In every group of disputed islands, there are those that China will concede  belong to another country, while at the same time they lay claim to still others. Conduct the exercises on the islands that are 'less disputed.")

● Develop a set of exercises designed to physically challenge China's presence near, at or on each of the disputed islands. Monitor each island, and when Chinese naval or fishing vessels approach, match their strength, plus one, in each case. Take no aggressive action, but make it clear that their passage is at the behest of the Co-security Sphere's approval.

● Parallel all of the above efforts with a robust public relations campaign that covers all media outlets, including social networking (an especially important outlet given the propensity of China's youth to follow world events via this channel). Design the program so that the rhyme and reason for the Co-security Sphere's actions are explained in depth. Take the moral high ground in these discussions and never fail to keep it. Include historical reference and education on the subject of the evolution of each island's settlement and inhabitation to substantiate the claims of ownership being made.

● Constantly keep pressure on the civilian side of all of the governments involved to work to resolve the matter through friendly discussions with China, in order to assure that these military efforts do not end up becoming the only and best avenue of choice for settling the dispute. 

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Next month: Strategic Military Imperatives – South Korea

 

 

    

Footnotes 

[1] While the sea lanes and disputed islands are the major threat to peace and stability in Asia, there are other flash points between China, its neighbors and the U.S. that pose risk. An example would be the U.S.’ continued sale of arms to Taiwan. These other issues aside, as regards the strategic military imperatives that relate to the U.S. and Japan, the issue of ownership of the disputed islands, the necessity of keeping the sea lanes in this area open for navigation by all, and the need to build closer, more respectful ties between Japan and the countries it formerly occupied (for the most part South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, as well as China itself) are the driving factors that affect the need to change the form and function of the U.S.–Japan military relationship. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[2] These factors all fall under the term A2AD, or Anti-Access/Area Denial. It is a term coined in 2003 by Dr. Krepinevich and Bob Work to describe an opponent's ability to contest America’s freedom of maneuver, most generally at sea but also over land. Pakistan’s ability to close the supply routes that the U.S. uses to support its war efforts in Afghanistan shows an example of A2AD in action. China is actively engaged in trying to apply A2AD to America throughout the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea and many of the sea lanes that it uses to communicate with the world. While an important term, the concept is nothing new as this mode of contestation has prevailed since armies and navies were first invented. Of interest to us here is its use as a simple phrase to describe the many items listed above. The reader is cautioned that the term can apply to either an attempt to deny access to a country, or the effort to stop such denial. In other words, the term is usually used by both sides when talking of the same subject, with opposite meaning being connoted by whether you are seeking to be the one to deny or to stop from being denied.- To return to your place in the text click here:

[3] The relationship China and North Korea share is symbiotic. For China, one of the key values North Korea has and which causes China to support it against all logic is that when China needs to deflect America’s interest from a global event where America is winning the scrum with China all it need do is prod North Korea to create an incident with either South Korea or the U.S. By doing this China knows that America will run to address this new incident, and in the process concede the point to China as regards the other issue, in return for China helping America by bringing the North Koreans back into line. Whether it’s firing test missiles or testing nuclear weapons, if one looks one can usually find these things happening at just about the same time that the U.S. is beginning to get the upper hand over China on some other unrelated issue. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[4] Key countries of the Co-security Sphere: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Burma. Possible backup players: Brunei and Cambodia.- To return to your place in the text click here:

[5] Wikipedia, key word: Okinawa Prefecture. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[6] David Hearst, March 11, 2011, “Second battle of Okinawa looms as China's naval ambition grows". The Guardian. UK. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[7] PLAGF: People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces; PLAN: People’s Liberation Navy; PLAAF: People’s Liberation Army Air Force; SAC: Second Artillery Corps (strategic missile forces and nuclear forces); and PAP: People’s Armed Police (paramilitary internal police force that provides additional infantry capabilities in timer of war). - To return to your place in the text click here:

[8] The Rand Corporation, The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China, “China’s Potential Military Threat To Southeast Asia,” Page 22.- To return to your place in the text click here:

Additional Sources

Michael Swaine; The Diplomat; China, What’s Next?, Avoiding US-China Military Rivalry; February 2011.

Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force, RAND, MR-1160-AF, 2000.

Robyn Lim, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2, August 1998.  

Kosuke Takahashi, April 4, 2012, Japan sets sights on Pyongyang's launch, Asia Times Online. 

Richard L. Armitage and Joseph Nye, August 15, 2012, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, Anchoring Stability In Asia, Center for Strategic And International Studies.

Michael McDevitt; Pacific Forum CSIS; Honolulu, Hawaii; Publication Number 33; May 31, 2012, The Evolving Maritime Security Environment in East Asia: Implications for the US-Japan Alliance.

 

 

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