This is the continuation of a story begun on our May 2015 Home Page. To go to an archived version of that page, click here: May 2015 Home Page Archive. To return to this month's actual Home Page, click on the Signal Corps orange Home Page menu item in the upper left corner of this page.

continuing...

Returning to the story: on Eisenhower's and Bradley's inspection tour one of their first stops was at Patton's 3rd Army HQ, in Nancy, about 30 miles north and 60 miles east of both the 103rd Signal Company and Eisenhower’s worry spot: the Colmar Pocket. What they saw discouraged them, as they determined that Patton was in no condition to support a serious offensive action. Despite his reputation for being able to beg, borrow or steal what he needed to keep his men on the move, the truth was that Patton’s Army simply did not have enough supplies to keep moving forward. Bold fighters aside, there was just not enough logistical support available to him to sustain an aggressive drive.

From meeting with Patton, Ike and Omar Bradley moved on to meet with Devers and Patch, where they rehashed every sort of alternative they could come up with to bring more supplies of men and material to the front. Finding no ready solution, they moved on to Sarrebourg to look at the state the XVth Corps was in, then on to Brooks' VI Corps at St. Dié, finally ending their journey with an inspection of the French Army, which was further south still.

In a state of gloominess, Eisenhower concluded that his Army was in no condition to cross the Rhine any time soon. Devers’ plans were to be abandoned.

Instead, Eisenhower ordered Generals Devers and Patch to focus on helping the French Army eliminate the German 19th Army elements that appeared to Eisenhower to be in a strong defensive pocket at Colmar. Whether due to pique at Eisenhower not allowing him to move forward with his own plans to cross the Rhine, or for some other reason, Devers made no bones about the fact that he felt that not only was Eisenhower’s Colmar Pocket worry nothing more than a pipe dream, it was a mistake to base both strategy and tactics on its existence. As far as he was concerned, the German 19th Army had ceased to exist. What the Germans might have posed as a threat to him in the past was no longer a threat to his forces today. 

With this as his mindset, he left it to the French to do the bulk of the fighting with the Germans, sending them out in two columns to attack and free Strasbourg from German occupation, rather than going after the German threat that Eisenhower instructed him to take care of at Colmar.

The result: the German forces in the Colmar Pocket were not eliminated. Further, not only did they exist, but they were soon strengthened to the point that they were able to harry the southern end of the French–German border for another 3 months until eventually Eisenhower stepped in again and directed that they be addressed, immediately. In the mean time, the French victory in “freeing” Strasbourg was overturned when the Germans came back and drove the French out. As Ike had predicted, the Colmar Pocket proved to be a sore spot in the Allied lines, delaying even further Eisenhower's plans to cross the Rhine.

More determined than ever, Eisenhower stuck to his policy that called for destroying all German forces west of the Rhine, up to and including the Netherlands and down to and including the Swiss border, before he would begin any major operations east of the Rhine River. For the 103rd Infantry Division and its Signaleers, that meant a long winter of fighting to try and clear Germans from their operational region; for while in the end Eisenhower’s operational concept relied on a main Allied push into Germany from the north, if the Germans repulsed that attempt Ike had every intention of loosing the 103rd to take it to the Germans in the south, crossing the Rhine wherever they happened to be at the time, and moving on to Berlin.

Thus we find ourselves in November, 1944, with the 103rd Signal Company on the move. Under command of Captain Beck (Signal OCS Class 42-06), he and his men were moving in lock step with the 103rd Infantry Division, fighting their way through the Vosges Mountains.

On November 24 the men found themselves moving late in the afternoon through the town of La Pecherie, working their way up snow covered mountain roads, deeper into the Vosges, on their way to the town of St. Dié. When they got there what they saw was a town completely leveled and burned to the ground, from a battle that had taken place only a few hours before. Many commented that the ruins of the town stood in stark contrast to the beautiful hills and wooded forests that they had just passed through.

All around them were signs of a hasty German retreat, but this was not the time for them to stop and bivouac. Instead, they pushed on with the 103rd I.D. As dusk approached, the 103rd arrived in the town of Provencheres, in Alsace-Lorraine. It should be remembered that before the war Alsace was part of France. One of Hitler’s first moves in starting the war was to occupy Alsace, returning it, he said, to rightful German sovereignty.

As the men sought out a place to sleep for the night, they were warned to keep their eyes open, as the town had just been retaken from the Germans that morning. Most of the men of the 103rd Signal Company bedded down in a textile mill that made women’s silk stockings. As they set about stuffing their pockets with fine French stockings to trade with the women they would meet as they moved through the war (for what, we can only guess…), talk turned to their day’s march and how, just before leaving La Pecherie, they had seen General Eisenhower drive by with Lt. General Patch. They laughed about having seen Ike and saluting him in person. Little did they know he was there assessing whether they were in fit enough condition to cross the Rhine and invade Germany. Little too did they know he thought that they were sitting on a time bomb, as the Germans in front of them were far more prepared for war than these fresh out of Texas training recruits were.

As to what the men did as the 103rd I.D. fought its way forward, they were along for more than just the ride. As the Division’s Signal Company, most of their work focused on keeping Division and lower level commanders in communication with all of the various HQs.

As an example, Colonel Donovan P. Yeuell was the 411th Regimental Commander. He had the habit of setting up two Command Posts, one in the rear, and the other in an advanced position, where his infantry men were fighting. The 103rd Signal Company directly supported him by providing men to assure that he had functional radio communications not only for his CP in the rear, but wherever he happened to be as he moved throughout the day, in real time.

Usually this caused the 103rd Signaleers to ride along with Colonel Yeuell, to make sure that he had radio communication available to him both at his rear CP, as well as his advanced Regimental CP, as well as at any advance CP he might stop at along the way. Typically, this meant that a floating radio communication net had to be set up to move along with him such that, as he toured his combat battalion commander’s HQs, he would still be in communication with everyone else. Further, since Colonel Yeuell tended to order that his Battalion commands set up their own CPs alongside that of one of their own infantry companies, this meant that the 103rd Signaleers not only spent their day riding with Colonel Yeuell, but also nearly every one of his subordinate commanders, down to the commanders of each Infantry Company that might be located along the front lines, in the thick of the fighting. For the 103rd Signal Company then, daily life meant being glued to the sides of those infantry men and commanders in the thick of the fighting… both providing them with communications, as well as fighting alongside of them.

In the case of Colonel Yeuell, that meant that the 103rd Signaleers that supported him moved with him in rolling combat throughout France... first in Combrimont, then quickly through the 409th's sector at Frapelle and Provencheres, and then on through a series of rapid advance movements to attack Steige and Maisonsgoutte, until the Germans in each of these towns had been overcome and driven out. And they did this all in 10 days.

Seven battles in ten days was what it actually amounted to. When it was over, quite a few of the men said that absolutely none of the training they received in Texas prepared them for this kind of action.

As an aside, during this freewheeling combat offensive, Colonel Donoval P. Yeuell personally captured two German prisoners, with the help of a couple of Signaleers that were travelling with him, as he and they accompanied the lead infantry platoon as it moved into the town of Maisonsgoutte.

In the end, if it were not for the radio net that the 103rd set up and operated for the Colonel, out of his own jeep, these kind of fast moving situations would not have been possible. For Colonel Yeuell to command his troops on the fly, he needed constant contact with Division Headquarters. The men of the 103rd Signal company made that possible.

Daily combat was thus a real experience for the Officers and men of the 103rd. In another case the advance Command Post for the 411th was set up in a building just opposite a German position. As told by Private Evans, one of the men of the 103rd Signal Company that supported the 411th, “The building entrance was at street level, but the building was dug into the mountainside and extended out to the rear so the ground floor in front was the second story in the rear. The rear exit was a story lower. There was an outhouse behind the building.”

“The CP was at street level, and our radio crew was sleeping in the rear of the same floor.

“At dawn, 411th infantrymen who had slept in most of the other buildings in town had fallen out into the street and were preparing to move out against the Krauts. Then all hell broke loose. The CP came under heavy enemy artillery fire that threatened to destroy it. The very first few rounds landed outside the CP building directly under the heavily shuttered downstairs windows in the rear of the building.

“A second and third round came in very close to the point of impact of the first and then rounds came in all up and down the street. The infantrymen were caught by surprise and there were more than fifty casualties within a few yards of the CP.

“An emergency Battalion Aid Station was quickly set up in one room of the CP at street level.

“Someone risked a look out through the shutters and shouted, "Hey, there are wounded down there." I ran down the stairs to the lower level at the rear of the building and saw an unconscious G.I. lying on the ground. I crawled out and dragged him back inside. There was no visible sign of a wound. As soon as I got him inside the building I got my shoulder under him and carried him up to street level where the aid station was being set up.

“When I went out for him I thought that I heard someone else crying for help so I went back down to the rear exit. There was another infantryman there at the door. He said that he was looking for his buddy who had brought a German prisoner down to the outhouse and had not returned with him.

“I told them that his buddy was wounded but that I had gotten him up to the battalion aid station.

“The first artillery shell that had wounded his buddy had hit directly behind the outhouse and had blown the German prisoner out of it. He was sitting on the ground crying, "Mama, Mama," We ran out to get him. The other G.I. grabbed his shoulder and I grabbed his feet. He was seriously wounded and one of his legs pulled right out of his pants. We managed to get him into the building and up to the aid station but he didn't make it. He was too severely injured. The American soldier that I brought in did survive. His wounds were serious, too, but they got to them quickly enough to save his life.

“A 411th infantryman, a private named Edward Holt, acted on his own initiative to locate the enemy artillery battery. He got so close that he had to call in fire from our artillery right on his own position in order to knock out the German artillery. For his heroic actions he received the Distinguished Service Cross.”

In spite of being in nearly constant combat, the primary effort of the 103rd Signal Company's front line Signaleers centered around setting up and operating radio nets. This meant that they travelled with front line Infantry Lieutenants, which in turn meant that they tended to bunk where the front line infantry men of the 103rd I.D. bunked… in whatever place they ended up at the end of a hard day of fighting. Sometimes those places were terrible… cold, damp, indefensible, and on the other side of the street or river from angry Germans. At other times they weren’t so bad. Captain Beck tells of a couple of pleasant nights he and his men spent while “on the road” and fighting.

One occasion he told of in letters he sent to his family back home occurred at Thanksgiving time, in November 1944. On that occasion the 103rd Signal Company moved into a town and occupied several of of the houses along the main street. Captain Beck set up his Company Headquarters in a farm house, just outside of town… as he put it… “amidst a cow, about 50 rabbits and a few chickens.”

Just about the time his HQ was set up, the owner returned.

“He was so happy to see us [Americans] in his house [that] he dug up some cognac that he had buried under the house, and gave all the men around a drink.”

“The poor man had only recently escaped from the Nazis. The farm was damaged and pilfered a little [but otherwise suited our needs]. I plunked my bedroll down in the kitchen.

“[As I was settling in for the night] the Frenchman [began] eating a hunk of old dry bread for supper. I told my First Sergeant to feed him out of the mess hall, which I had set up in a stable.”

Captain Beck went on to say that while the smell in the stables might have been a bit challenging to deal with while eating,

“The weather [was] always so nasty, that any dry place [was] heaven....”

He closed his letter by saying that

“Today was Thanksgiving.  We had 449 lbs. of turkey [for the company to chow down on]. It pays to be in the army. Or does it?”

On still another occasion he found an even better place for his men to set up camp and get a little R&R as the war tore on around them. In this case, in a letter he wrote home on December 2, 1944, he told of hearing that some of his men had set up a radio net in a rich mansion just outside of town.

“High above this town [of St. Martin] is a beautiful chateau untouched by the ravages of war. When it was under siege I was on the outskirts, entering it when our infantry had pushed the krauts further back. This town was earmarked for a Div CP and I was on the hunt for a place to put my company. The Chateau caught my fancy as I rode through the now deserted street looking for a possible sniper.”

As Captain Beck approached the Chateau he was approached by its owner, a women whose “hair was white, done up, in an upswing."

“I spoke to her in French telling what I desired. She spoke a little English. Soon her son (about 36 years old) appeared. He, too, understood a little English. After they learned of what I wanted they showed me the grounds.

“There were four very beautiful buildings, two with towers, a private motion-picture house, a chapel, several bath houses, a swimming-pool and an underground shelter. Beneath the swimming-pool was a Turkish bath (inoperative at the time). The driveway swung all around the houses and continued on out. All the houses were well furnished.

A few hours later, Captain Beck ordered the 103rd Signal Company to move onto the property and settle in.

“My office was located in the main house (The Master's quarters) in two rooms overlooking the mountains. When we were set up the son, (his name was Jean Klienknischt) paid me a call and told me about himself, his mother and the grounds.

“Primarily they are very wealthy (or were). His father was a Professor of Surgery in Paris, but died in February. Jean, unmarried, was left to run the eight factories owned by the family. He and his mother live in the Chateau alone, with about five servants (maids, housekeepers, cook, gardener, etc). Their main home is in Strosbourg [sic] which had been in German hands until then. This was only their summer estate.

“They lost a great deal by the Nazi occupation, but nevertheless were not poor as most French were. Reasons why they weren't completely wiped out are many, most of which will never be known. The old man was quite a public figure for one. Jean had a great deal of influence in the manufacture of goods, such as cloth, wool and silk—all used for uniforms. They lived under the Nazi yoke for four years—as a result they speak German quite well. Suspicious? At first I was, but the Counter Intelligence Corps checked them and they are basically French.

“They lived in the privately built bomb proof shelter for weeks while all the fighting was going, existing on black Kraut bread and vegetables.

“When it became quiet they ventured out to obtain more food and water from the house. The Jerries had started to shell the grounds many times. During one of these quiet periods, as the old woman was coming out of the house, she heard a motor coming up the driveway. She was badly frightened. She told me later that she was amazed and happily surprised to see "little truck." It was SHELDON and myself coming up the driveway in my jeep (Sheldon, as you know, is my driver and my man Friday.) And that's where I started this description.

“They gave me whatever I wanted–not that I was demanding. All my men were careful not to break anything or act impolitely. The house had steam heat, lights, a beautiful radio from Germany in my room and all conveniences that you could think of. A piano was even there, which AMBROSE (remember him?) played.

“I operated out of there for about four days, (after which) I went back to the mud and dirt and torn buildings.

“Coming from the mud and dirt it was a revelation. (And then) we pushed on, and it was just a memory. "Rags to riches to rags" or "once in a lifetime" – call it what you like.”

Today as we read these recollections Captain Beck’s story seems like those of so many others who served in WWII… pathos, a bit of humor, more sadness, some joy, followed by hope, all underwritten with an unstated but ever present great longing for home… and all said without mentioning the dirty part of war, the killing part. Clearly, in the above story Captain Beck has sifted out all the war events he and his men lived daily… the ones that brutalized them. Why did he do this? For the same reason every other man in every other war has ever done it… for the sake of the family at home reading the letter.

This is normal. Most men in battle, when writing home, write of warm things, good thoughts, and in the process try to convey the feeling that they are fine and safe. But it must be remembered, in Captain Beck’s case he was at that time just over 25, had been commissioned to the rank of Captain less than 3 months earlier, was fresh out of Fort Monmouth OCS, and was leading the 103rd Infantry Division’s Headquarters Signal Company in the midst of very heavy daily battle conditions.

In our eyes, he was a remarkable man. While deep down inside he still held the youth of an American kid, traipsing through Europe tasting the luxuries of life that Europe’s richest families showered themselves with, on the outside he was already a grizzled combat veteran. And to his benefit, the way this young but grizzled combat veteran commanded his men earned him a Bronze Star.

- - - 

With this temporary reprieve from the filth of war behind them, the 103rd’s next objectives were the towns of LeHohwald and Barr, and from there Dambach-la-ville, a small town just 5 miles north of Selestat, and then Selestat itself. During this time the men began to notice that the Germans were getting pretty good at homing in on their radio signals… to the point that if they stopped to transmit and stayed for any length of time in that position, artillery fire would soon rain in on them.

To overcome this problem they turned to an easy but creative solution of the type that only Signaleers could come up with. An early version of what Signaleers in Vietnam did when they kluged together three or four transmitters and stuck them behind the seats of a Commander’s helicopter so that he could hover over a fire fight and call in artillery, talk to his HQ in the rear, call for Fast Movers to take out the enemy, and direct the battle on the ground… all at the same time. This time however the idea was to locate the radio jeep in the best place possible for a solid 5 X 5 signal strength, leave it there even while artillery landed around it, but move the radio operators to safety by moving them from the vicinity of the jeep itself. This they did by making use of something all radio jeeps were required to carry at the time, but no one knew why.

For some strange reason, there was a directive that all radio vehicles have with them a spool of "Spiral-4" cable. In those days Sprial-4 was new and exotic, and most Signaleers had no idea what it did that normal cable couldn’t do. Still, they carried it with them.

As the Germans began to improve their signal tracking capabilities, a good use for Spiral-4 was soon found. What the men did was to rig up a way to run the cable out from where the jeep was located, to a safe place at a safe distance. Cellars of buildings were ideal, but almost any kind of cover would work as long as it was out of artillery range of the immediate vicinity of the radio transmitter in the jeep. With the cable they then separated the insulated conductors such that a portable speaker could be tied onto one pair, while the other pair was attached to the transmission switch. In this way they could send messages over the transmitter, all by remote control. Their only worry was to make sure that the jeep or truck battery was kept charged, and that during this time someone paid attention to the amount of gas in the tank… so that if a crises came up they would have enough gas to pack up and leave before things became hairy.

- - -

By December 1st the 103rd Infantry Division was driving to the east-northeast trying to push the Germans back. Their goal was the earlier mentioned Selestat, a town on the plains southwest of Strasbourg. Unlike earlier however, this time they were entering enemy territory, as not only was resistance tougher, but the native population seemed decidedly on the German’s side. This, along with the simple fact that as the Allies advanced the German supply lines became shorter, made fighting that much more intense. And to add insult to injury, the squabble Eisenhower, Devers and Patch had had earlier, over whether Devers should be allowed to cross the Rhine, had slowed the Ally’s advance so much so that the Germans were able to make use of that time to construct stronger resistance points along the front.

So effective were the Germans at preparing for the Allied advance in the area that while the French had captured Strasbourg on 25 November, they soon lost it. In the process, the Germans put up such a determined defense that while the 409th Regiment’s B company (along with elements of the 36th Infantry Division) had fought their way into Selestat, they were soon cut off and almost completely wiped out.

To help a rescue effort undertaken by Brigadier General Pierce (the Assistant Division Commander), who led a special task force to rescue the men cut off in Selestat, several 103rd Signal Company wire teams, along with a radio team, several Sergeants and an Officer, were dispatched to support General Pierce’s effort.

The rest of the Division, and the 103rd Signal Company, moved on in a motor-march toward Gougenheim in the northeast of Alsace.

It was about this time that the earlier disagreement between Eisenhower and Devers was resolved once and for all. By the 5th of December it became clear that the French First Army in the area of the Colmar Pocket was unable to keep the Germans buttoned up. Eisenhower and SHAEF found this situation intolerable, as having so many Germans running around, ready to move to support wherever the Allies tried to cross the Rhine, meant sure disaster. Despite Devers’ and Patch’s continuing insistence that they would drive the Germans out, and therein create an ideal place from which the Allies could cross the Rhine near Strasbourg, by this time no one bought the plan. Eisenhower put it to bed forever when he ordered the 7th Army to move northward, abandoning its campaign around Strasbourg and the Colmar Pocket, instead to now support the US 3rd Army as it prepared to make an assault across the Rhine River at Manheim.

With this order, the possibility of a drive through Strasbourg and into the heart of Germany ended.

But the war didn’t. For the 103rd, the next obstacle was getting past the Maginot Line and Germany’s Siegfried Line.  With the conclusion of the battle for Selestat, and the 7th Army on its way to support the 3rd Army’s attempt to cross the Rhine at Manheim, the 103rd found itself in tow. For the most part, the men made rapid advancements toward the Franco-German border, through essentially open but wet country.

Sprinkled with rolling hills and small mountains in an area that had been prepared by the French as a defensive barrier to stop Germany from invading their country, the whole idea of going over the Maginot Line in the opposite direction from which it was meant to provide security seemed ludicrous. But that was what the 103rd was doing… taking the French Maginot Line from the back, leaping over it, and now chasing Germans moving away from the Maginot Line, retreating back through the same fields over which that they had once charged towards the Maginot Line.

Lacking any ability to use the Maginot Line’s bunkers for their own benefit, the Germans established their own defenses just beyond the normal fields of fire that extended beyond the Line. As it turned out, this simple expedient worked to stymie the 103rd’s advance, because while in and of itself the Maginot Line provided a strong bulwark against attack, the French never bothered to build the Line as a fortification offering defense-in-depth. That is, yes… it was big, and strong… but it sat there all by itself. No forward defenses, no defenses to the rear, nothing but one long line of concrete bunkers… with no depth to the defense they offered. For an army trying to move forward, from France into Germany (instead of the other way around) the Maginot Line offered nothing of value that could be used as a point of thrust with which to attack the Germans.

As a result, even though the 103rd I.D.'s infantry was able to push the enemy beyond the shallow defensive corridor of the Maginot Line, the bunkers it comprised did little in the way of helping them win the fight, and so were soon left behind. That wouldn’t be the case however when the next road block came up… the German Siegfried Line.

For those that might have forgotten, unlike the Maginot Line, which was one long, cement bunker system with no defense in depth nor any means for swinging its guns around to face to the rear, the Siegfried Line was well laid out. It consisted of groups and segments of camouflaged machine gun emplacements concealed in the mountainsides. Usually grouped into three or more strong-points laid out to provide protective fire for one another, each section provided a formidable defensive system. More importantly, unlike the Maginot Line, they were laid out in depth and in a systemic manner, with layer upon layer of interlocked, hidden defensive strong point positions all positioned to support each other. When it was designed, the idea behind the Siegfried Line was to assure that the attacking forces took such heavy losses that they would simply give up and go home.

Pausing to reflect on how far the 103rd Signal Company had come so far, by this point in its trek to war the unit had fought through heavy resistance as they worked their way through the Vosges Mountains, increasingly greater resistance as they crossed the Meurthe River, and ever increasingly more as they took St. Dié (23 November), captured Diefenbach (29 November) and assaulted and took Selestat on 4 December. It seemed almost as though from their very first day in Europe, the resistance they met was greater with each step they took towards Germany… which is exactly what one would expect.

Along about this time (5 December), the 103rd Infantry Division was reassigned out of the 7th Army XV Corps and into the VI Corps. The following day, December 6th, 1944, the 103rd relieved the 45th and 79th divisions on the Zintel river, from Uttenhofen to Mertzwiller, in the vicinity of Gougenheim. From there, on 10 December 1944, the Signal Company and its Division crossed the Zintzel River at Griesbach. Once on the other side and assembled, they pushed through to Climbach, where finally, on 15 December 1944, they pushed another mile further north and crossed the Lauter River [Ed Note: a.k.a. Wieslauter, it is the upper portion of and left tributary of the Rhine] into Germany.

After so much time, here they were… standing on land they had been preparing to take since the 103rd Signal Company was first activated on 15 November 1942, trained at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, and Camp Howze, Texas, brought ashore in Marseille, France, and fought their way to where they now stood. To most, it was a good feeling, they had entered Germany. Yet it was one filled with trepidation.

Taking not a minute to rest, the 103rd Infantry Division, along with its Signal Support Company, immediately assaulted the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line.

From the 15 of December through to the 22nd the Division fought its way through to the Sarreguemines area, where they settled in to create an active defense, awaiting a German effort to drive them back across the river into France.

Interestingly, the Germans decided not to mount an assault on the 103rd at that time, but instead to move their troops south. This opened up room for the 103rd to maneuver even deeper into Germany, and so on 14 January, 1945, the Division moved to Reichshofen, taking up positions along the Sauer River.

It was during this period, from the time the 103rd Signal Company reached the Maginot Line to the time they settled in along the Sauer River, that they saw some of their most intensive fighting to date. For one thing, they were now within easy reach of the German Luftwaffe, and began to feel the effects. On 6 December 1944, the unit received its first in depth, continuous air assault and strafing. Surprised beyond measure, the Signal OCS Lieutenants commanding the company quickly established an enemy aircraft alert system. While on the surface it was said that its purpose was to alert the Division CP staff and men of an imminent air assault, the truth was probably closer to the point that the 103rd Signal Company itself wanted to know what the heck was going on when all of those aircraft appeared above their heads.

As to how the system worked, it was really quite primitive. Local Anti Aircraft (AA) Battalions broadcast air attack alert warnings, which the 103rd Signal Company picked up and passed on to Division HQ, and as many of the surrounding subordinate commands as could be reached… including, of course, the 103rd Signal Company CP itself. As a measure of warning and security, the system worked well in the CP area, but the Company’s Signal men in the field remained out of the loop, and had to depend on themselves to visually identify any aircraft above them, and provide for their own defense if they wanted to stay alive. Still, it was better than nothing, considering the number of alerts the unit faced each day. Regardless of how well the 103rd was able to prepare for aerial attacks, in the end, as the men were want to say, after crossing into Germany everyone became much more alert, and considerably more adept at finding and “diving into the nearest foxhole, hiding behind the nearest fortification, tree, bridge, vehicle, or even dung pile.”

In one of his letters home, Captain Beck wrote, “This morning a couple of Stukas tore loose out of the sky and went belching their machine-guns at tree-top level. They come in so fast it's hard to spot them. The ack-acks caught one in the nose and it went down in flames. I watched the proceedings from behind a wall 3 feet thick—of concrete. In air-attacks like that the only thing for someone like me to do is get out of the damned way. [Now] every time I hear a motor I get anxious and uneasy. When I get back to the states I'll jump every time I hear a plane.”

Attacks by Stukas or not, the men were ordered to move on. But progress was slow. The Germans may have been giving up ground, but it was begrudgingly and only at the rate of an inch at a time. To slow the 103rd’s onslaught, the Germans wrapped explosive charges around nearly every tree that bordered the roadways, and set them off. This created a jumble of tree trunks and debris that virtually closed the roads until foot soldiers could secure the area and mine sweeping engineers be brought in behind them to clear the paths. Until that happened, while the Infantry could advance on foot, communication wire was hard to lay, and the 103rd Signal Company’s communication vans could not move forward with the troops.

Interestingly, while the level of combat got hotter, and danger levels much worse, the Signaleer’s quality of life actually got better. This was because they were now out of eastern France, which had been fought over both as the Germans entered it, and as they were driven back out of it… and so everything for miles around was devastated. Now, being in western Germany, an area that had not been fought over, everything was pristine. The houses were intact, food was available, and except for dealing with the enemy in your front, life looked normal.

One squad in the 103rd Signal Company commented that when their midnight radio shift approached, while most of the men were sick with dysentery and barely able to move forward with the Company as it pulled out for another town, things seemed to be easier than they should have been. After all, they were at war.

As the sick men in the Company struggled to keep up, the 103rd marched through the towns of Wasselnheim, Hoch Feloen and Ettendorf, and kept on going. After a bit more, Captain Beck ordered that the Company C.P. be set up in the next town, La Walch. 

Expecting an uneasy night in a dismal, rain filled field, the stragglers with dysentery who came in long after the Company had settled down were surprised to find that the CP was set up quite snugly and securely in a lumberyard, and that one of our OCS graduate Officer’s of the Day had secured for them sleeping quarters in a cold but dry upstairs room, in an undamaged house. From the furnishings in the home the OD had even set aside for the most seriously ill of the men two soft feather tick beds. The German owners, downstairs all night, didn’t seem to complain.

Notwithstanding the occasional comfortable night’s sleep, it should be remembered that the men of the 103rd Signal Company were still new at this game of war, and in fact had been living through combat for no more than one month's time at this stage. Yet in that time they had proven their mettle, as they were now spearheading the drive of the 6th Army Group into Germany. And yet again, as they pushed their way into Germany, near Wissembourg, it was beginning to look like they would have to slug it out every inch along the way, and that they would pay dearly for the German soil they took.

As the 103rd assaulted the Siegfried Line, all hell broke loose. Confusion reigned, up and down the line. The German’s fought hard, and scored more than one would like to think. Signal men out laying cable at night often found themselves staring down the barrel of 88s, wondering whether they could get off the road fast enough to avoid direct fire. Others found themselves trying to hide from columns of Tiger tanks, flanked by German infantry, searching for American troops to take on. Still others found themselves fighting other Tiger tank units with bazookas, not normally a weapon Signal men need to depend on.

Still others, while trying to lay wire at night through the town of Bobenthal, within the Siegfried Line, faced German shelling all night long. Holed up in the basement of one of the houses, they spent the entire night “sweating out each shell”, until morning, when they climbed out ready to start laying wire again, only to find that their communication vans and vehicles had all be destroyed.

Several commented that the severity of fire forced them to lay wire faster than they had ever done before, and that the danger of being out laying wire was such that most men barely slept… opting to lay wire when they could at night, catch a cat nap on the ground, and then set off pulling wire again when it seemed safe. The result was an extremely fluid situation, where everyone lost sleep. Adding to this, it seemed as though there was no directional component to what they were doing. Wire was laid in one direction one day, and the opposite the next. Combat was “a swirl of activity!”

One Signaleer commented in a letter home to his family, “Small gains were made against the very strong defenses of the [Siegfried Line’s] well defended bunkers and in-depth fortifications. The Germans were able to use the rugged terrain beyond the forts to prepare a well organized and determined defense. Progress was very slow and losses were increasing for the GIs. The German defensive effort in our sector seems to have increased."

Others commented that “For some reason, we cannot figure if we are coming or going—literally. We are hearing stories of strong enemy action everywhere. The infantry men are being pulled out of the line and we are preparing to move in [yet] another direction.”

What they didn’t know was that their pressure on the Siegfried Line had been one of the factors that kicked off the Battle of the Bulge, and the effects were now being felt by the 103rd Signal Company.

Hundreds of thousands of men from both sides were now being thrown into the events of the Battle of the Bulge, and that included the men of the 103rd Infantry Division. In their case, they were given the task of providing support for the southern edge of Patton's 3rd Army. Patton, for his part, mobilized his men to dash northward, to help repulse the massive German force that was attacking in the Battle of the Bulge, in the Ardennes forest.

For the 103rd Signal Company there was no time to waste. They were needed to support Patton, and so with no warning at all, they were ordered to disengage from their attacks on the Siegfried Line and immediately move from wherever they were—wherever each and every man found himself—towards Patton’s 3rd Army. It was an abrupt and disorderly affair, with men, squads, platoons and the Company as a whole scrambling to gather up its equipment, load it and head northeast, all while the Germans they had only a few moments before been firing at continued to pour fire back at them. Command being what it is, few of the men had any idea why they were disengaging, why they were packing up, or where they were going. All they knew was that they were ordered to pack up and move out on the double. For everyone involved, being in the middle of a live fire fight and being told to pack up and get moving in an entirely new direction… even while the enemy continued to pursue and fire at you, without knowing what was next, was physically and emotionally straining.

As all of us know now, sitting here far removed in history from those days in the middle of December 1944, the Battle of the Bulge proved a turning point in the war. Hitler had used the pause that ensued as the Allies slowly prepared to cross the German border as an opportunity to organize 30 German Panzer Divisions into a counter offensive that he would loose through the Ardennes forest, in Belgium. This he did on Saturday, 16 December 1944, amidst a weather system of thick fog and heavy clouds so extensive that it covered the battle front. Ideal conditions for a surprise attack, the Germans used the low visibility on the ground to obscure their troop movements, while all along knowing that the grey skies above would keep the Allied air force grounded.

Their quick success was thus due in part to the fact that ground conditions were right. But it was also due to the fact that the front they were attacking was being held by a combination of a very large number of green, untried troops, supported by a very small number of seasoned units, mostly sent along to that particular spot so that they could get some much needed rest. Basically, SHAEF thought it would be a "quiet front", and so paid little attention to it. What the Germans faced then were American men strung out in lonely outposts, and hunkered down in cold, wet foxholes cut off from each other.

When the fighting started hardly anyone expected the enormity of what was to come. The first sound of gunfire started as normal, but within minutes escalated into one of the largest artillery barrages of the war. The German field guns in some sectors outnumbered the American’s 10 to 1. But artillery was not all the German’s had. The German infantry swept forward behind their artillery en masse, and quickly overran the inexperienced 106th Infantry Division that had been assigned to hold this "quiet area". 

As it turned out, they were no match for what came at them, as soon over 4,000 Officers and men of the 106th were forced to surrender to the Germans. Looking back at it today, there is no doubt that they made a brave and determined fight… but even so, it was brief, desperate, and ended in a rout. Considering that these men had been on the front line for only 8 days, and had seen combat for only 3 of those 8, it is no wonder the commander, Major General Allen Jones, bemoaned "I have lost a division faster than any other general in the US Army."

As we all know, the month-long Battle of the Bulge was to be the biggest and bloodiest battle American soldiers ever fought, either before or since.

- - - 

While this battle in the Ardennes forest seemed far to the north of the 103rd Infantry Division’s position, their help was needed and so they were ordered to quick march to Patton’s aid. So much so was help needed to stop the Germans from bursting through the Bulge that a large and rapid re-deployment of almost all of the Allied forces in Europe was made.

Eventually word passed through the ranks of the 103rd that they were heading to support Patton and join the Battle of the Bulge. As far as the men were concerned, if Patton's 3rd Army was making a charge northward 100 miles to support the thinly spaced troops on the southern edge of the Bulge, then they intended to be there too. And when the word passed around that Patton had sent word to Bastogne, where the Battling Bastards were surrounded by the Germans, "I'll be there by Christmas", then they intended to be by his side.

As they approached the Bulge, the 103rd moved around the rear of the 7th Army, and then moved northwest, to the flank of the Bulge, into a position near the left flank of the 7th Army, with the 106th Cavalry Group sitting between them and Patton’s 3rd Army, at a spot where the most intense fighting was taking place.

So intent was the 103rd Signal Company on getting where they were needed as fast as possible that most of the Company’s units moved ahead of the reserve-support infantry that was already in route to the area. As it turned out, these were the men that they would have to provide communication for when they finally arrived, so this gave the 103rd the chance to actually begin setting up communication lines along the front even before the infantry they were assigned to arrived.

Eventually Patton's 3rd Army broke through the German lines and reached Bastogne, on December 26, 1944. Supporting him was a bombing campaign unlike any the men of the 103rd had ever seen. Looking up, at first they sought out the sound of the heavy bombers they heard moving towards them. Within minutes what they saw surprised them beyond measure; a sky filled from horizon to horizon, in every direction, with America's largest four engine bombers. B-24 Liberators, B-17 Flying Fortresses, British Wellingtons and even Lancasters were all there. Each came in a V-formation, with one formation after another being tucked in behind the lead wing, each followed by another and still another... seemingly off to infinity. With barely a space between them, the formations were packed wing tip to wing tip as far as the eye could see. As the men looked on in awe, they could see enormous shock waves radiating out from each bomb burst.

In support of all of this massive numbers of P-47s, P-51s, Hurricanes, Spitfires, and B26s flew low level sorties against the panzers and ground troops of the Wehrmach. In quick order, Patton’s tanks, the infantry on the ground, and the Army Air force broke the back of the German offensive.

All the while, the 103rd Signal Company, led by 7 Army Signal Corps OCS graduates, kept communication flowing for the 3rd Army, whenever asked and wherever needed. As an example of the level of traffic being passed, a telephone traffic survey conducted in the early days, when the unit was back in St Jean, Rohrbach, France, showed that a total of 2,700 calls were handled every twenty-four hours through the 103rd Signal Company’s switchboards. By the time the unit was supporting Patton, this traffic level had tripled.

In terms of radio communication, radio nets were installed and continuity of service was maintained with all elements, 100% of the time, whether the men were on the road or in bivouac. Adding to this, the previously mentioned Aircraft Warning Alert System that was set up as they approached Germany became a standard functional support element for the Division, as did both scheduled and special messenger service to all of the 103rd’s Division elements, Corps, and attached units. In this area, on a typical day, Harley Davidson supported Signaleers ran messages an average of 406 miles each day, with 50% of the daily mileages being run at night and under blackout conditions. To Captain Beck’s credit, during this whole period only one minor motor vehicle accident occured.

Not surprisingly, even in battle our 7 Signal Corps OCS graduates continued to train their men. Whenever time was available, men were turned out in small groups to sharpen their skills. In one case one of the Officers observed that some of the wire teams had failed to utilize to the utmost the availability commercial lines running in the vicinity of the units being supported. To remedy this, our OCS graduates schooled the men on open wire construction and repair. While some of the men grumbled, most realized that tapping into existing overhead lines was easier and less risky than running up and down streets, hills, along country roads, and through forests packed with German troops, and so they grudgingly paid attention. Similar training was held in the field and on the fly for those men involved in telephone and teletype operations, switchboard operators, and more.

By the time the Battle of the Bulge neared its end, the men of the 103rd Signal Company began to realize that they were no longer rookies. Instead, they were now operating as a well oiled machine. In a letter home, one of our Signaleers commented that,

“Everyone plays his position that he knows best. If it brings victory then what the heck, we'll all go home. The boys are starting to feel like combat veterans. They acquire that tough, arrogant, rough and boisterous complex.

“We are not starving nor are we freezing to death. I think that the government has done and is doing a splendid job of equipping and feeding us. We don't get steaks or fancy dessert with our chow. It's all a plain basic ingredient of a ration, usually the same thing. But, it's food, wholesome and nutritious. We may get tired of it—but that's only natural. You should see what the Krauts have to eat.”

Captain Beck himself commented on how his view of the U.S. Army had changed. Proud to be a Signalman, he nevertheless took time out to write home about the infantrymen he worked alongside.

“No matter what is written or said about the various branches engaged in war none can compare to the infantry. All branches are doing a magnificent job and none should be belittled. And in some instances we all fight as infantry. But for straight fighting, continually at grips with the enemy in a physical manner, the infantry is far ahead of us.

“It is the infantry that attacks, occupies and defends whatever land is fought for. The infantry are the one that first get in there and wade across. None of us can move forward without the doughfeet to push the Hun back. When we retreat, it's the infantry that holds the enemy at bay, while the rest of us go back safely. It's the slogging, plugging infantry that win the battles. We just support them. By "we" I mean every other branch. The infantry is paratroopers, rangers and the motorized troops. They are all doughfeet! And without the doughfeet we might as well go home. My hat (or helmet) is off to the infantry.”

And then he continued on to speak to his wife of his own Signal Corps…

“Now for my dear Signal Corps. It has been often said that the boys of the crossed-flags are the nerve center of the army. And so we are! Without us there would be no information, no orders/no command. To accomplish this we go from the plodding infantry to the plush of higher headquarters. We are everywhere. We link all branches, all services with one and the other.

“Our main threat is artillery, planes and bombs. Occasionally a little small arms fire is thrown in for good measure. We have had more than a taste of it. Some of us have had gulps. After a fashion it's rather tolerable, subject to ones (sic) constitution.

“A plane, an enemy one, would suddenly come charging out from behind a cloud and come tearing straight for the ground you stand on. For a moment you are frozen. Your eyes are glued to that human bullet. You think, there is a man in there and he is coming at you with a ton of greased lightning, with 8 machine guns ready to bark fiercely in rasping tome at his slight touch of a button. He dives in a crescendo of roaring motors growing louder and louder. Suddenly, as if by instinct you hit a hole, any hole, or a cellar if one is nearby, and burrow your body as far down as you can worm that clumsy body of yours. Your heart beats fast (frankly more from the excitement than fear) and you clench your fists. If he starts to pull out of the dive it will be clear for you to look up as his proverbial bolt is shot. Our ack-ack is now pocketing him in a ring of flack. He either pulls out prematurely or gets it. Most of the time he gets hit, and you watch that plane, who only a few moments ago was a roaring lion, go crazily earthward, to hit the ground a mile away in a terrific explosion.

“After a while it's rather a lot of fun. The threat of danger is really very little as cellars, buildings or holes are always available. And it's very seldom does the Jerry try such foolhardy tactics. He hasn't the planes to spare.”

“… It's more a war of nerves than anything else. I think that slowly we are becoming veteran combat soldiers instead of rookies which we were actually called upon our initial landing.”

Clearly, the men of the 103rd Signal Company had come of age, as had their Officers. Captain Beck, his soft-spoken way of writing to his wife aside, had matured and seemed to have had clear eyes when it came to understanding the role he and his troops played. Their job was a tough one, yet not as tough as that of the infantrymen they supported. And yet the work they did was essential to those very same infantrymen. Without the men of the 103rd Signal Company, the 103rd Infantry Division could not have done its job.

- - - 

For the 103rd Infantry Division and its support elements, the war to this point had been tough on all combined. So tough that on January 8th the 103rd Division's Commander, Major General Charles Haffner, gave up his command and returned to the States in poor health. The next day the 103rd was placed temporarily in the XXI Corp. By that time the Battle of the Bulge was well under control, and the situation stabilized. With that, Major General Maxwell Taylor, the Division commander of the 101st Airborne Division, was able to return to his troops and then, on January 11th, Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe, the hero of the Battle of Bastogne, was given command of the 103rd Infantry Division, and there through the 103rd Signal Company.

McAuliffe… the man who, as commander in Bastogne, received this typed note from his opposite German commander:

December 22nd 1944

To the U.S.A. Commander of the encircled town of Bastogne.

The fortune of war is changing. This time the U.S.A. forces in and near Bastogne have been encircled by strong German armored units. More German armored units have crossed the river Ourthe near Ortheuville, have taken Marche and reached St. Hubert by passing through Hompre-Sibret-Tillet. Libramont is in German hands. There is only one possibility to save the encircled U.S.A troops from total annihilation: that is the honorable surrender of the encircled town. In order to think it over a term of two hours will be granted beginning with the  presentation of this note. If this proposal should be rejected one German Artillery Corps and six heavy A. A. Battalions are ready to annihilate the U.S.A. troops in and near Bastogne. The order for firing will be given immediately after this two hours' term. All the serious civilian losses caused by this artillery fire would not correspond with the well known American humanity.

The German Commander.

And who replied with a typewritten note of his own, on a full sheet of paper:

December 22, 1944

To the German Commander, N U T S ! 

The American Commander

Now here he was, in command of the 103rd.

If life had been tough before, it  was about to get much tougher, because while General Haffner had been a "map-room" commander, McAuliffe was a "hands-on" commander. 

Join us next month for Part III of this IV part series, as we follow the 103rd Signal Company as it continues to work its way through World War II. You’ll especially like what happens when our Army Signal OCS graduate Captain Beck runs afoul of General McAuliffe.

 

 

            

Reference Sources

Pictures from various online sources. When shown without identification, no identifying source was able to be found.

103D Infantry Division Signal Company Remembrances, William F. Barclay, various online sources. 

Quotations shown, unless otherwise identified, were excerpted and extracted from 103D Infantry Division Signal Company Remembrances, William F. Barclay; sourced from various online locations. 

The Patriot Files; dedicated to the preservation of military history; www.patriotfiles.com.

Map Graphics and References courtesy www.103rdcactus.com.

Papa's War, Evans, Pierce; Limited Publication, 1995; various online sources.

Report After Action: The Story of the 103rd Infantry Division; Mueller, Ralph; Turk, Jerry; Printing Office, Innsbruck, Austria.

Captain Bernard Beck, various personal remembrances provided to William F. Barclay et al, various online sources. Our understanding is that the bulk of this material came from Captain Beck's personal letters, as made available by his son.

Index of /Sexton/103rd; deep web sourcing.

Various data: Audie L. Murphy Memorial Website.

103D Infantry Division Signal Company History, online as a Pierce-Evans.org project.

103rd Infantry Division, Wartime Press.

Miscellaneous fact checking: The Patriot Files; an online resource dedicated to the preservation of military history.

 

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This page originally posted 1 May 2015