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You Just Can't Trust Those Signal Corps Guys

"The Signal Corps"

Saw something the other night which surprised me more than my late investigations of spiritualism. It was some examples of the methods of the United States Signal Corps to telegraph information from point to point on the battle-fields of the rebellion. The Signal Corps "mediums" were Colonel Wicker, of the Russian Telegraph Expedition, and Mr. Jerome, Secretary of Mr. Conway of the same, both of whom were distinguished officers of Signal Corps throughout the war. Besides these two gentlemen there are only two other members of the corps on the coast.

In the late war a signal party was always stationed on the highest available point on the battle-field, and by waving flags they could telegraph any desired messages, word for word, to other signal stations ten miles off. At night, when torches were used, these messages have been read forty miles away, with a powerful glass. The flag, or torch, is waved right, left, up and down, and each movement represents a letter of the alphabet, I suppose, inasmuch as any villainous combination of letters and syllables you can get up can be readily telegraphed in this way with a good deal of expedition. These gentlemen I speak of sent messages the other night with walking-sticks, with their hands, their fingers, their eyes and even their moustaches! It is a little too deep for me.

One sat on one side of a large room, and the other at the opposite side. I wrote a long sentence and gave it to Jerome - he made a few rapid passes with his right arm like a crazy orchestra leader, and Colonel Wicker called off the sentence word for word. I confess that I suspected there was collusion there. So I whispered my next telegram to Jerome - the passes were made as before, and Colonel Wicker read them without a balk. I selected from a book a sentence which was full of uncommon and unpronounceable foreign words, pointed it out to Colonel Wicker, and he telegraphed it across to Jerome without a blunder. Then I gave Jerome another telegram; he placed two fingers on his knees and raised up one and then the other for a while, and the Colonel read the message. I furnished the latter with the following written telegram:

"General Jackson was wounded at first fire."

He went through with a series of elaborate winks with his eyes, and that other signal-sharp repeated the sentence correctly. I wrote:

"Thirteen additional cases of cholera reported this morning."

The accomplished Colonel telegraphed it to his confederate by simply stroking his moustache. There must be a horrible imposition about this thing somewhere, but I cannot get at it. They say that when they are in lecture rooms and parlors whence they are not close enough to speak to each other, they telegraph their comment on the company with their fingers, on their moustaches, or by gently refreshing themselves with a fan.

The signal Corps was one of the most important arms of the military service in the late war. It saved many a battle to the Union that must otherwise have been lost. Yet many of the officers of the army did not believe in its efficiency, regarded it as an ornamental innovation, and bore it strong ill-will. At the battle of Winchester, the officer in command after General Shields was wounded, had pressing need of reinforcements. The reserve were in full view six miles away. The Acting General asked a signal officer if he could order up a brigade. He said he could. "Then do it," said the General; "but," said he, "to make everything sure, I will dispatch an orderly for the reinforcements." The signal officer set his flags waving, and telegraphed: "Send up a brigade on the double-quick." Before the orderly was a hundred yards off, the anxious General gazing through his field glass, saw a brigade wheel into the plain, peel their coats and knapsacks off and throw them down, and come sweeping across on the double-quick. "By G--. here they come! - send back the orderly," said the General - "but I didn't think it could be done. 

Reproduced from: Virginia City Territorial Enterprise, February 1866

In this article we'll call it Burma. Understand though that the government of Burma calls it Myanmar. As to what the people in the country call it… the strange answer is both. In private, when the Myanmar government is not listening, the old world (pre-‘62 revolution) elite call it Burma, the western educated call it Burma, most of the ethnic minorities call it Burma, and the Burmese people who want to make a political statement call it Burma. But the military leaders that (until recently) ran the country still call it Myanmar.[1]

Get the point? The country is so fractured that even the people who live in it disagree about what it should be called.

While the people of Burma are a friendly, smiling and peaceful people, they are also a deeply troubled people, with a strong penchant towards division along ethnic (tribal) lines. Intimidated since 1962 by every form of human rights abuse you can imagine, all inflicted by the ruling military junta, the people are tired and a bit scrappy. Give them a chance and they will express their frustration. Arguing over the name of the country is one of the ways they do it.

Religious persecution, ethnic cleansing, forced relocations of indigenous communities, summary executions, arbitrary arrests, the use of civilians as human mine sweepers, slave labor, gang-rapes… they have all been documented by Amnesty International and the U.N. Human Rights Commission as means used by the ruling military to control the Burmese people in order to stay in power. As a result of these abuses more than 800,000 refugees have been driven out of Burma, mostly into neighboring Thailand, Bangladesh and India. Yet the people are hopeful.

Going back in time one finds the beginning of Burma starting in 1057 when King Anawrahta founded the first unified Burmese state at Pagan and adopted Theravada Buddhism as the national religion. Theravada Buddhism is an interesting religion, as it allows one to become a Rinpoche (literally: precious one; figuratively: a pastor in the form of one who provides guidance on the teachings of Buddha) and then, when the need arises, take off one’s habits to rejoin society and become a normal person again, after which one can then put their habits back on and return to their religious duties, before leaving again when the need next arises. A practical solution to the task of surviving in a difficult world, it shows the pragmatic thinking of the Burmese people in modifying their spiritual approach to match life’s demands.[2]

Yet while Buddhism took root and spread throughout the country, once the British took over the unification that the monarchy brought began to die. The result is that in the living memory of most Burmese today the country has not had a stable, modern central government that has been able to make the country feel as though it is one.

The British aside, one of the other reasons this is so is because Burma is made up of many minorities. Tribal people who live in disconnected regions of the country, the 136 ethnic groups include such notables as the Shan (one of the most warring), the Kachin (who control the drug trade and many of Burma’s famous jade mines), and the Bamar (that make up the largest group, with about 68% of the population).  

Continued from left column... 

Fighting among themselves much as early American Indian tribes did (mostly for small territorial expansion, women, foodstuffs in time of famine, and purely for honor and as a show of manhood), no one group has been able to prevail long enough for the nation to find and establish a social order that embraced all of the other groups. Instead, various forms of ‘western’ government mechanisms have been tried as a means of bringing the country together, from socialism to communism, war lords, democracy (of various kinds), and military rule.

It’s only this last method that proved able to keep the country from splintering into a dozen or so tribal areas… albeit at great cost and via a heavy-handed approach that nearly destroyed the country. It reminds one of the statement 'It became necessary to destroy the town to save it,' attributed variously to either Major Cannella or Major Booris over the battle of Bến Tre in 1968. Still, without the heavy-handed approach the military took to keep the country together it probably would have split into dozens of virulent factions. However, from our perspective, remembering that this quasi-successful but greatly despised military is the same military that the U.S. Army must befriend if it is to help implement the State Department’s rebalancing strategy, it begs the question what will the people of Burma think of our military if it suddenly begins cozying up to their military?

As to how the military ended up in charge, it all began when the British turned over the remaining vestiges of their Empire to self rule following WWII. Just as they did in India where their partition of Pakistan led to problems that we still live with today, so too did they do the same in Burma’s case; the British screwed up.

Before the British arrived the ethnic groups, while willingly paying tribute and homage to a central king, still ruled their own micro-kingdoms. When the British forced them into one British ruled country they revolted. When the British then packed up and left, but still forced them to accept a common "ruler," the fighting started in earnest. As the tribes got busy fighting among themselves the elite got busy trying to figure out a mode of government that would work for this fractured country. Not surprisingly, what they began with was a form of western style democracy.

In 1960 U Nu's party faction won a decisive victory in what for all practical purposes was a rather fair democratic election. For a while things looked as though they might settle down. Unfortunately, U Nu took it upon himself to promote Buddhism as a state religion, while at the same time tolerating separatism by the ethnic tribes that were fighting for control of their own territory. For the military this was a bridge too far. Angered by the government promoting a state religion as well as acceptance of separatism, the military, who wanted a unified country that was secular and not a hotbed of religious fervor, struck. They took over the government.[3]

As we military men all know, taking over a government is one thing, running it is another (think: Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan).

As the country’s new leaders Burma’s military did not just a horrible job, but a despicable one too. Worse, in the process they layered self enrichment on top of authoritarianism until the people revolted.

Repression and corruption pushed people to the point of no return, and in 1988 riots broke out. Riots were followed by thwarted elections, ousted leaders and conflicting signals as to what would be tolerated and what would not be. Meager attempts by the people to take back their country were pushed aside as the powerful military and non-military elite fought for the spoils and trappings that came with the power they seized. Along the way Russia and China vied for positions of influence and strength, North Korea struck financially lucrative deals and transferred a few nuclear secrets, pro democracy supporters were tried and imprisoned (mostly to keep them out of the way so that the spoils could be fought over) and public unrest grew. Eventually the whole mess became top heavy and tipped over. Whether it was the cyclone of 2008 being a straw more than the camel could carry, or the aging of the military leaders and their simply tiring of fighting each other to stay alive, through 2008 and 2009 cracks began to appear and the light of freedom began to seep through.

In 2010 the military rulers changed the flag, national anthem, and name of the country one more time… and let several splinter groups enter the political arena. In November 2010, for the first time in 20 years, a free and quasi-fair election was held, with the military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) claiming victory. Interestingly, while most western analysts saw the election as having been rigged to allow the USDP to win, contentiously shouting election fraud from the rooftops, what they missed was that the military was in fact stepping aside. That is, while it admittedly was deciding which party it would allow to win, it was nevertheless still allowing another party to win. Pointedly, it was letting another party come to power on the basis of picking the party that would be least objectionable to it.[4]

And thus the transition began. By March 2011 Thein Sein was sworn in as president of a new, nominally civilian government. In August Aung San Suu Kyi found herself being invited to discussions with him about how to move forward to create a more pluralistic society. In September President Thein Sein suspended construction of the controversial Chinese-funded Myitsone hydroelectric dam, a move seen as showing greater openness to public opinion as well as a signal to the west (think: United States) that Burma was interested in hedging its bets with China by building closer ties to the west.[5]

And so it has gone until today, mostly with good things happening but also a few problems too. As for where the problems are coming from, ethnic conflict is still at the root of much of it. For the government to be effective and govern it is going to have to figure out how to solve this problem. And since violence and military strength have not worked to ‘keep the tribes in their place’ for the past 50 years, there’s little chance it is going to work today. The ethnic tribes in the hill country of the north, as well as the lowlands, are not afraid of a head to head fight with the Burmese Army. 

Training Challenges

–

The Signal Corps In

WWII

- 1943 -

Last month we posted an article that talked of the very early days of Ft. Monmouth. In it we spoke of the curiosities of Monmouth’s early history, how it came into existence, why, and the shenanigans having to do with “recruiting” Monmouth’s first soldiers for training. Along the way we spoke of Camp Little Silver and Camp Alford Vail (both early names for Ft. Monmouth).

In other articles over the past few months you have heard us refer to Camp Crowder in Missouri, Murphy in Florida, and other Signal Corps facilities… many of which none of us ever heard of during our time in OCS. The short story of Camp Kohler in the column at left is still another example. One could be forgiven for wondering just what these Signal Corps places were, and why they were built? For that matter, why is it that the Signal Corps back during the WWI to WWII period seems to have had such a jumbled assemblage of loosely connected areas of responsibility, tasks, facilities, and personnel that, from this far into the future,  seems to make no sense at all to those of us who knew it during Korea or Vietnam?

Well, in this short column we hope to help clarify a few of these things for you. The best way to do that however is to talk to you of the Signal Corps from mid-1943 to the end of that important year.

For military historians, the second world war can easily be broken down into three key periods: the emergency, the test, and the outcome. Clearly, the emergency refers to that portion of the war following Pearl Harbor, when America needed to ramp up to fight a war it was only sparsely prepared for. The test would of course cover that period from the time of our first troubling defeats until we began to turn the tide and gain both a little ground and an upper hand on the enemy. During these periods, a span of about 18 months, America had experienced a brief period of what others have described as confused impotence, followed by a slightly longer period of desperate defeats, after which came a slow growth of confidence and a concentration upon offensives until eventually we began to demonstrate a capacity to win. By mid-1943 the war was being carried to the enemy. This marked the beginning of what we are calling the outcome. To best understand the Signal Corps and how it evolved to what we Korean and Vietnam Vets know it as it is easiest if we go back to the beginning of the outcome, and look at the Signal Corps' efforts to organize itself from that point forward.[6]

At that time the Signal Corps was a disjointed command that included nearly every element that none of the other service arms wanted (from aircraft to artillery radar and more), as well as any weapon system even remotely connected to things based on new technologies. With a primary mission to provide communication throughout the Army, mid-1943 saw the Signal Corps just beginning to get a handle on the crisis and struggles it had been having from the beginning. More to the point, while it still had its plate full of problems and angry stake holders (the Infantry, tank corps, and senior command in Washington come to mind…) it could at least hold its head up as in the field in North Africa it had just passed its first great combat test of the war.

The North African campaign was important for the Signal Corps, as it brought together the disparate elements the Signal Corps had been trying to integrate for the past two years into a cohesive force that was finally able to support intense ground combat operations across a large battlefield. In North Africa the model that had been put together succeeded and from that point forward the Signal Corps gained confidence in itself, as troops, equipment, and doctrine met the task and proved that the principles that had been laid out during the period of the test were what was needed.

As significant, it soon became obvious just how important the Signal Corps’ role was to winning the war, as around the world one field commander after another began to see how critical signalmen were to his own success. At the highest ranks of the Signal Corps itself these facts quickly set in, as those charged with getting the job done began to realize the unprecedented breadth and scope of work that needed to be accomplished to meet the oath embedded in those four simple words: get the message through.

story continued below photo and byline... 

story continues from above inset...

In mid-1943 that was the situation the Signal Corps was facing. That is, now that it was known that the tactics that underwrote the Signal Corp’s mission worked, the task was to assemble the supplies and troops needed by each theater of war and get them out to the combat commanders that depended on them. Notwithstanding this, everyone involved also knew that the war, while fully engaged on all fronts, was far from over. From this point forward it was going to be a logistics race: the side that was most able to advance their development of leading edge weapons, train their men better than the other side, and get these two to the battle space was going to win. Material and men. It was coming down to that.

Fortunately the Signal Corps began this race with a decent complement of both on its side. In mid-1943 the Signal Corps had nearly 26,000 Officers and over 290,000 enlisted men wearing the crossed flags. These were further supported by more than 60,000 civilian workers salted throughout Signal Corps facilities across America. Behind all of this was a budget of $5 billion that had been allocated to the Signal Corps out of the Army-Navy budget total of $100 billion. A fair sum, it meant that a nickel out of every dollar spent on the war went towards Signal Corps goals. To make sure it was spent well a new Chief Signal Officer was appointed: Maj. General Harry C. Ingles.

Ingles quickly figured out that if the Signal Corps was to provide improved and ever more communication capabilities to even more people it needed more, better, and more reliable electronic equipment, as well as much better trained men… and all of this had to be provided on a much larger scale and in greater variety than had ever been done before by the U.S. military.

Of all of the things Ingles did the one that sits dear to our hearts is the creation of the Personnel and Training Service. Why? Because this unit is what led to the Signal Corps OCS program that most of us graduated from. At the same time as he created this service Ingles appointed Brigadier General Jerry V. Matejka to head it. Fortunately for all, Matejka was the man who just happened to have set up and witnessed the Signal Corps’ success in the North African campaign (technically: the North Africa Theater of Operations, United States Army, or simply NATOUSA; see inset above). If anyone knew what was needed back home in the States to allow the successes in North Africa to be replicated around the world, it was Matejka.

Notwithstanding the need to increase the speed of production of men and materials, and inculcate in them the Signal Corps’ now proven tactics, at the time General Matejka took charge Signal Corps’ training activities were doing pretty well. In fact they were at their height, with the inflow of men nearly matching the demand coming from the theaters of war. Doing what it was supposed to do, month after month, thousands of new draftees, technical students, specialists, officer candidates, and Officers entered the Signal Corps’ training factories on one end and came out the other side with the intricacies of communication instilled in their soul, ready for assignment. 

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