It’s possible. General Claire Lee Chennault proved it was possible to mount an independent air campaign over friendly yet independently commanded army troops, with both sides chasing the same enemy, when he crafted a group called the Flying Tigers. While Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese army took after the Japanese on the ground, with little regard for what Chennault was doing in the air, Chennault kept the Japanese from ruling the skies even while he took the fight to the Japanese on the ground... all still without coordinating with Chiang until far into the war.

This then is the Dutch Treat War Policy we speak of: a concept built around the idea that in a mid-level regional conflict one country would provide the army, another the air force, perhaps a third the navy, and a fourth the logistical support required to enable the whole thing to work. For the most part, each would stick to their own area of responsibility… and presumably expertise. Senior level command and control would come from the most seasoned and capable of the three countries involved, but such command would not extend down, for example, to management of the troops on the ground by some central authority. Instead, the troops on the ground would fight the war they want to fight, the air power above would fight the war it wants to fight, and when useful or of value, the two might mount a combined operation...  but not as a rule. There thus would be no "combined forces" operations, in the traditional sense that our readers may know of it as taking place. Yes, there would be coordination, but no, the forces involved would not be directed from a centralized command center in terms of each level's small-force tactical goals, objectives and responses to events on the ground.

Is this what President Obama has in mind for fighting the Islamic State?

We know not, but whether he knowingly invented this concept or just stumbled upon it as part of his normal knee jerk reaction to avoid anything having to do with war, it just might prove a useful model as the world moves on through the next century. And to be sure, somewhere, sitting at some desk in the Pentagon, is a young butter bar fresh out of college with his MBA in strategic thinking and planning framed and hanging over his desk… someone who will look at this whole thing and turn it into a war doctrine of beauty… a new strategic war concept able to allow America to forge drone wars wherever it wishes, without putting more than a token of its youth onto the actual battlefield.

Doubt and skepticism aside… there is both value and danger in such a concept, and it should be explored more; but for a Dutch Treat War Policy to work there are some preconditions that must be met. One of them is that the coalition partners be able to coordinate their efforts and integrate their actions. This is so even to the extent that they strive to act autonomously.

Going back to our earlier analogy, in a Dutch Treat lunch this means, for example, that we both have to be using the same kind of currency that the restaurant accepts. A Dutch Treat lunch won’t work if the restaurant accepts U.S. dollars but one party brings Guilders. The same is true in a Dutch Treat War. For all practical purposes, the two parties are going to have to be using the same kind of military arms and communication equipment if they are to effectively coordinate their efforts. It’s because of things like this that NATO was formed—to assure not only that its members can depend on support from other members in a time or war, but also to make sure that all of the military equipment, systems, and command and control parameters involved were compatible.

In a case like NATO, a formal organization, establishing a common standard that assures military-to-military compatibility is easy to do. But what of the case of an Obama led Dutch Treat War, like the one ramping up in the Middle East? Can the U.S. be assured that its coalition partners—the ones that will provide the troops on the ground that will underscore America’s airpower—will have military equipment compatible with ours?

If the Saudis, Iraqis, Jordanians or Kurds provide the troops on the ground, the answer would likely be yes, and that would be good. But there is no guarantee that the next time a U.S. President decides to apply the Obama Dutch Treat War Doctrine that that will be the case. For that to happen, America is going to have to actively identify those countries around the world that it feels it may turn to in time of a Dutch Treat War as a coalition partner, and go out and seek to sell them U.S. military equipment of the type and kind necessary for them to be able to act as a terra firma partner to our avian war power.

Make no mistake, we think that what President Obama is playing around with here—the formation of an innovative approach to war, what we have called with a bit of tongue in cheek humor a Dutch Treat War Doctrine—is good. We laud him for his creativity and support his efforts. Let’s hope he succeeds both in the coming war in the Middle East, and in establishing this new international power projection tool as something America can depend on for years to come. However, if what he is doing is going to have long term value, then America needs to get busy building coalition partners that will neatly fit into the Dutch Treat War Policy puzzle.

Among the first such countries we recommend America try to bring into this framework as a potential future partner is Vietnam.

The Vietnam Syndrome

Fifty years ago it would not have seemed possible to think that someday in our lifetime we, the ones who fought that war, would be recommending that America bring under its fold as a combat partner those we were fighting against back then… but that was back then. Today the world has changed. Vietnam is no longer an enemy, nor for that matter is the concept of other countries living under different social, economic or political systems than ours.

If a country’s people want to live under some abstract form of socialism or communism, let them. There’s no need for us to give of our country’s youth to stop them. Let the dominos fall where they may.

Hegemonic power projection though is a different matter. If a country wants to project its power to the extent that it stifles the freedoms of neighboring countries, holds citizens of other countries hostage to economic, military, religious, or social goals that serve their purpose alone, then they have to be stopped. Stopped not to the extent of forcing change on the way that a hegemonic country lives, but its ability to stifle the freedoms of its neighbors.

We talk here of forming a new relationship with Vietnam because in China we see such hegemonic ambitions. Born of long held and still simmering anger over centuries of “unequal treaties” forced on it by the world at large (think England, Germany, France, Holland Portugal and especially Japan); stung by the embarrassment of having once controlled more of the world’s land mass than any other nation, only to be reduced for a while to a desperate, starving, over populated cult run by a despot… China today is full of young people who think that now that they have turned their country and economy around, it is their time… their time to rule the world. And in feeling such, many of these young people look with barely concealed spite and malice at countries like South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and especially Vietnam… as countries who are due for a comeuppance. Countries that need to be put in their place and taught a lesson for what they did to China in the past… countries that need to be reminded of China’s superiority over them.

Why should we care?

Because if China expands her hegemonic activities in Southeast Asia she will destabilize not only the countries she targets, but the global economy as well. And while this would cause only a minor disruption to the economy of China itself, and no military threat to speak of, it would play havoc with America’s economy and might well have military consequences too. The reason is that a) today the world comprises an integrated global economy to which America is tied to many of the countries of Southeast Asia, and b) America is also tied to many of these same countries via mutual defense treaties. Because of this dual linkage, when America catches a cold… economic or military… Southeast Asia sneezes. And when one or two of the countries in Southeast Asia get sick at the same time, America gets sick too. If China embarks on a path to make a number of these countries come down with a cold, we will suffer.

Presuming for the sake of argument that we are right, and that China poses an economic and military threat to its neighbors, and there through to America as well, what should America do about it? Our answer is that Obama’s new Dutch Treat Foreign Policy concept just might provide a means for stopping China from undertaking hegemonic activities and exploiting its neighbor’s and America’s weaknesses in that part of the world. If so, then America needs to begin now to reach out to countries like Vietnam and ask them to sign on to a new Dutch Treat Foreign Policy initiative with us.

To do that with Vietnam however, America must first lift its weapons sales ban on the country; because until we do so, we cannot bring them into the fold and prepare their troops to fight alongside of us… trampling the earth underneath our airborne umbrella, if you will.

Is there some risk in bringing Vietnam so close to us? We doubt so. From our perspective, China represents a much greater threat to the world than Vietnam does, and the sooner America puts together a coalition of like minded countries… such as Vietnam… interested in not necessarily containing China but at least making her think twice before throwing her weight around, the better.

An Enemy No More?

Getting to the point where the U.S. begins selling weapons to Vietnam… weapons and weapon systems that integrate with our own… is not going to be easy. Yes, ties between our two countries have been warming of late, but problems still remain.

On the plus side, our two countries have developed what might be called a common strategic foundation. This has led to the U.S. military making more headway in working with Vietnam than their cohorts in the U.S. State Department. There is no doubt, relations between our two militaries have become increasingly cooperative, to the extent that the road is already paved for America to help Vietnam upgrade its armament to U.S. standards. But the weapon sales ban still continues.

Why? In great measure because of two things, a reservation on our part, and another on theirs. For our part, there continues to be concern about Vietnam’s human rights record. For theirs, some members of the ruling Communist Party Politburo in Hanoi worry about provoking China by enhancing military ties with the United States.[1]

That’s the bad news. The good news is that despite both of our concerns, there is keen mutual interest in taking another look at these issues and seeing if they can be mitigated. President Obama’s Dutch Treat Foreign Policy concept just might provide an impetus to do so.

In terms of what kind of U.S. military weapons and systems the Vietnamese need in order to fit into a Dutch Treat War framework, the Vietnamese are way out in front of America on this issue, and have already presented the U.S. with a wish list of first pass purchases of military hardware. They did this back in 2012 when former secretary of defense Leon Panetta visited the country. At that time he was invited to tour Cam Ranh Bay, where during meetings the Vietnamese pointedly made the case that the upgrade the U.S. was seeking in terms of bilateral defense ties could not go forward as long as the U.S. continued to keep in place a ban on military equipment sales to Vietnam... yet they wanted the U.S. to know that not only did they want to upgrade ties between our two countries, but also begin to buy military hardware from us too.

From this author’s perspective, their pressing the case that the weapon sales ban should be lifted seems only natural. After all, if the U.S. wants to upgrade its military ties with Vietnam to the “normalized level,” then isn’t it only right that Vietnam be treated like any other country the U.S. maintains “normalized” military relations with?

The D.O.D. seems to accept this premise, it's the State Department (perhaps under orders from the White House) that is dragging its feet. They seem to be the ones who are sticking to the proposition that until they see “significant" improvements in Hanoi’s human rights record, they will be against dropping the arms sales ban.

We think they are wrong. From our perspective, preparing now for a more aggressively hegemonic China is much more important than jousting over human rights issues. Do not mistake us, we are not saying that human rights comes second on our list of important societal attributes. What we are saying however is that if you want to see real human rights abuse, wait until you see what China does to the peoples of the countries it tries to subjugate on its quest to become a world power. If you want to know what’s in store in this regard, reference if you will the Tian An Men massacre, or even China’s stifling these very day's of Hong Kong’s efforts to hold representative elections.

Be that as it may, America needs to become more responsive to Vietnam’s efforts to forge a new relationship with us, paying particular attention to her views and efforts. As an example, human rights watchers all agree that in the past year Vietnam has made good progress on the human rights front. So much so that the issue found itself center stage when Ted Osius, President Obama’s nominee to be the next U.S. ambassador to Vietnam, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that continuing human rights improvements being observed in Vietnam suggest that “it's time to begin exploring the possibility of lifting the ban.”

For the State Department, that’s a positive statement. For us, it’s time to lift the ban. Period.

By doing so America will actually be helping Vietnam, in overcoming its own fear of upsetting China by portraying the lifting of the ban as nothing other than the normal activities of two former adversaries who are now celebrating 20 years of normalized relations (next year will be the 20th anniversary of that event).

Let’s face some facts: Vietnam is an important player in the Southeast Asia region. America needs her on its side in every way possible. This is especially true in terms of slowing China’s inexorable rise to power, greatness and propensity to project its muscle and influence without care for the consequences.

Unless America shows the peoples and countries of Central and Southeast Asia that she intends to remain a force in these regions, slowly but surely these countries will hedge their bets by beginning to replace their allegiance to the United States with a growing one towards China. Hilary Clinton’s platitudes about a new pivot strategy towards Asia aside, the fact of the matter is that throughout the Obama Administration’s reign America has talked a good story but done nothing of substance. The countries of Asia are not fooled. One by one they are already turning to China, seeking a more reliable big brother than we have been for them. From their perspective, if in the process they have to kowtow [叩头] to the Mandarin’s in Beijing, that is still a far smaller price to pay than depending on the United States to be there for them when everyone knows the U.S. has no intention of going to war to save any one of them. Look if you will to the Ukraine. If the U.S. won’t act decisively to protect the integrity of this little pocket sized country, what will it do for, say, Burma or Bangladesh?

And while this may perhaps not be the case for Japan, it most definitely will be such for South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, India… and even Australia. How do we know? Because reality says so: when you have an 800 pound, sulking, angry gorilla with an attitude on your doorstep, you tend to try to make friends with it. China is that gorilla, and the doorstep she sits on is that of her neighbors in Asia.

As regards the U.S. and Vietnam, it should be clear that the relationship between us cannot reach its full potential if it is not built on mutual trust. Continuing to ban military equipment sales while trying to increase military-to-military ties implies a lack of trust from our side. Telling the Vietnamese that America sees it as a constructive partner in safeguarding regional peace and stability, and has felt this way since the early 1990s, but won’t sell it arms because Vietnam once occupied Cambodia with its own troops, and while no longer shows any tendency towards human rights abuses might again one day, makes no sense. Especially when other countries in the area are not subject to this same line of reasoning or even military equipment sales ban.

So what’s the real reason behind America’s continuing ban on military equipment sales to Vietnam?

Can Vietnam Ever Be Trusted?

We think that the truth lies in an old fear… left over from the very early 1980s when Vietnam was trying to rejoin the world… that Vietnam sought the ability to buy arms from America as a sort of seal of approval, to tell the world that it was now o.k. for other countries to view Vietnam as a good citizen of the world again. Twenty-plus years ago there was some truth to this. Vietnam then had no intention of buying military equipment from the United States, it merely sought the change in status to help leverage it from the economic mess it had created for itself after the Vietnam War ended.

But that is not the case anymore. Today Vietnam has in fact rejoined the world and does in fact see an improved relationship with both the U.S. and its military as crucial for its long term growth, prosperity and survivability. As to how this relates to its own views in terms of what kind of military hardware it should adopt as a standard, in recent months Hanoi has indicated an interest in acquiring U.S. made radar and surveillance equipment. Compare this if you will to one of America’s oldest partner countries… one just a short distance away from Vietnam: Australia. Last month (September 2014) Australia announced that it would be purchasing its next generation of submarines from Japan.

Australia… a died in the wool, stalwart partner of America… spending $20 billion to buy 10 - 12 submarines from Japan, while America’s shipbuilding industry sits steeping in rust? What’s going on here?

Look if you will to Vietnam then. If America does not recognize that times have changed and that the Vietnamese government has too—for the better—it will lose its chance to add an important ally to its arsenal. Vietnam not only can be trusted, it should be trusted. And if we do not get busy demonstrating our trust and ability to work with this important little country, we will soon see her cozying up to India, Japan, England, Germany or any number of other fair-weather friends only too anxious to sell arms to her and take her money and run... leaving America out to dry from both an economic and military standpoint.

Why should we care? Because at the root of any initiative to keep China in check over the long term must be Vietnam. And if that initiative should take the form of either a Dutch Treat War policy, or even a conventional one, then Vietnam is absolutely essential, if for no other reason than the fact that she shares a 1,306 km long border with China, and looks askance at almost everything China does.

Still not enough for you? Still don't know if you can trust her? Consider then as a sign that Vietnam is sincere about changing its posture and becoming a trusted friend of America and its military an announcement it made in May, when it said that it would participate in the U.S.–backed Proliferation Security Initiative. This decision on Vietnam’s part to follow America’s military lead in its part of the world fully opens the door for the U.S. and Vietnam to conduct future joint maritime surveillance work, as the need may arise.

Against the backdrop of growing Chinese assertiveness and rising maritime tensions in the South China Sea, there is no more clear a sign that Vietnam sees the value of an American presence in this part of the world than a request to join the U.S. formed Proliferation Security Initiative. The Vietnam of old would not have done that.

Finally, to show that Vietnam has sure and truly come in out of the cold, Vietnam has expressed its intent to both find common interests with other members of, and strengthen its interest in, ASEAN. It looks in this regard towards building closer ties to ASEAN defense institutions, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meetings—a platform that includes the defense ministers of the ten ASEAN states and their eight major dialogue partners, and strives through this platform to develop mutually supportive and mutually beneficial military policies—almost all of which align perfectly with America’s views.

We're Getting There, But Still Have A Long Way To Go

So where do the U.S. and Vietnam stand today in terms of relations? The answer is that our relations are based on a mixed hodge-podge of sometimes close, often not so close, and usually distant ties, all existing under a veneer of smiling statements professing close ties, but of little value to either side. There is little rhyme or reason as to how America is building bridges to this important country. It’s almost like the President and his Secretary of State are asleep at the switch.

Consider this:

• The ban on military equipment sales is still in place, yet the Vietnamese Coast Guard was allowed to purchase and is soon due to receive five or six new patrol vessels from the U.S. Still, because of the sheer difficulty of dealing with the U.S., Vietnam has turned to other countries to supply it with even more vessels. What kind of a salesman makes one sale and then lets the customer go to another company to fill future orders, we ask you? What’s wrong with our government that it can't follow up on opportunities like this?

• While the final decision has not yet been made, and with no clear reason as to why it hasn’t been, it is likely that the U.S. will agree that over the next several years Vietnam will be allowed to receive a number of used U.S. Coast Guard cutters. This will help Vietnam protect its own littoral maritime interests, vis-à-vis China’s activities in Vietnam claimed waters. Yet if this is to happen, what’s stalling it? Are we going to wait for China to invade one of the contested islands before we act on this effort?

• Secretary of State John Kerry announced an $18 million assistance package when he visited Vietnam in late 2013. Why? No one seems to know. $18 million is too little to move the needle one way or the other, if anyone can even figure out what needle Kerry was trying to move. How about a package that accomplishes something? How about specifying what the package will accomplish?

• Becoming tired with America’s intransigence… or the White House’s inability to make a decision (sound familiar?)… Vietnam opted and announced just a few weeks ago its intention to purchase six ships from Japan, ostensibly to be used to strengthen Vietnam’s maritime security and help it both project and protect its maritime domain. While no one is labeling these ships warships, one wonders what kind of maritime vessel can provide maritime security if not a warship. One also wonders why, as in the case of Australia, those countries America needs most on its side are buying military hardware from the Japanese?

• While Vietnam slips farther and farther from a course designed to form close and improving relations with the U.S.—because the U.S. doesn’t seem to be targeting such on its own front—Congress continues to whine that if it lifts the arms sales ban the U.S. will lose leverage over Hanoi’s human rights activities. Someone should tell these cretins that what’s important is leverage over China’s human rights activities, not Vietnam’s. More to the point, by building closer ties to Vietnam the U.S. can gain leverage over both country’s human rights activities. From China’s side, having America sitting in Vietnam and acting like a trusted friend is going to make China pay greater attention to how it treats the peoples of this area of the world. From Vietnam’s side, with the U.S. as a close friend and strategic partner it will be more inclined to listen to America’s entreaties over human rights. After all, who are you more inclined to listen to when you are called out for doing something wrong, someone you barely know, or a close friend? If America wants Vietnam to listen to it, then it needs to become a closer friend of this small but important country.

• And if all of this is not enough, rumor in Washington is that President Obama is reluctant to bring Vietnam closer to the U.S. because it will cost him political capital. Really? Does America’s left hold so many objections to building closer ties to Vietnam that they would hold it against President Obama if he lobbied for Vietnam’s participation in, say, the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement that is currently being negotiated? Have people gone mad? Do they not know that America benefits economically every time a free trade agreement is signed? Does Barack Obama have so much political capital tied to Vietnam that he actually has to worry about this? Does the left not know that if President Obama’s Dutch Treat War Policy initiative were to actually be put in place between the U.S. and Vietnam it would mean that in any confrontation with China it would be Vietnamese troops doing the fighting, not American soldiers? Would they prefer our Army take to the field over the Spratly Islands, instead of Vietnam’s?

It boggles the mind.

Putting all of the smoke and mirrors of politics aside, it is time that the U.S. put its house in order as regards both present and future relations with Vietnam. To begin, the U.S. must define a clear policy that will lead to significantly improved ties between our two countries—in the short term—and it needs to start acting on those policies now. Why? Because the U.S. military needs Vietnam on its side. The fact is:

1. Vietnam is going to be on someone’s side, and it might as well be on ours than China’s. So let’s get busy organizing such a state of affairs and putting it into effect.

2. Crazy as it may sound, President Obama’s Dutch Treat War Policy concept just may work in the Middle East. If it does, it might also find value in other places in the world. America would do well to begin signing up free agents to act as local boots on the ground partners if we ever have to go to war under circumstances similar to that which we face with ISIS—an issue important enough to require kinetic action on our part, but not important enough to warrant American soldiers patrolling the ground being fought over. In terms of Southeast Asia, Vietnam would make an ideal partner in this regard, and should be brought into our stable of thoroughbreds just in case we need her at the post the next time the bugle goes off in that part of the world.

Expect A Cold Shoulder From Our Hot New Friend

In putting this new relationship in place however, the U.S. should understand that how Vietnam acts in public, with respect to U.S. initiatives seeking closer ties with it, should not be misconstrued as a sign of its true feelings or intentions. Instead, the reality is that the U.S. must cut Hanoi a great deal of slack, such that while it acts in private to bring our two countries closer together, it will display in public, for the world to see, something short of cold antipathy towards the idea of deeper bilateral security cooperation between itself and America.

As to why this is the case, it should be remembered that while Vietnam is a scrappy little country, it is still little. In building closer ties to America Vietnam is going to have to walk softly and gingerly such that it is able to portray for China’s consumption a guarded response towards building closer long term military ties to the U.S. On the surface, for the foreseeable future, Vietnam will have to look as though it is pursuing a policy of remaining independent of the U.S. in its foreign policy, even while it is undermining this very point by, behind the scenes, building closer military ties with us.

In conclusion, as regards the concept of a U.S. Dutch Treat War Doctrine, there is value in such an idea and that value should be further explored. One area deserving of scrutiny... in fact action... relates to deciding which of the many countries around the world might make ideal partners to work with under such a protocol. If the U.S. decides to pursue relations with countries that might fit into such a doctrine, one aimed at jointly but severally fighting small regional wars of limited size, it should most definitely consider and include Vietnam in the list of countries targeted.

Regardless of whether it does or not, considering the instability that China's actions are bringing to Asia, it's time for the U.S. to improve its military ties with Vietnam. If for no other reason than this alone, we think it is time that the U.S. end its ban on arms sales to Vietnam. The U.S. should also promote and engage in a greater effort to work together more closely with Vietnam, actually doing something about this matter rather than just subscribing to friendly words published in a memorandum of understanding produced by the State Department for PR purposes.

One way the U.S. can do this is to not only lift the ban on lethal weapons sales but also offer greater technical support and training to Vietnam, to increase the level of integration between our two militaries… as might be required in a future kinetic engagement where the U.S. provided either air or naval power in support of their army in the field.

We understand that Secretary of Defense Hagel will visit Vietnam in November. If so, his visit will provide an ideal opportunity for our two countries to reach agreement as to what things both sides must do now to see forward movement as regards the new relationship we need build. On this point, the very first thing we must do, again, is lift the ban on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam.