True or not, the reader can readily understand why today’s Russians think and feel the same about the Crimean Peninsula… which houses their Black Sea fleet. Nearly 96% of Russians today believe that Khrushchev never should have given the Crimean Peninsula to the Ukrainians; and they applaud Putin’s gumption in taking it back last March.

Continuing with this analogy, it would not be hard to envision the same happening in America today, over the Canal Zone. Informal polls show that a fair majority of Americans believe that Carter never should have handed the Canal Zone over to Panama. That being the case, if China flexed its muscles and tried to extend its current management contract of the canal to include military defense of it, more likely than not the vast majority of Americans would support our government sending troops in to stop China from militarizing the Canal Zone, and maybe even take it back. Further to this, under such a situation it would not surprise us at all if some 50% – 60% of the people living in the country of Panama didn’t petition the U.S. to take over the whole damned country, not just the Canal Zone.  That being the case, it wouldn’t be surprising then for a bunch of separatist rebels to pop up and actively try to break off, say, Panama City, and make it a territory controlled by the United States.

Can you see the analogy? Russia, fearing the Ukraine’s closening ties with NATO, found reason to step in and take back the Crimean Peninsula, as we might someday find ourselves inclined to do with the Canal Zone vis-a-vis China. What Russia claimed it found when it took over Crimea, if one believes Russia’s side of the story, was some 50% – 60% of the Russian speaking people in the eastern half of the Ukraine also asking to be made part of Russia. As claimed by Russia, freedom fighters within this group opted to use the opportunity of Russia taking over Crimea to fight to break off the eastern part of Ukraine (some 2% of the country) and make it part of Russia… an action no different than what one might expect if the U.S. took back the Canal Zone. That is, the U.S. might suddenly find itself being petitioned by the enormous number of U.S. retirees and other foreign nationals living in Panama to hive a portion of that country off and make it a protectorate of the United States too.

So who is right in this situation? Self-government supporters say that what Russia is doing is abominable. Then again, on the other side, the Russian people wholeheartedly back Putin’s moves. Perhaps it’s easier to answer this question if we ask instead, what would we in America opt to do if such a scenario struck in Panama?

For our first question above then, should America have gone to the rescue of the Ukraine, the answer is not as easy to arrive at as one might think. For one thing, it appears that Russia may in fact have had a few legitimate fears as regards loss of its military presence and reach in the Black Sea, if the Ukraine continued to cozy up to NATO. If that’s the case, then while it pains us to say so, Putin may have had reason to act the way he did in stepping in to take control over the Crimean Peninsula. After all, they used to own it back as short a while ago as 1954, and it was only because of Russia’s own version of Jimmy Carter that after 300 years of being under Russian control it was gifted to Ukrainia. With the Ukraine threatening to join the E.U. and/or become a member of NATO, if I were Putin I would step in too. From this perspective what he did is no different than what America would likely do if China decided to station a few of its troops along the Panama Canal... ostensibly to "protect it".

In terms of what happened in eastern Ukraine, where rebel separatists “suddenly” popped up and began demanding that the Ukrainian government in Kiev let them break off a section of the Ukraine and become a part of Russia, well… that’s not too far of a stretch to imagine happening either… even if Putin’s men did help to incent it.

For one, the country of the Ukraine is a basket case; corrupt beyond measure, as are Iraq and Afghanistan and most of the countries that America dabbles in and then leaves. For all practical purposes, there is no reason for people living within the Ukraine to stay put, versus leaving it to join some other country. Yes, if the Ukrainian government does become closer to the E.U. then eventually things will get better… but that could be generations from now. If you and, say, your wife and three kids lived in a small corrupt Eastern European country offering little in the way of a decent standard of living, jobs or health care, and had the choice of becoming part of Russia… not a great country by any means but far better than some of those hell holes in Eastern Europe, what would you do? It’s only to be expected then that with Russia finding reason—good or bad—to reacquire the Crimean Peninsula, many within the Ukraine itself would ask the question “What about us? What are we, chopped liver?”

Hopefully the reader can see then that the problems that arose between the Ukraine and Russia back in April–May were not as simple as they may have appeared on the surface. Add to this the strange situation of President Obama appearing to the world as having no global gravitas… drawing lines in the sand with Syria and then doing nothing about it, and on, and on… and the motivation for Putin to act becomes even more compelling. While Russia might have had a good pretext to take back the Crimean Peninsula… one good enough to cause over 90% of his own population to give Putin their adulation for his actions—and scorn both the E.U. and the U.S. for opposing his actions—that does not mean he could have done what he did if another President other than Barack Obama was in office.

Another U.S. President, one with more perceived backbone, might have been able to stop Putin, by either causing him to reverse his actions in the Crimea, or at a minimum causing him to back away from supporting the separatists.

Only Strength Can Stand Against Strength

Here then is the real issue: while good reason exists for Putin and Russia to act the way they did, if America had a stronger Presidential presence on the world stage would that have caused Putin to pull his punches and maybe not have acted at all? Having a reason to act and having the balls to act are two different things. With President Obama being seen globally as a weak President, any world leader today with an axe to grind is going to take this opportunity to do it, rather than wait for the next American President to come along. Or put another way, when America fronts a President who is perceived by world leaders as ineffectual and vulnerable, many among them will take the opportunity to press their case on those issues that they would normally bide their time over if America had a stronger President. And while this is to be expected, when the perceived vulnerability of our American President becomes so great that countries like Russia and China began to act out of context and pursue measures they know America and the world condemn, the world is in trouble.

And so it is that today China is running around the South Pacific pocketing every island it can lay its hands on, while Russia does the same with every Eastern European republic it can bully into submission.

It reminds one of the situation in WWII when Churchill and Roosevelt were up against Marshal Joseph Stalin. The Stalin that Roosevelt faced was as cagey then as the Putin that Obama faces today. Yet somehow Roosevelt managed to outsmart and contain Stalin. That is not the case with Obama and Putin, and it is instructive to understand why.

At the time of the Yalta meeting, in the Crimea no less, mutual distrust between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was just beginning to heat up. Roosevelt held deep suspicion of Stalin, primarily because of Stalin’s views on post WWII borders within Europe. He was especially troubled by Stalin’s views on the question of German and Polish borders, the political status of Eastern Europe, and the terms of Russia’s involvement in the war in the Pacific. For his part, Stalin was determined to reject and prevent any British-American attempts to limit his hegemony over Eastern Europe.

It sounds like Russia and the Ukraine today, doesn’t it?

The analogy doesn’t end there. George Orwell, the writer of 1984, described Stalin as a “disgusting murderer temporarily on our side.” James Byrnes, Roosevelt’s right-hand man, said of Stalin that “the more America appealed for Soviet military assistance [in WWII, against the Germans  and Japanese,] the more Stalin would demand in return.” Roosevelt himself shared Churchill’s view that the “Soviet regime [ruled by Stalin was] hungry for conquest, [and] ruled by a dictator who displayed not the slightest intention of matching his words with deeds.”[1] Is this not Putin and Russia today?

Further to this point, while Roosevelt and Stalin acted like they were best of friends and on the same side of the war, the truth was that there was a “face off” taking place between them... to see which of their countries would rule the post-WWII world. Reflecting on President Obama's uncensored comments to Medvedev that he would have more room to maneuver after his reelection, and could then grant Putin the concessions he requested, the same comes to mind... except this time we fear President Obama bought Putin's lure hook, line and sinker, while Roosevelt saw Stalin for what he was.

What then to do when two country’s face off against each other, one ruled by a power hungry, conquest focused dictator (Putin) hell bent on restoring his country to its former glory, and the other—more powerful in every measure but one…he is considered feckless by the other—seems unable to stand his ground? The answer is that there is nothing that can be done. Nothing can be done by a strong country with a weak leader to stop the actions of a weaker country with a determined, stronger leader. Only strength can stand against strength.

In the case of the Ukraine, the fact of the matter is that there is no doubt that Putin’s disdain for Obama caused him to feel he could do whatever he wanted with the Crimean Peninsula, and the rebel separatists too. The fact of the matter is, much of the situation in the Ukraine, whether warranted by Russia’s past history or not, came about because Putin sees President Obama as an irresolute leader that can be “rolled”.

We know, we know… right about now half of our readers are crying “Here you go getting political again. This is supposed to be a forum that focuses on military matters, not politics. Why do you keep writing articles that talk politics and trash our President in the process? Can’t you just stick to military matters?”

Our answer… sheepishly… is no we can’t. You see, military matters are the result of political matters. That is to say, everything that happens in the military and in a military person’s life is based on an action that previously took place in a politician’s life. To understand the former you must look to the latter, and that is all we are doing here.

As an example: if you are upset that at the conclusion of a small war the U.S. military makes a big push to force out of service far too many of its Junior Officers… to downsize the military… look to a political decision to see what brought this on (be sure to see our Home Page article next month, on this very topic). If you don’t like the fact that perfectly good armament systems are being upgraded to expensive new systems that fail more often than not, provide less fire power and are less reliable… look to a political decision to see what brought this on. If you don’t like the fact that you are being sent for another 18 month tour of duty to a new hot war zone in a country of only remote importance to America… look to a political decision to see what brought it on.

That being the case, our readers should understand that the life of every military oriented person is dependent on political people. Understanding how those political people think, and how you can go about persuading them to see things your way, and therein dissuade them from doing things that you believe are injurious to our country and its military, is critical. Those of you who are retired military Officers spent your life pursuing America’s best interest… so much so that you were willing to die for it… why would you turn your back on her interests now, just because it means you have to engage on the subject of politics? To be critical of politicians? To question their judgment? To lobby for change? To speak your mind?

Please then do not fault us for discussing political matters and the people who decide the very things that affect the military and country we all love; the subject goes to the heart of the question of what kind of America will exist as we pass from the scene and a younger generation is left to clean up the mess the politicians we elected left.

Cause And Effect

In terms of how the Ukraine situation came about, the unfortunate case is that the actions of an unskilled political leader caused it… our President. This is his watch and on it new problems have come to the fore, and many of the problems of the world that he inherited have gotten worse. By saying this we do not mean to be injurious to our President or even critical of him. Having said this, recognizing the cause of a problem is important if one is to devise a solution for it. Our interest then is in properly analyzing, from a military perspective that gives weight to political matters, the military issues that are happening around the world today—such as in the Ukraine. To do so we are forced to look beyond just military matters to the realm of politics, whether we like politics or not.

The Ukraine is one of the military topics that we are interested in, and so are those issues affecting countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and others… as they feel the sharp end of China’s elbows as it powers its way around the southern Pacific Ocean claiming one island after another as its own. And so too is what is happening in Iran with its nuclear weapons development program, and Syria, an incubator for extremists but which the current leader of the U.S. has all but said he could care less about. And so too with ISIS.

Our task as military historians and analysts is to not just understand what causes military matters to become problematic, but how to compensate for any weakness our own country and national leader may have in dealing with these matters. That is, while we may understand that when America is seen to have a President that is all talk and no walk the indecorous leaders of the world will rise to the occasion, the question is not what is wrong with him, but what can we do about them… or more to the point, how should America address the issue itself? What can America do to fix the problems it faces, given the fact that its current leader is unable to put stop to them?

To find the answer to this question we must be free to be critical of our President and those political supporters he relies on. Only by seeing how his weaknesses—and we all have them—cause and affect the situation we are interested in can we, as a nation, develop a road map to overcome the problem itself. In the case of the Ukraine, understanding how Putin perceives President Obama is important to figuring out what America should to do help nudge events in the Ukraine towards a peaceful resolution.

As for what caused Putin and Russia to make a land grab for the Crimean Peninsula and then set about backing separatist rebels that would challenge the integrity of the Ukraine, four things can be seen as the cause of the situation as it exists today:

1. The history of the Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, with particular emphasis on Khrushchev’s actions in granting the Ukraine independence from Russia,

2. The Ukraine being so corrupt that at this point (from Putin’s standpoint as well as much of the world’s) it wouldn’t matter who ran it anyway,

3. A weak American President, and 

4. The perceived threat that NATO would stymie Russia’s control over the Black Sea.

Of all of these factors, the one that pushed Putin to act now was number 3; but even then, he wouldn’t have acted at all if items number 1, 2 and 4 did not exist.

What is our point? Our point is that the world is full of situations where history, malfeasant governments and military threats all combine to create sordid spots of sewer gasses in need of little more than a spark to ignite into a small war… yet few do… not at least like that taking place in the Ukraine. What then precipitates small wars?

Opportunity. That's what ISIS saw as it gauged that the United States would not respond to its efforts to stake a claim for itself in the world, and that's what Putin responded to when he judged that President Obama would take no action against him. America would do well to consider this the next time it elects a President. Weak Presidents invite the onset of small wars. Weak Presidents create opportunities for malfeasant world leaders.

As to whether this means that the U.S. should have offered military assistance to the Ukraine or not—our original question—our answer is an unequivocal no. While the issue of whether America has an anemic leader or not is a major issue, just because we have one and his actions precipitate troubles around the globe does not necessarily mean that America should go to the world’s rescue in each and every case. Sometimes military action on America's part is just not justified, no matter how poignant the cause.

We believe this is so for the Ukrainian crisis. That is, it’s tragic that factor number 3 exists but that does not negate the fact that factors number 1,2 and 4 exist too. The history of the Ukraine–Russia relationship, the corruption of the people ruling the Ukraine and the fact that while NATO has been flirting with the Ukraine regarding a future membership it clearly has no intention of coming to the Ukraine’s military rescue any time soon, all suggest that America doesn’t belong in this dust up. Or more simply put, if any outside help is deserved by the Ukraine it is not on the basis of its past actions or current situation. If the Ukraine wants military help from the west, it is going to have to prove that it deserves that help.

How can it do this? How can the Ukraine prove that it deserves outside military help? The answer is by fighting for its own survival. Stepping forward and taking the mantle of protecting its own territory will go a long way towards proving to the world that as a nation it is deserving of our support.

Can The Ukraine Fight?

And so to our original question Number 2: should America have at a minimum acted to arm the Ukrainian military… by sending military hardware to what all presumed must have been a poorly constituted army… so that, at a minimum, they would have had a fighting chance against both Russia and its sponsored and fully armed rebels?

To answer that question we have to look not only at what the Ukrainian military is composed of, but what it did with those assets when Russia came knocking.

Reading the press and watching what has been happening on TV, one would be forgiven for thinking that the Ukrainian military was bereft of any strength and certainly no match for the Russian military. Worse, most reporting has suggested that the separatist rebels are better equipped and operate as a more disciplined fighting force than the Ukrainian army. If that is the case, then the cause of this small war aside, perhaps the U.S. should have come to the rescue of the Ukrainian military. If not with manpower, at least with weaponry. But is that really the case?

One can see an example of the reporting on the battles the Ukrainian military was having with the Russian backed rebels by reading the reporting of a well respected Eastern European reporter, M. M. Hodarenok. In October he penned an article, in the Russian language, entitled How to Disorganize An Army. It suggested that the Ukrainian military was near to useless. His reporting indicated that in fighting the rebels the Ukrainian army “suffered [a] humiliating defeat” and “lost practically all [of their] heavy arms.” He went on to say that the Ukrainian military had only a “few serviceable planes and helicopters” and that the “fighting spirit and ability to be at war” was compromised, even within the regular army.

His reporting was picked up and echoed around the world. Many in the U.S. felt pity for the Ukrainian military… such a small country… surely no match for Russia.

So they said.

But what is the truth? Is the Ukraine a minimalist military might, unable to fight to protect its own territory and people? Or is the truth something else? Surely, one would expect that before America goes running off to war to help some defenseless little country fight off a bigger bully it would know what the capabilities of that country are. No? And the same is true when it comes to sending arms to help them… before sending arms shouldn’t the U.S. find out what they need or even if they need them at all?

As it turns out, if one studies the true military posture of the Ukraine what one finds is that while the country certainly does not have a military as robust as that of Russia, the Ukrainian military is nothing to sneeze at. While European publications suggest that the Ukrainian air force is on its back, with few serviceable aircraft, our investigation shows otherwise. While they claim that almost every Ukrainian air force plane that flies is shot down within minutes of its appearing over the east, our analysis suggests that this is simply not the case.

- Ukrainian Air Force

Far from having lost control of the airspace over the Ukraine, our investigations showed that while some losses have occurred the air force is still in good health and able to fight. Specifically, as of August 29 the Ukrainian Air Force had lost to the rebels some 10 war planes. This included 3 transport aircraft, 1 SU-24 bomber, 2 MiG-29 fighters and 4 SU-25 attack planes. In addition to this one more SU-25 was permanently lost due to mechanical failures that made it simply not worth the effort of repairing.

All in all then there were a total of 8 combat aircraft lost in fighting with the rebel separatists. Considering that the rebels were backed by Russian air surveillance and SAM equivalents, 8 attack aircraft and a couple of transport planes doesn’t seem so bad. Or is it?

Researching things further we were able to find data from official Ukrainian sources that listed the number and type of armament systems and assets owned by the Ukrainian military.[2] Showing not just what the Ukrainian military has, but where each air force asset was located within the country, it was easy for us to deduce that during the August period in question when the world was saying that the Ukraine didn’t have the kind of armament and manpower it needed to stand up to the Russian backed rebels, from an air force standpoint anyway… it had in a combat-ready state some 33–34 SU-24 bombers, 20–24 SU-27 fighters, 80 MiG-29 fighters, and 31–36 SU-25 attack aircraft, for a total of about 170 warplanes ready and able to be launched.

One can add to this another 10 - 15 SU-27 and MiG-29 aircraft that were either off line in storage or under repair. And to this could also be added another 30–40 obsolete (but still quite suitable for use in a low grade conflict of this type) strike fighter MiG-27s. Finally, to this total could be added an additional 72 attack helicopters (what the Ukraine refers to as “shock helicopters”) of the Mi-24 variety (of these, 4 had been shot down in conflict with the rebels).

All totaled then, the Ukraine air force was able to mount in excess of 297 combat aircraft and helicopters in its fight against Putin’s rebels. The claim then by European media that the Ukraine was suffering irrevocable losses at the hands of the rebels was simply not true. Yes, it had lost some 4 percent of the original quantity of combat-ready planes and helicopters at its disposal, but it’s air force was far from defeated. The country was still very much able to control its own destiny.

In terms of whether the United States needed to quickly send combat aircraft of its own to rescue the Ukraine, our conclusion is that it certainly didn’t appear so. Weak American President or not, the Ukraine seemed—at least from this perspective—to be able to stand on its own and defend itself quite well, thank you.

From what we can see, press reports were simply wrong when they claimed that “almost all [combat aircraft] were hit” by the rebels. Instead of needing U.S. and/or NATO air support what was needed instead was a robust counteroffensive on the part of the Ukrainian military. That is, before Uncle Sam should think of trying to rescue the country it should make an effort to prod the Ukrainian government to do more on its own to defend itself and drive out the rebels.

The least the Ukraine should do is display for the world that it will vigorously fight to save itself… by actually vigorously fighting… before it cries wolf and asks for help. With nearly 300 flyable combat aircraft at its disposal, but few if any in the air fighting the rebels, one can be forgiven for asking why American help is needed.

- More Than Just Aircraft, Tanks Too

To be fair, a country’s military does not stand on its air force alone. So before saying that America’s help isn’t needed in the Russian–Ukraine fight we should take a moment to look at the rest of the Ukraine’s military capabilities.

Not surprisingly, tanks in the Armed Forces of the Ukraine (variously AFU, ZFU and VSU; Ukrainian: Збройні сили України or ЗСУ; and Zbroyni Syly Ukrayiny or ZSU) are in much bigger supply than aircraft. This is because Russia's predecessor, the USSR, had intended that the Ukraine provide the bulk of the USSR's southern defense against any invaders, and so equipped it to do so. Planning on the Ukraine providing a robust anti-tank defense against the west (read: NATO and the U.S.), the USSR made sure that the AFU had more armored weapons than any of their other captive states.

Exact figures are difficult to come by, but it is possible to extrapolate the number of tanks the Ukraine has on hand by looking at the number of tanks repaired in recent conflicts and applying a standard failure rate, reverse calculated from the MBTF (Mean Time Between Failure) rate for Russian class armored vehicles. The figure so obtained can then be extrapolated to come up with the likely total number of tanks the country has. As a cross check, it is possible to also compare the total number of losses the Ukraine suffered in armored vehicles during the 9 years of the Russian Afghan war to see if the repair rate there matches the MBTF rate we calculated.

As a base for our calculations, we used the fact that in the case of the Ukraine’s participation in the Russian Afghan war they lost some 147 tanks in that conflict. One can compare that to their losses in fighting the rebels over 3 months in Donbass. In this latter instance they lost some 67 armored units, of which 30 were damaged beyond repair, plus about 75 BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles, and 140 BMD-1 airborne infantry troop armored vehicles.[3]

Admittedly, this level of loss is high for such a small engagement, however, two things must be kept in mind: 1) the determination of the Ukraine to fight for its territory can be seen in the extent to which it forcefully fought and accepted losses in Donbass—it appears that the Ukrainian military is not afraid of armed conflict—and 2), while the losses are large for such a small engagement one needs to put them in perspective in relation to the total number of armored vehicles and tanks the Ukraine has.

Out of all of this we were able to determine that the AFU currently fields about 700 heavy tanks and 2,500 armored combat vehicles of lesser strengths. Adding to this, data for 2010 showed that the Ukraine had an additional 2,650 smaller sized T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks, for a combined total of 5,850 armored vehicles. If this seems like a high number for such a small country the reader should remember that the Soviet Union and its former satellite countries fielded the world’s largest collection of tanks and tank corps of any nation. When the USSR collapsed most of these assets went to the satellite states, with the Ukraine receiving the largest contingent of them. At the time of the collapse of the USSR the Ukraine held some 6,500 tanks alone… not to mention other armored vehicles of lesser strength. It’s only natural then that today the Ukraine still has at its disposal a plethora of armored vehicles and trained men to man them.

Considering then the previously mentioned loss of 147 tanks to date in fighting the Russian armed rebels, the Ukrainian military has more than enough held in reserve to replace these losses, and do so again and again if necessary until the rebels are defeated.

As to how many tanks the Ukrainian army is fielding in battles with the rebels, our research puts this number at about 560 tanks, supported by 1,300 armored personnel carriers, BMPs and BMDs. Finally, as to the Ukraine’s ability to maintain a steady and consistent level of armored warfare against the rebels, we should recognize that within the territory of the Ukraine itself are located the actual factories and plants that manufactured most of these vehicles. This capability exists because back during the time of the USSR when the Ukraine was part of it, it was determined that tank manufacture would take place in the Ukraine, along with all of the work related to the repair, restoration and modernization of the Soviet Union’s entire fleet of armored vehicles. Now that Russia and the Ukraine have gone separate ways, this minor fact represents a serious loss to the Russian military… but a huge benefit in terms of the Ukrainian army being able to stand toe to toe against the Russian armed rebels.

- Not Just Hardware, But Manpower Too

Yet as we all know, aircraft, tanks and artillery are nothing without trained fighting men to man them. To date it appears that the Ukraine has lost between 1,500 and 2,000 killed or missing military personnel in fighting against the rebels, with an additional 1,500 – 2,000 being wounded, with the majority of them being able to be treated and return to battle. The question is, how does this stack up against available fighting men and how do these losses correlate to the number of men actually in battle?[4]

Combat wise, our estimates show that the Ukrainian army has fielded some 20 thousand men in the actual battlespace, referred to by the rebels as Novorossiya (New Russia). In addition to this, in the operational  reserve area that backs the battle space (Raisin, Slavyansk and Kramatorsk) there are another 6 thousand fighting troops available. Supporting this combined total of 26,000 are between 9 and 14 thousand additional transport division troops and local security services (adjunct military police), which makes for a total manpower complement taking a real part in military operations of between 35,000 and  40,000 men. Compared to this figure then, the 4,000 in general losses amounts to about 16% of the total number of men involved in the fight, with irrevocable losses (KIA) amounting to only 5%.

What do we conclude from this? We conclude that while the Ukrainian military has suffered a comparatively high level of losses in its battles with the rebels, the level is certainly not a record and there is no reason to suggest that this level of loss presupposes that the rebels will eventually win. This is especially the case when one considers the history of how the Ukrainian army fights and the level of losses it has come to expect in its combat encounters. Two historical examples will serve to make our point:

Example 1: The Battle of Hal Khin Gol River (known in Japan as the Nomonhan Incident), Mongolia, 1939.

In August 1939, just weeks before Hitler and Stalin invaded Poland, the Soviet Union and Japan fought a massive tank battle on the Mongolian border. At that time the battle was the largest tank battle the world had ever seen. Under the then unknown Georgy Zhukov the Soviets won a crushing victory, killing some 70,000 Japanese soldiers. In search of raw materials to grow their nation and economy, the defeat persuaded the Japanese to expand into the Pacific (China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, etc.) rather than into the eastern USSR. Also as a result of this battle and their loss, the Japanese decided that if it was going to have to fight to acquire territory to secure the natural resources it needed to expand its Empire, the United States would likely prove a weaker opponent than the Soviet Union. With this in mind, to assure that the U.S. did not oppose their efforts to expand into the Pacific they determined to attack Pearl Harbor and further weaken the U.S. military.

The Ukraine fought in the Battle of Hal Khin Gol, on the side of the Soviets. Comparatively speaking the terrain at Hal Khin Gol was the same as that the Ukraine fights over today against the rebels: a steppe, with armed conflict taking place in limited time and space. At Hal Khin Gol the Ukraine fielded 69,000 men, 498 tanks and 385 armored vehicles. Their general losses were 24,000 troops of which 8,000 were KIA, resulting in a ratio of 35% for general losses and 12% KIA. On this basis, the Ukrainian military would think that their losses to date of 5% against the rebels is excellent.

Example 2: The Karelian Offensive (a.k.a. the Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive)

The Karelian Offensive took place in August 1941 and was a strategic operation by the Soviet Union’s Leningrad and Karelian Fronts against Finland. It took place on the Karelian Isthmus in East Karelia and was a continuation of the war on the Eastern Front of World War II. The main strategic objective of the offensive was to push Finnish forces away from the north of Leningrad and drive Finland out of the war. The Ukraine contributed some 7 infantry divisions to the operation, equivalent to some 120–130 thousand troops. General losses for the month of battle amounted to 25,000 men, or 20% of the complement supplied. Notwithstanding this, in some areas of the front losses were much higher, including in one case where an infantry regiment lost 480 KIA with 1,622 WIA, or almost  50% of its regular TOE. By this example too one can see that the Ukrainian army expects to suffer heavier losses than any western army.

From these two examples alone we can see that the 5% losses calculated, based on the number of men actually in battle against the rebels, are nothing out of the ordinary for the Ukrainian military. They would certainly be considered sustainable, and not cause military leaders to back away from pressing the fight.

Manpower wise, as of the end of 2013 the Ukrainian military service contained some 220 thousand troops, including what they classified as 49,000 Land Forces, 40,000 Frontier Guards, and 33,000 Internal Troops, all operationally held within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. To this number of 220,000 can be added another 30,000 SBU plus a separate battalion of marines and two regiments of special troops of the intelligence service (known as GSh). Backing all of this up of course is the population itself, amounting to more than 35 million people (excluding the Lugansk and Donetsk areas, which are the areas under attack). This number is significant as from these 35 million people a very modest effort at mobilizing manpower could easily and quickly put another 500,000 men under the arms.[5]

In conclusion, if one looks at the Ukraine’s air, armored and infantry capabilities alone there is no reason to believe that it could not win the war it is fighting against the rebels. Equally conclusive, most analysts would say that even if Russia itself joined the fray and put its own men on the front lines the Ukraine could still win. All that is necessary for this to happen is for morale amongst the Ukrainian people to remain high and in favor of fighting for their own independence, and their opinions to turn against Russia.

This is in fact beginning to happen. Already, an active part of the population of the Ukraine has begun to express fierce hatred towards Russia and its president. Not surprisingly, we were able to ferret this interesting fact out by simply surfing Ukrainian social network forums, as they provide as good a source of information about the Ukrainian public’s feelings as they do about the feelings of the people of any other country. In this instance anyway, social media reveals the truth behind the happenings in the Ukraine; and in the Ukraine’s case the truth is that the people of that country have turned against Russia.

Regarding our original first two questions, our unmistakeable conclusion is that at this point there is no need for the U.S. to send troops to help the Ukraine, nor is there even a need to send arms. In both of these categories the Ukraine has all it needs to defend itself and fight its own battle. Further, considering the long and close history between the Ukraine and Russia, if battle is to be avoided and peace to be reached through other means, the chances are better that the Ukrainian government could negotiate an acceptable settlement with Putin more so than Barack Obama could.

All of this suggests that while the small war in the Ukraine is worth America’s fight on principles alone, it is not worth the fight by any other measure. That is, sometimes not every war worth fighting is worth fighting. On this one, President Obama appears to have gotten it right.

We wish the Ukrainian people success in their fight against the Russian backed rebels. When and if they have expended their blood and treasure, have decimated their military and made the case that they gave their all to maintain their freedom and independence from Russia, and are facing likely defeat, then perhaps America should consider joining in on their side. It may sound cruel to say this, but the fact is that if a people are not ready to wage all out war to defend themselves and fight for their freedoms, America does not belong in that war. This is especially so when it comes to countries more than adequately staffed and supplied to fight the war they face.