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True
or not, the reader can readily
understand why today’s Russians
think and feel the same about
the Crimean Peninsula… which
houses their Black Sea fleet.
Nearly 96% of Russians today
believe that Khrushchev never
should have given the Crimean
Peninsula to the Ukrainians; and
they applaud Putin’s gumption in
taking it back last March.
Continuing with this analogy, it
would not be hard to envision
the same happening in America
today, over the Canal Zone.
Informal polls show that a fair
majority of Americans believe
that Carter never should have
handed the Canal Zone over to
Panama. That being the case, if
China flexed its muscles and
tried to extend its current
management contract of the canal
to include military defense of
it, more likely than not the
vast majority of Americans would
support our government sending
troops in to stop China from
militarizing the Canal Zone, and
maybe even take it back.
Further to this, under such a
situation it would not surprise
us at all if some 50% – 60% of
the people living in the country
of Panama didn’t petition the
U.S. to take over the whole
damned country, not just the
Canal Zone. That being the case,
it wouldn’t be surprising then
for a bunch of separatist rebels
to pop up and actively try to
break off, say, Panama City, and
make it a territory controlled
by the United States.
Can you see the analogy? Russia,
fearing the Ukraine’s closening
ties with NATO, found reason to
step in and take back the
Crimean Peninsula, as we might
someday find ourselves inclined
to do with the Canal Zone vis-a-vis
China. What Russia claimed it
found when it took over Crimea,
if one believes Russia’s side of
the story, was some 50% – 60% of
the Russian speaking people in
the eastern half of the
Ukraine also asking to be made
part of Russia. As claimed by
Russia, freedom fighters within
this group opted to use the
opportunity of Russia taking
over Crimea to fight to break
off the eastern part of Ukraine
(some 2% of the country) and
make it part of Russia… an
action no different than what
one might expect if the U.S.
took back the Canal Zone. That
is, the U.S. might suddenly find
itself being petitioned by the
enormous number of U.S. retirees
and other foreign nationals
living in Panama to hive a
portion of that country off and
make it a protectorate of the
United States too.
So who is right in this
situation? Self-government
supporters say that what Russia
is doing is abominable. Then
again, on the other side, the
Russian people wholeheartedly
back Putin’s moves. Perhaps it’s
easier to answer this question
if we ask instead, what would we
in America opt to do if such a
scenario struck in Panama?
For
our first question above then,
should America have gone to the
rescue of the Ukraine, the
answer is not as easy to arrive
at as one might think. For one
thing, it appears that Russia
may in fact have had a few
legitimate fears as regards loss
of its military presence and
reach in the Black Sea, if the
Ukraine continued to cozy up to
NATO. If that’s the case, then
while it pains us to say so,
Putin may have had reason to act
the way he did in stepping in to
take control over the Crimean
Peninsula. After all, they used
to own it back as short a while
ago as 1954, and it was only
because of Russia’s own version
of Jimmy Carter that after 300
years of being under Russian
control it was gifted to Ukrainia. With the Ukraine
threatening to join the E.U.
and/or become a member of NATO,
if I were Putin I would step in
too. From this perspective what
he did is no different than what
America would likely do if China
decided to station a few of its
troops along the Panama Canal...
ostensibly to "protect it".
In terms of what happened in
eastern Ukraine, where rebel
separatists “suddenly” popped up
and began demanding that the
Ukrainian government in Kiev let
them break off a section of the
Ukraine and become a part of
Russia, well… that’s not too far
of a stretch to imagine
happening either… even if
Putin’s men did help to incent
it.
For one, the country of the
Ukraine is a basket case;
corrupt beyond measure, as are
Iraq and Afghanistan and most of
the countries that America
dabbles in and then leaves. For
all practical purposes, there is
no reason for people living
within the Ukraine to stay put,
versus leaving it to join some
other country. Yes, if the
Ukrainian government does become
closer to the E.U. then
eventually things will get
better… but that could be
generations from now. If you
and, say, your wife and three
kids lived in a small corrupt
Eastern European country
offering little in the way of a
decent standard of living, jobs
or health care, and had the
choice of becoming part of
Russia… not a great country by
any means but far better than
some of those hell holes in
Eastern Europe, what would you
do? It’s only to be expected
then that with Russia finding
reason—good or bad—to reacquire
the Crimean Peninsula, many
within the Ukraine itself would
ask the question “What about us?
What are we, chopped liver?”
Hopefully the reader can see
then that the problems that
arose between the Ukraine and
Russia back in April–May
were not as simple as they may
have appeared on the surface.
Add to this the strange
situation of President Obama
appearing to the world as having
no global gravitas… drawing
lines in the sand with Syria and
then doing nothing about it, and
on, and on… and the motivation
for Putin to act becomes even
more compelling. While Russia
might have had a good pretext to
take back the Crimean Peninsula…
one good enough to cause over
90% of his own population to
give Putin their adulation for
his actions—and scorn both the
E.U. and the U.S. for opposing
his actions—that does not mean
he could have done what he did
if another President other than
Barack Obama was in office.
Another U.S. President, one with
more perceived backbone, might
have been able to stop Putin, by
either causing him to reverse
his actions in the Crimea, or at
a minimum causing him to back
away from supporting the
separatists.
Only Strength Can Stand Against
Strength
Here then is the real issue:
while good reason exists for
Putin and Russia to act the way
they did, if America had a
stronger Presidential presence
on the world stage would that
have caused Putin to pull his
punches and maybe not have acted
at all? Having a reason to act
and having the balls to act are
two different things. With
President Obama being seen
globally as a weak President,
any world leader today with an
axe to grind is going to take
this opportunity to do it,
rather than wait for the next
American President to come
along. Or put another way, when
America fronts a President who
is perceived by world leaders as
ineffectual and vulnerable, many
among them will take the
opportunity to press their case
on those issues that they would
normally bide their time over if
America had a stronger
President. And while this is to
be expected, when the perceived
vulnerability of our American
President becomes so great that
countries like Russia and China
began to act out of context and
pursue measures they know
America and the world condemn,
the world is in trouble.
And so it is that today China is
running around the South Pacific
pocketing every island it can
lay its hands on, while Russia
does the same with every Eastern
European republic it can bully
into submission.
It reminds one of the situation
in WWII when Churchill and
Roosevelt were up against
Marshal Joseph Stalin. The
Stalin that Roosevelt faced was
as cagey then as the Putin that
Obama faces today. Yet somehow
Roosevelt managed to outsmart
and contain Stalin. That is not
the case with Obama and Putin,
and it is instructive to
understand why.
At the time of the Yalta
meeting, in the Crimea no less,
mutual distrust between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union was just
beginning to heat up. Roosevelt
held deep suspicion of Stalin,
primarily because of Stalin’s
views on post WWII borders
within Europe. He was especially
troubled by Stalin’s views on
the question of German and
Polish borders, the political
status of Eastern Europe, and
the terms of Russia’s
involvement in the war in the
Pacific. For his part, Stalin
was determined to reject and
prevent any British-American
attempts to limit his hegemony
over Eastern Europe.
It sounds like Russia and the
Ukraine today, doesn’t it?
The analogy doesn’t end there.
George Orwell, the writer of
1984, described Stalin as a
“disgusting murderer temporarily
on our side.” James Byrnes,
Roosevelt’s right-hand man, said
of Stalin that “the more America
appealed for Soviet military
assistance [in WWII, against the
Germans and Japanese,] the more
Stalin would demand in return.”
Roosevelt himself shared
Churchill’s view that the
“Soviet regime [ruled by Stalin
was] hungry for conquest, [and]
ruled by a dictator who
displayed not the slightest
intention of matching his words
with deeds.”[1]
Is this not Putin and Russia
today?
Further to this point, while
Roosevelt and Stalin acted
like they were best of friends
and on the same side of the war,
the truth was that there was a “face off”
taking place between them... to
see which of their countries
would rule the post-WWII world.
Reflecting on President Obama's
uncensored comments to Medvedev
that he would have more room to
maneuver after his reelection,
and could then grant Putin the
concessions he requested, the
same comes to mind... except
this time we fear President
Obama bought Putin's lure hook,
line and sinker, while Roosevelt
saw Stalin for what he was.
What then to do when two
country’s face off against each
other, one ruled by a power
hungry, conquest focused
dictator (Putin) hell bent on
restoring his country to its
former glory, and the other—more
powerful in every measure but
one…he is
considered feckless by the
other—seems unable to stand his
ground? The answer is that there
is nothing that can be done.
Nothing can be done by a strong
country with a weak leader to
stop the actions of a weaker country with a
determined, stronger leader.
Only strength can stand against
strength.
In the case of the
Ukraine, the fact of the matter
is that there is no doubt that
Putin’s disdain for Obama caused
him to feel he could do whatever
he wanted with the Crimean
Peninsula, and the rebel
separatists too. The fact of the
matter is, much of the situation
in the Ukraine, whether
warranted by Russia’s past
history or not, came about
because Putin sees President
Obama as an irresolute leader
that can be “rolled”.
We know,
we know… right about now half of
our readers are crying “Here you
go getting political again. This
is supposed to be a forum that
focuses on military matters, not
politics. Why do you keep
writing articles that talk
politics and trash our President
in the process? Can’t you just
stick to military matters?”
Our
answer… sheepishly… is no we
can’t. You see, military matters
are the result of political
matters. That is to say, everything
that happens in the military and
in a military person’s life is
based on an action that
previously took place in a
politician’s life. To understand
the former you must look to the
latter, and that is all we are
doing here.
As an example: if you
are upset that at the conclusion
of a small war the U.S. military
makes a big push to force out of
service far too many of its
Junior Officers… to downsize the
military… look to a political
decision to see what brought
this on (be sure to see our Home
Page article next month, on this
very topic). If you don’t like
the fact that perfectly good
armament systems are being
upgraded to expensive new
systems that fail more often
than not,
provide less fire power and are
less reliable… look to a
political decision to see what
brought this on. If you don’t
like the fact that you are being
sent for another 18 month tour
of duty to a new hot war zone in
a country of only remote
importance to America… look to a
political decision to see what
brought it on.
That being the
case, our readers should
understand that the life of
every military oriented person
is dependent on political
people. Understanding how those
political people think, and how
you can go about persuading them
to see things your way, and
therein dissuade them from doing
things that you believe are
injurious to our country and its
military, is critical. Those of
you who are retired military
Officers spent your life
pursuing America’s best
interest… so much so that you
were willing to die for it… why
would you turn your back on her
interests now, just because it
means you have to engage on the
subject of politics? To be
critical of politicians? To
question their judgment? To
lobby for change? To speak your
mind?
Please then do not fault us for
discussing political matters and
the people who decide the very things
that affect the military and
country we all love; the subject
goes to the heart of the
question of what kind of America
will exist as we pass from the
scene and a younger generation
is left to clean up the mess the
politicians we elected
left.
Cause And Effect
In terms of how
the Ukraine situation came
about, the unfortunate case is
that the actions of an unskilled
political leader caused it…
our President. This is his
watch and on it new problems
have come to the fore, and many of the
problems of the
world that he inherited have
gotten worse. By saying this we
do not
mean to be injurious to our
President or
even critical of him. Having
said this, recognizing the cause
of a problem is important if one
is to devise a solution for it. Our
interest then is in
properly analyzing, from a military
perspective that gives weight to
political matters, the military
issues that are happening
around the world today—such as
in the Ukraine. To do so we are forced to
look beyond just military
matters to the realm of politics, whether we like
politics or not.
The Ukraine is
one of the military topics that
we are interested in, and so are
those issues affecting countries
like the Philippines, Vietnam,
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and
others… as they feel the sharp
end of China’s elbows as it
powers its way around the
southern Pacific Ocean claiming
one island after another as its
own. And so too is what is
happening in Iran with its
nuclear weapons development
program, and Syria, an incubator
for extremists but which the
current leader of the U.S. has
all but said he could care less
about. And so too with ISIS.
Our
task as military historians and
analysts is to not just
understand what causes military
matters to become problematic,
but how to compensate for any
weakness our own country and national leader
may have in dealing with these
matters. That is, while we may
understand that when America is
seen to have a President that is
all talk and no walk the
indecorous leaders of the world
will
rise to the occasion, the
question is not what is wrong
with him, but what can we do
about them… or more to
the point, how should America
address the issue itself? What can
America do to fix the problems it
faces, given the fact that its
current leader is unable to put stop
to them?
To find the
answer to this question we must
be free to be critical of our
President and those political
supporters he relies on. Only by
seeing how his weaknesses—and we
all have them—cause and affect
the situation we are interested
in can we, as a nation, develop
a road map to overcome the
problem itself. In the case of
the Ukraine, understanding how
Putin perceives President Obama
is important to figuring out
what America should to do help
nudge events in the Ukraine
towards a peaceful resolution.
As for what caused Putin and
Russia to make a land grab for
the Crimean Peninsula and then
set about backing separatist
rebels that would challenge the
integrity of the Ukraine, four
things can be seen as the cause
of the situation as it exists
today:
1. The history of the
Ukraine and the Crimean
Peninsula, with particular
emphasis on Khrushchev’s actions
in granting the Ukraine independence from Russia,
2. The
Ukraine being so corrupt that at
this point (from Putin’s
standpoint as well as much of
the world’s) it wouldn’t matter
who ran it anyway,
3. A weak American President,
and
4. The
perceived threat that NATO would
stymie Russia’s control over the
Black Sea.
Of all of these
factors, the one that pushed
Putin to act now was number 3;
but even then, he wouldn’t have
acted at all if items number 1,
2 and 4 did not exist.
What is
our point? Our point is that the
world is full of situations
where history, malfeasant
governments and military threats
all combine to create sordid
spots of sewer gasses in need of
little more than a spark to
ignite into a small
war… yet few do… not at least
like that taking place in the
Ukraine. What then precipitates small wars?
Opportunity. That's what ISIS
saw as it gauged that the United
States would not respond to its
efforts to stake a claim for
itself in the world, and that's
what Putin responded to when he
judged that President Obama
would take no action against him. America would do well to
consider this the next time it
elects a President. Weak
Presidents invite the onset of
small wars. Weak Presidents
create opportunities for
malfeasant world leaders.
As to whether this
means that the U.S. should have
offered military assistance to
the Ukraine or not—our original
question—our answer is an
unequivocal no. While
the issue of whether America has
an anemic leader or not is a
major issue, just because we
have one and his actions
precipitate troubles around the
globe does not necessarily mean
that America should go to the
world’s rescue in each and every
case. Sometimes military action
on America's part is just not
justified, no matter how
poignant the cause.
We believe this is so for
the Ukrainian crisis. That is,
it’s tragic that factor number 3
exists but that does not negate
the fact that factors number 1,2
and 4 exist too. The history of
the Ukraine–Russia relationship,
the corruption of the people
ruling the Ukraine and the fact
that while NATO has been
flirting with the Ukraine
regarding a future membership it
clearly has no intention of
coming to the Ukraine’s military
rescue any time soon, all suggest
that America doesn’t belong in
this dust up. Or more simply
put, if any outside help is
deserved by the Ukraine it is
not on the basis of its past
actions or current situation. If
the Ukraine wants military help
from the west, it is going to
have to prove that it deserves
that help.
How can it do this?
How can the Ukraine prove that
it deserves outside military
help? The answer is by fighting
for its own survival. Stepping
forward and taking the mantle of
protecting its own territory
will go a long way towards
proving to the world that as a
nation it is deserving of our
support.
Can The Ukraine Fight?
And so to our original question Number 2: should America have at a
minimum acted to arm the
Ukrainian military… by sending
military hardware to what all
presumed must have been a poorly
constituted army… so that, at a
minimum, they would have had a
fighting chance against both
Russia and its sponsored and
fully armed rebels?
To answer
that question we have to look
not only at what the Ukrainian
military is composed of, but
what it did with those assets
when Russia came knocking.
Reading the press and watching
what has been happening on TV,
one would be forgiven for
thinking that the Ukrainian
military was bereft of any
strength and certainly no match
for the Russian military. Worse,
most reporting has suggested
that the separatist rebels are
better equipped and operate as a
more disciplined fighting force
than the Ukrainian army. If that
is the case, then the cause of
this small war aside, perhaps
the U.S. should have come to the
rescue of the Ukrainian
military. If not with manpower,
at least with weaponry. But is
that really the case?
One can
see an example of the reporting
on the battles the Ukrainian
military was having with the
Russian backed rebels by reading
the reporting of a well
respected Eastern European
reporter, M. M. Hodarenok. In
October he penned an article, in
the Russian language,
entitled How to Disorganize An
Army. It suggested that the
Ukrainian military was near to
useless. His reporting indicated
that in fighting the rebels the
Ukrainian army “suffered [a]
humiliating defeat” and “lost
practically all [of their] heavy
arms.” He went on to say that
the Ukrainian military had only
a “few serviceable planes and
helicopters” and that the
“fighting spirit and ability to
be at war” was compromised, even
within the regular army.
His reporting was picked up and
echoed around the world. Many in
the U.S. felt pity for the
Ukrainian military… such a small
country… surely no match for
Russia.
So they said.
But what
is the truth? Is the Ukraine a
minimalist military might,
unable to fight to protect its
own territory and people? Or is
the truth something else?
Surely, one would expect that
before America goes running off
to war to help some defenseless
little country fight off a
bigger bully it would know what the
capabilities of that country
are. No? And the same is true
when it comes to sending arms to
help them… before sending arms
shouldn’t the U.S. find out what
they need or even if they need
them at all?
As it turns out, if
one studies the true military
posture of the Ukraine what one
finds is that while the country
certainly does not have a
military as robust as that of
Russia, the Ukrainian military
is nothing to sneeze at. While
European publications suggest
that the Ukrainian air force is
on its back, with few
serviceable aircraft, our
investigation shows otherwise.
While they claim that almost
every Ukrainian air force plane
that flies is shot down within
minutes of its appearing over
the east, our analysis suggests
that this is simply not the
case.
- Ukrainian Air Force
Far
from having lost control of the
airspace over the Ukraine, our
investigations showed that while
some losses have occurred the
air force is still in good
health and able to fight.
Specifically, as of August 29
the Ukrainian Air Force had lost
to the rebels some 10 war
planes. This included 3
transport aircraft, 1 SU-24
bomber, 2 MiG-29 fighters and 4
SU-25 attack planes. In addition
to this one more SU-25 was
permanently lost due to
mechanical failures that made it
simply not worth the effort of
repairing.
All in all then
there were a total of 8 combat
aircraft lost in fighting with
the rebel separatists.
Considering that the rebels were
backed by Russian air
surveillance and SAM
equivalents, 8 attack aircraft
and a couple of transport planes
doesn’t seem so bad. Or is it?
Researching things further we
were able to find data from
official Ukrainian sources that
listed the number and type of
armament systems and assets
owned by the Ukrainian
military.[2] Showing not just
what the Ukrainian military has,
but where each air force asset
was located within the country,
it was easy for us to deduce
that during the August period in
question when the world was
saying that the Ukraine didn’t
have the kind of armament and
manpower it needed to stand up
to the Russian backed rebels,
from an air force standpoint
anyway… it had in a combat-ready
state some 33–34 SU-24 bombers,
20–24 SU-27 fighters, 80 MiG-29
fighters, and 31–36 SU-25 attack
aircraft, for a total of about
170 warplanes ready and able to
be launched.
One can add to this
another 10 - 15 SU-27 and MiG-29
aircraft that were either off
line in storage or under repair.
And to this could also be added
another 30–40 obsolete (but
still quite suitable for use in
a low grade conflict of this
type) strike fighter MiG-27s.
Finally, to this total could be
added an additional 72 attack
helicopters (what the Ukraine
refers to as “shock
helicopters”) of the Mi-24
variety (of these, 4 had been
shot down in conflict with the
rebels).
All totaled then, the Ukraine
air force was able to mount in
excess of 297 combat aircraft
and helicopters in its fight
against Putin’s rebels. The
claim then by European media
that the Ukraine was suffering
irrevocable losses at the hands
of the rebels was simply not
true. Yes, it had lost some 4
percent of the original quantity
of combat-ready planes and
helicopters at its disposal, but
it’s air force was far from
defeated. The country was still
very much able to control its
own destiny.
In terms of whether
the United States needed to
quickly send combat aircraft of
its own to rescue the Ukraine,
our conclusion is that it
certainly didn’t appear so. Weak
American President or not,
the Ukraine seemed—at least from
this perspective—to be able to
stand on its own and defend
itself quite well, thank you.
From what we can see,
press reports were simply wrong
when they claimed that “almost
all [combat aircraft] were hit”
by the rebels. Instead of
needing U.S. and/or NATO air
support what was needed instead
was a robust counteroffensive on
the part of the Ukrainian
military. That is, before Uncle
Sam should think of trying to
rescue the country it should
make an effort to prod the
Ukrainian government to do more
on its own to defend itself and
drive out the rebels.
The least
the Ukraine should do is display for the
world that it will vigorously
fight to save itself… by
actually vigorously fighting…
before it cries wolf and asks
for help. With nearly 300
flyable combat aircraft at its
disposal, but few if any in the
air fighting the rebels, one can
be forgiven for asking why
American help is needed.
- More Than Just Aircraft, Tanks Too
To
be fair, a country’s military
does not stand on its air force
alone. So before saying that
America’s help isn’t needed in
the Russian–Ukraine fight we
should take a moment to look at
the rest of the Ukraine’s
military capabilities.
Not
surprisingly, tanks in the Armed
Forces of the Ukraine (variously
AFU, ZFU and VSU;
Ukrainian: Збройні сили України
or ЗСУ; and Zbroyni Syly
Ukrayiny or ZSU) are in much
bigger supply
than aircraft. This is because
Russia's predecessor, the USSR, had intended that the
Ukraine provide the bulk of the USSR's
southern defense against any
invaders, and so equipped it to do so. Planning on the
Ukraine providing a robust
anti-tank defense against the
west (read: NATO and the U.S.),
the USSR made sure that the AFU
had more armored weapons than
any of their other captive
states.
Exact figures are
difficult to come by, but it is
possible to extrapolate the
number of tanks the Ukraine has
on hand by looking at the number
of tanks repaired in recent
conflicts and applying a
standard failure rate, reverse
calculated from the MBTF (Mean
Time Between Failure) rate for
Russian class armored vehicles.
The figure so obtained can then
be extrapolated to come up with
the likely total number of tanks
the country has. As a cross
check, it is possible to also
compare the total number of
losses the Ukraine suffered in
armored vehicles during the 9
years of the Russian Afghan war
to see if the repair rate there
matches the MBTF rate we
calculated.
As a base for our
calculations, we used the fact
that in the case of the
Ukraine’s participation in the
Russian Afghan war they lost
some 147 tanks in that conflict.
One can compare that to their
losses in fighting the rebels
over 3 months in Donbass. In
this latter instance they lost
some 67 armored units, of which
30 were damaged beyond repair,
plus about 75 BMP-2 infantry
combat vehicles, and 140 BMD-1
airborne infantry troop armored
vehicles.[3]
Admittedly, this level of
loss is high for such a small
engagement, however, two things
must be kept in mind: 1) the
determination of the Ukraine to
fight for its territory can be
seen in the extent to which it
forcefully fought and accepted
losses in Donbass—it appears
that the Ukrainian military is
not afraid of armed conflict—and
2), while the losses are large
for such a small engagement one
needs to put them in perspective
in relation to the total number
of armored vehicles and tanks
the Ukraine has.
Out of all of
this we were able to determine
that the AFU currently fields
about 700 heavy tanks and 2,500
armored combat vehicles of
lesser strengths. Adding to
this, data for 2010 showed that
the Ukraine had an additional
2,650 smaller sized T-64, T-72
and T-80 tanks, for a combined
total of 5,850 armored vehicles.
If this seems like a high number
for such a small country the
reader should remember that the
Soviet Union and its former
satellite countries fielded the
world’s largest collection of
tanks and tank corps of any
nation. When the USSR collapsed
most of these assets went to the
satellite states, with the
Ukraine receiving the largest
contingent of them. At the time
of the collapse of the USSR the
Ukraine held some 6,500 tanks
alone… not to mention other
armored vehicles of lesser
strength. It’s only natural then
that today the Ukraine still has
at its disposal a plethora of armored vehicles
and trained men to man them.
Considering then
the previously mentioned loss of
147 tanks to date in fighting
the Russian armed rebels, the
Ukrainian military has more than
enough held in reserve to
replace these losses, and do so
again and again if necessary
until the rebels are defeated.
As to how many tanks the
Ukrainian army is fielding in
battles with the rebels, our
research puts this number at
about 560 tanks, supported by
1,300 armored personnel
carriers, BMPs and BMDs.
Finally, as to the Ukraine’s
ability to maintain a steady and
consistent level of armored
warfare against the rebels, we
should recognize that within the
territory of the Ukraine itself
are located the actual factories
and plants that manufactured
most of these vehicles. This
capability exists because back
during the time of the USSR when
the Ukraine was part of it, it
was determined that tank
manufacture would take place in
the Ukraine, along with all of
the work related to the repair,
restoration and modernization of
the Soviet Union’s entire fleet
of armored vehicles. Now that
Russia and the Ukraine have gone
separate ways, this minor fact
represents a serious loss to the
Russian military… but a huge
benefit in terms of the
Ukrainian army being able to
stand toe to toe against the
Russian armed rebels.
-
Not Just
Hardware, But Manpower Too
Yet
as we all know, aircraft, tanks
and artillery are nothing
without trained fighting men to
man them. To date it appears
that the Ukraine has lost
between 1,500 and 2,000 killed
or missing military personnel in
fighting against the rebels,
with an additional 1,500 – 2,000
being wounded, with the majority
of them being able to be treated
and return to battle. The
question is, how does this stack
up against available fighting
men and how do these losses
correlate to the number of men
actually in battle?[4]
Combat
wise, our estimates show that
the Ukrainian army has fielded
some 20 thousand men in the
actual battlespace, referred to
by the rebels as Novorossiya (New Russia). In addition to this, in the operational reserve
area that backs the battle space
(Raisin, Slavyansk and
Kramatorsk) there are another 6
thousand fighting troops
available. Supporting this
combined total of 26,000 are
between 9 and 14 thousand
additional transport division
troops and local security
services (adjunct military
police), which makes for a total
manpower complement taking a
real part in military operations
of between 35,000 and 40,000
men. Compared to this figure
then, the 4,000 in general
losses amounts to about 16% of
the total number of men involved
in the fight, with irrevocable
losses (KIA) amounting to only
5%.
What do we conclude from
this? We conclude that while the
Ukrainian military has suffered
a comparatively high level of
losses in its battles with the
rebels, the level is certainly
not a record and there is no
reason to suggest that this
level of loss presupposes that
the rebels will eventually win.
This is especially the case when
one considers the history of how
the Ukrainian army fights and
the level of losses it has come
to expect in its combat
encounters. Two historical
examples will serve to make our
point:
In August 1939,
just weeks before Hitler and
Stalin invaded Poland, the
Soviet Union and Japan fought a
massive tank battle on the
Mongolian border. At that time
the battle was the largest tank battle the
world had ever seen. Under the
then unknown Georgy Zhukov the
Soviets won a crushing victory,
killing some 70,000 Japanese
soldiers. In search of raw
materials to grow their nation
and economy, the defeat
persuaded the Japanese to expand
into the Pacific (China, Korea,
Burma, Vietnam, etc.) rather
than into the eastern USSR. Also
as a result of this battle and their loss, the Japanese
decided that if it was going to have to fight to acquire territory to secure the natural resources it needed to expand its Empire, the United States
would likely prove a weaker
opponent than the Soviet Union.
With this in mind, to assure that the U.S. did not
oppose their efforts to expand
into the Pacific they determined
to attack Pearl Harbor and
further weaken the U.S.
military.
The Ukraine fought in
the Battle of Hal Khin Gol, on
the side of the Soviets.
Comparatively speaking the
terrain at Hal Khin Gol was the
same as that the Ukraine fights
over today against the rebels: a
steppe, with armed conflict
taking place in limited time and
space. At Hal Khin Gol the
Ukraine fielded 69,000 men, 498
tanks and 385 armored vehicles.
Their general losses were 24,000
troops of which 8,000 were KIA,
resulting in a ratio of 35% for
general losses and 12% KIA. On this basis, the Ukrainian military would think that their losses to date of 5% against the rebels is excellent.
Example 2: The
Karelian Offensive (a.k.a.
the Vyborg–Petrozavodsk
Offensive)
The Karelian
Offensive took place in August
1941 and was a strategic
operation by the Soviet Union’s
Leningrad and Karelian Fronts
against Finland. It took place
on the Karelian Isthmus in East
Karelia and was a continuation
of the war on the Eastern
Front of World War II. The main
strategic objective of the
offensive was to push Finnish
forces away from the north
of Leningrad and drive Finland
out of the war. The Ukraine
contributed some 7 infantry
divisions to the operation,
equivalent to some 120–130
thousand troops. General losses
for the month of battle amounted
to 25,000 men, or 20% of the
complement supplied.
Notwithstanding this, in some
areas of the front losses were
much higher, including in one
case where an infantry regiment
lost 480 KIA with 1,622 WIA, or
almost 50% of its regular TOE.
By this example too one can see
that the Ukrainian army expects
to suffer heavier losses than
any western army.
From these two
examples alone we can see that
the 5% losses calculated, based
on the number of men actually in
battle against the rebels, are
nothing out of the ordinary for
the Ukrainian military. They
would certainly be considered
sustainable, and not cause
military leaders to back away
from pressing the fight.
Manpower wise, as of the end of
2013 the Ukrainian military
service contained some 220
thousand troops, including what
they classified as 49,000 Land
Forces, 40,000 Frontier Guards,
and 33,000 Internal Troops, all
operationally held within the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. To
this number of 220,000 can be
added another 30,000 SBU plus a
separate battalion of marines
and two regiments of special
troops of the intelligence
service (known as GSh). Backing
all of this up of course is the
population itself, amounting to
more than 35 million people
(excluding the Lugansk and
Donetsk areas, which are the
areas under attack). This number
is significant as from these 35
million people a very modest
effort at mobilizing manpower
could easily and quickly put
another 500,000 men under the
arms.[5]
In conclusion, if
one looks at the Ukraine’s air,
armored and infantry
capabilities alone there is no
reason to believe that it could
not win the war it is fighting
against the rebels. Equally
conclusive, most analysts would
say that even if Russia itself
joined the fray and put its own
men on the front lines the
Ukraine could still win. All
that is necessary for this to
happen is for morale amongst the
Ukrainian people to remain high
and in favor of fighting for
their own independence, and
their opinions to turn against
Russia.
This is in fact
beginning to happen. Already, an
active part of the population of
the Ukraine has begun to express
fierce hatred towards Russia and
its president. Not surprisingly,
we were able to ferret this
interesting fact out by simply
surfing Ukrainian social network
forums, as they provide as good
a source of information about
the Ukrainian public’s feelings
as they do about the feelings of
the people of any other country.
In this instance anyway, social
media reveals the truth
behind the happenings in the
Ukraine; and in the Ukraine’s
case the truth is that the
people of that country have
turned against Russia.
Regarding
our original first two questions, our unmistakeable conclusion is that at
this point there is no need for
the U.S. to send troops to help
the Ukraine, nor is there even a
need to send arms. In both of
these categories the Ukraine has
all it needs to defend itself
and fight its own battle.
Further, considering the long
and close history between the
Ukraine and Russia, if battle is
to be avoided and peace to be
reached through other means, the
chances are better that the
Ukrainian government could
negotiate an acceptable
settlement with Putin more so
than Barack Obama could.
All of
this suggests that while the
small war in the Ukraine is
worth America’s fight on
principles alone, it is not
worth the fight by any other
measure. That is, sometimes not
every war worth fighting is
worth fighting. On this one,
President Obama appears to have gotten it right.
We
wish the Ukrainian people
success in their fight against
the Russian backed rebels. When
and if they have expended their
blood and treasure, have
decimated their military and
made the case that they gave
their all to maintain their
freedom and independence from
Russia, and are facing likely
defeat, then perhaps America
should consider joining in on their side. It may sound cruel to say this, but the fact is that if a people are not ready to wage all out war to defend themselves and fight for their freedoms, America does not belong in that
war. This is especially so when
it comes to countries more than
adequately staffed and supplied
to fight the war they face.
Footnotes:
[1] Distrust between
Anglo-American and the Soviet Union:
McCullough, D., Truman, Touchstone.
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text click here:
[2] Our data was
obtained from a document called the
White Book, which lists the composition
of both the armed forces and the types
and number of arms held by the military
of the Ukraine.
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text click here:
[3] The BMP-2 (Boyevaya
Mashina Pekhoty, Russian: Боевая Машина
Пехоты; infantry combat vehicle) is a
second-generation, amphibious infantry
fighting vehicle introduced in the 1980s
in the Soviet Union, following on from
the BMP-1 of the 1960s. The BMD-1 is a
Soviet airborne amphibious
tracked infantry fighting vehicle, which
was introduced in 1969 and first seen by
the West in 1970. BMD stands for Boyevaya
Mashina Desanta (Боевая Машина Десанта,
literally "Combat Vehicle of the
Airborne"). It can be dropped by
parachute and although it resembles
the BMP-1 it is in fact much smaller.
The BMD-1 was classified as an IFV
(infantry fighting vehicle) by
the Soviet Army's airborne divisions. An
improved variant of BMD-1 was developed,
theBMD-2. The BMD-1 also provided a
basis for the BTR-D airborne
multi-purpose tracked APC.
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text click here:
[4] The Ukrainian
government claims that it had lost 967
killed as of the end of September. Our
research shows this number to be far
smaller than actual losses incurred, and
so we stand by our estimate of 1,500 –
2,000.
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text click here:
[5] Some sources put
the estimate of Ukrainian forces at
220,000, versus our estimate of 139,000.
see for example the
Ukrainian Media Group.
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text click here:
Timeline:
NOVEMBER
Nov 21: Yanukovich announces abandonment of a trade
agreement with the EU, seeking closer ties with Moscow.
Nov 30: Public support grows for pro-EU anti-government
protesters as images of them bloodied by police crackdown spread online and
in the media.
DECEMBER
Dec 1: About 300,000 people protest in Kiev's
Independence Square. The City Hall is seized by activists.
Dec 17: Russian President Vladimir Putin announces
plans to buy $15bn in Ukrainian government bonds and a cut in cost of
Russia's natural gas for Ukraine.
JANUARY
Jan 16 : Anti-protest laws are passed and quickly
condemned as "draconian".
Jan 22: Two protesters die after being hit with live
ammunition. A third dies following a fall during confrontation with police.
Jan 28: Mykola Azarov resigns as Ukraine's prime
minister and the parliament repeals anti-protest laws that caused the
demonstrations to escalate in the first place.
Jan 29: A bill is passed, promising amnesty for
arrested protesters if seized government buildings are relinquished.
Jan 31: Opposition activist Dmytro Bulatov found
outside Kiev after being imprisoned and tortured for eight days, apparently
at the hands of a pro-Russian group.
FEBRUARY
Feb 16: Opposition activists end occupation of Kiev
City Hall. In exchange 234 jailed protesters are released.
Feb 18: More street clashes leave at least 18 dead and
around a hundred injured. Violence begins when protesters attack police
lines after the parliament stalls in passing constitutional reform to limit
presidential powers. Protesters take back government buildings.
- - - -
August 13: At least 12 Ukrainian nationalist fighters
from the Right Sector group are killed and an unknown number taken captive
when their bus is ambushed in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine announces the aid
convoy will not be allowed into the country due to concerns Russia did not
co-ordinate with the Red Cross and is not following aid mission regulations.
August 14: Ukraine's government says the aid will be
allowed into the country's east, provided certain stipulations are met,
including the point at which the trucks cross being under control of the
Ukraine's military.
August 18: Rebel missile fire hits a convoy of buses
carrying refugees from the east Ukrainian city of Luhansk resulting in
dozens of casualties, Ukrainian military spokesmen says.
August 19: Ukrainian government troops fight
pro-Russian rebels in the streets of Luhansk and capture most of a town near
the eastern city of Donetsk, tightening the noose around the key rebel-held
stronghold.
August 22: Ukrainian authorities say about 90 trucks
from a Russian aid convoy have crossed into Ukraine without permission,
branding the act as "direct invasion".
August 26: Ukraine says its troops have captured a
group of Russian military servicemen who had crossed the border into eastern
Ukraine. Russian and Ukrainian presidents meet in Minsk face-to-face for the
first time since June.
August 30: Ukraine announces that it has abandoned an
eastern city of Ilovaisk through a corridor after days of encirclement by
the rebels.
August 31: Ukraine hands over a group of captured
Russian paratroopers and Russia returns 63 Ukrainian soldiers. Meanwhile,
pro-Russian separatists attack a Ukrainian naval vessel in the Azov Sea by
firing artillery from the shore.
SEPTEMBER
September 5: Ukraine's president orders government
forces to cease fire following an agreement signed at talks attended by
representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the rebels and the OSCE in Minsk,
Belarus.
September 15: Ukraine's president offers parts of the
country's separatist east limited self-rule for three years under the terms
of a peace plan reached with Russia. September 20: Participants in Ukrainian
peace talks agree to create a buffer zone to separate government troops and
pro-Russian fighters, as well as withdraw foreign fighters and heavy weapons
from the area of conflict in the east.
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