This article originally published on our Home Page in July 2012
In this article we continue with the third and final installment in a series of
three essays on technology and war. In our first essay we looked at the search for
the ultimate weapon and its impact on war, in the next we looked into how
technology shaped warfare. This time we bring these two together and look
into how Human Agency when added to the mix of technology and warfare
determines the outcome of war.
In our earlier articles we said that
in great measure war determines the pace of advancement of
technology, while technology determines how warfare is
conducted and how warfare determines the final outcome of a
war. Our position has been that if a country wants to
control the final outcome of a war it needs to aggressively
develop emerging technologies that will enable an
exponential
lift in a country’s ability to conduct warfare, or, as they
say in business: create a hockey stick change in a country’s
ability to achieve its goals. The question that should be asked
is what causes the exponential lift in a country’s ability
to conduct warfare? That is, what outside force is it that
when added to the emerging technologies that come along
allows the creation of a winning form of warfare?
To understand the answer to this it
would be worthwhile to review again some of the positions we
took in our earlier articles. For one, we said that while we
concede that the evolution of weaponry is what changes
warfare, what we didn’t concede is that changes in weaponry
determine the outcome of war. Specifically, we said that
technology (and therefore weaponry) is
not
deterministic. Clearly, what we were saying was that it’s
not the weaponry that is important but what is done with it.
Nuclear weapons by themselves are benign. In the hands of a
radical religious leader like Ahmadinejad though they can
threaten the world. So is it the nuclear technology that is
the culprit here or the mind and intention of the guy
nervously holding the trigger mechanism? The reader will
quickly agree, it’s the mind of the weapon holder that is
the driving force behind the risk that is inherent in
technology.
And yet while this is true it is only
part of the story. A more interesting part of the story is
that it’s not the evolution of weaponry that is important
but its distribution. Yes, the distribution of
weaponry is more critical than the weapons themselves.
Therein the conundrum with Iran and North Korea and their
quest for not only nukes but a way to deliver them.
If this sounds counterintuitive it's
because it is. Throughout history most wars have taken place
under a state of weapons symmetry. Today that symmetry is
disappearing and for America that is good.
Take the first Gulf War; during it
Saddam Hussein tried to defeat America’s conventional
mechanized Army with his own conventional mechanized Army.
Traditionally speaking, weapons wise the war was one of
symmetry. What tipped the balance in our favor was the
combination of the quality of our troops (think:
Human Agency) and the edge our more advanced
technologies gave us. These two factors, which can be
thought of as just another form of weaponry, shows that
Saddam didn't have the same kind of weapons we did. That is,
the distribution of weapons was in fact uneven. And therein a key
point to be learned: any country that wants to win the wars
it gets into has to pay as much attention to stopping those
countries that pose a threat from getting leading
edge weapons as it does in getting those weapons itself. It's not
enough to simply build new weapon systems, you have to stop
the other guy from doing so too.
We can see this in action if we go back again and look at
the second Gulf War.
In the second Gulf War the enemy learned its lesson and
resorted instead to what has come to be known as insurgent
based asymmetric warfare. In this new fight America’s
high-tech weapon systems proved of diminished value against
the enemy’s low-tech instruments of suicide bombers,
targeted murders, assassinations, and terror. It was only
after the U.S. adjusted its technology by introducing COIN
to meet this new form of warfare that the bad guy’s tactics
began to lose their edge.
COIN
as a technology, you say? Yes. More than just a doctrine or
a strategy, in the realm of warfare COIN approaches that of
being a technology of its own. First, it's utility on the
field of war makes it akin to a weapon system and second, if
the superior skills of our military leaders are part of
Human Agency then clearly their ability to apply that
cleverness to the task of assembling an integrated mix of
kinetic and non-kinetic actions, troop movements, tactics,
and other factors to create a means to defeat a strategic
initiative by the enemy makes the result of that effort
analogous to a new form of technology. Think of it: a 105mm
Howitzer is clearly a piece of technology. When Human Agency
is applied to it and it is placed en masse as part
of a predefined set of supporting weapons and tactics such
as are found in a firebase the combination becomes a
technology upon which Human Agency has acted to create a new
form of warfare. In our view this is no different that what
happens when COIN is created from a seemingly motley mix of
economic, social and political initiatives layered on top of
troop movements, kill teams, drones,
FOBs and special ops. It becomes a weapon system and in
the triumvirate of war, technology and warfare weapon
systems fit into the category called technology.
But we don't have to argue this point because the more
important point is that its
the superior skills of the military leaders who created the
concept of COIN that is what is important here. From a
military perspective superior skills encompass all of those
things that come from superior training and best of breed
combat principles, like distributed decision making
abilities, enhanced capacity to communicate in real time,
numbers of men, and will to succeed. It also encompasses the
ability to think on one's feet, combine the tools at one's
disposal to create a better tool, and things of this nature.
Intellectually, it's what philosophers and sociologists call
the capacity of an agent to act. In other words: Human
Agency.
Thus, it’s Human Agency that, when applied to a known
technology, allows the “agent” to alter that technology so
that it is more effective… in this case in combating the
enemy. The result of such a situation, the application of
Human Agency to a given technology, more often than not
results in an extended form of the original technology, one
that is more effective in accomplishing the chosen purpose.
By these standards most wars, when properly reviewed and
assessed in terms of how they were won, can be seen as
having had their outcome determined not by politics but by
the nature of the technology that each side could apply to
its mode of warfare. You can see then the importance of a
country not only fostering newer forms of technology, but of
denying their distribution to potential enemies.
Why do we put the emphasis on the emerging technology and
not Human Agency? Because while we may want to think
otherwise the truth is that America does not have a
stranglehold on creativity and unique skills. What stops
other countries from being able to do what we can do when it
comes to warfare is not a lack of Human Agency potential,
it's a lack of emerging technology on which to put that
Human Agency to work.
Thank God.
So when it comes to assuring that a country has the best
form of warfare at its disposal to protect its interests
what we see is that a fine balance must exist between i) the
quality and quantity of people with Human Agency that are
made available by a country to work on improving its form
of warfare, ii) the extent to which the country continues to
invest in emerging technologies so that there are sufficient
doors opened for those people to walk through, and iii) the
encouragement that a country gives to those people to pass
through those doors and apply their Human Agency to the
emerging technologies.
Think of it as a three legged stool: the availability of
people with Human Agency, the availability of new
technologies for them to act on and a country bound and
determined to bring these two together.
If there is anything that we should learn from this it is
that it's not the weapons that determine the result of
warfare folks, it's a country's determination to keep this
three legged stool in play—during both war and
peacetime. Throughout history hundreds of seemingly wondrous
new weapons were thought to be able to change the result of
a war but they didn’t. Such emerging technologies from the
introduction of gunpowder by the Chinese through to the
great battleships of the past, trench warfare, the airplane,
carpet bombing, agent orange, and even nuclear weapons did
little more than impact how a war’s managers fought the war
not what the result ended up being.
For those of you who are skeptical and would point to
Hiroshima and Nagasaki as examples of technology ending a
war we would disagree. Yes, the nukes we dropped on Japan
worked well but they didn’t win the war. It was the mode of
warfare adopted that ended the war. That mode—unconditional
surrender, a determination by America’s war leaders to turn
Japan into an unpaved parking lot by dropping more and more
nuclear bombs, and a very determined U.S. Army itching to
get on the ground on the mainland of Japan and dish out a
little payback for the losses incurred in Guam, Saipan,
Attu, Guadalcanal and the rest—that caused the Japanese
government to throw in the towel. Warfare determined the
outcome, not technology. Warfare that was made possible
because America's leaders at that time deigned to turn Human
Agency loose on emerging technology to create weapon systems
that sat the Japanese back on their butt.
Unconditional surrender. Imagine the audacity of even
thinking of staking out a position like that in one of
today's wars? One almost hesitates to ask the inevitable
question: what is our mode of warfare in Afghanistan? Get
out at all costs like the French announced (in the first
week in June) that they will be doing? Or an unconditional
determination to stay the course until the country is as
pacific as, say, Vermont? After all, that's what Japan is today.
In terms of its threat to the world Japan is another Vermont,
and a darned good one at that.
The important point here is to
distinguish between war, warfare, technology and Human
Agency and understand that technologies, emerging or
otherwise, do not determine the outcome of war but instead
contribute mightily to the ability of those in charge of a
war fighting effort to conduct effective warfare.
How does it do this?
Emerging technologies contribute to a country's war fighting
effort by opening the doors to the possibility of new
methods of warfare that in turn can alter the outcome of a
war.[1] Once the door is open
however it is up to the civilian leaders to decide whether
to allow the combat commanders to walk through a particular door
or not, thus allowing them to apply the Human Agency at
their disposal. Of equal importance, since no technology holds
value on its own (but only via its utilization) those managing
a warring effort—both the combat commanders and the
civilian leaders—must find ways to adapt the technology at
their disposal to the challenge at hand. This means that
civilian leaders must be willing participants in the
process, looking for ways to use new technology to avoid
wars as much as the combat commanders do in their effort to
win wars.
One can see an example of this in the emerging technology
area of missile defense shields (like
those scheduled for Poland, with their
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle capabilities
that include a closing
speed of about 7 km/s—a technology whose use in Eastern
Europe was cancelled by the
current administration in 2009). In this case the technology
in question resulted from President Reagan's Human Agency.
He legitimized the concept when he launched America's effort
to develop missile shield technology. Now, so many years
later, it is ready for deployment... except our civilian
leaders are afraid that doing so will anger our Russian
friends. In our view this particular form of technology
serves two useful purposes: one, it's a deterrent, and two,
it provides a darn good sidearm if an active war ever does
take place. This then is what we mean
by Human Agency acting on technology to provide a means to
alter the outcome of a war. Again... making our case as
strongly as we can... in this instance the technology can
alter the outcome of a war in two ways: by providing an
incentive to avoid it in the first place, and by helping win
it if it does get underway.
Clearly, in today’s world there is plenty of emerging
technology to go around. The question is, is there enough
Human Agency to match it and develop better means to avoid
wars through the threat of the ultimate weapon-like
capabilities that result when emerging technologies are
modified? Or more to the point, are there leaders willing to
release the Human Agency at their disposal so that it can
develop new forms of warfare that may be able to assure that
our side wins the wars we get into? In the end, government
leaders must decide if they are going to, or can, take up a
given military innovation. And they must adapt it to their
country’s unique circumstances. As long as governments, our
government, is more inclined to cut back on the roll out of
newer forms of military technology we will forever be
constrained to fighting the next war with the last war’s
technology… while our enemy brings to the field innovative
ways to circumvent the technology he already knows we have.
Technology is a possibility not an imperative. If you don’t
use it the other guy will. As important, in using it you
absolutely must modify it to suit your country’s particular
strategic objectives.
For example, in the years between the
world wars the U.S. and Britain, geographically isolated
from continental Europe, developed strategic bombers with
which to project their military power while the major
continental powers concentrated on fighter aircraft to
contend with each other for air superiority over the
battlefields in their own back yards. Today our strategic goals
have to do with things like winning against asymmetrical
forms of warfare, implementing a new security strategy in
the Pacific, countering violent extremists and destabilizing
threats in the Middle East, and maintaining regional access
and the ability to operate freely. If, using the analogy of
the between the war period, we focus on building fighter
aircraft (as the continental powers did) instead of focusing
on our own strategic need for bombers, we just might lose
the next war. So, allegorically speaking, what do we need
today? Fighters or bombers? Whatever it is our government
needs to let loose the dogs of Human Agency and let them get
busy deciding which emerging technology doors our military
scientists should pass
through. Further, when the result of imposing Human Agency
on emerging technology is finished and a new military
technology evolves we need to put it into place and stop
this ridiculous trend of worrying that we might offend a country
or two who could care a whit about our security to begin
with (think: Russia and it's objection to our placing
missile shields in Eastern Europe).
Summarizing these points, it can be said that while technology
determines the form of warfare that is available for use,
it’s Human Agency that determines the applicability of that
technology to the war being fought and the outcome of the
warfare undertaken, not the technology itself. Yet if a
country’s leaders are remiss to either allow the development
of newer forms of military technology more suitable to the
country’s changing strategic goals, by allowing the
application of Human Agency to emerging technology, or
deploy them once they come on line, then it is a foregone
conclusion that any war fought by that country is going to
be long, painful, and internally contentious for the citizens
of the country fighting it... likely ending in a failed
effort, or possibly even in a loss.
Finally, we visit one more time
the issue of emerging technology. Now that we know that the
application of Human Agency to emerging technology leads to
more applicable forms of military technology for the
intended purpose… that is, military technology that is more
able to support a country’s evolving strategic needs (such
as maintaining regional access and the ability to operate
freely), the question becomes how do you recognize when that
technology has arrived? Part of the answer has to do with
understanding that modern military technology is different
than your father’s technology… noticeably different. Yet
that difference is subtle because it’s not different in
kind but in degree.
If one thinks back to World War II, one
will quickly recognize that the weapons in use at the end of
that war were significantly different from those used at the
beginning. The atomic bomb is the most obvious example but
the list also includes jets, guided missiles, microwave
radar, tactical FM radio, the proximity fuse, Heat and HESH
anti-armor warheads, and even our old friend Napalm, to name
just a few. A lot of post war pundits claimed that this
plethora of new military technology meant that America’s
industrial production capability is what won the war.
We don’t think so. Sure, production capacity is important,
but the idea that America’s industrial might is what lets it
win wars is an old saw left over from the Civil War, when it
was clear that the North’s industrial might helped it arm
itself faster and more completely than the rural south could. Instead, in WWII
it was the institutionalized research and development
capabilities that America had that allowed Human Agency to
be applied to emerging technologies in a way that led to the
surfeit of “for purpose” weapons that supported the soldiers
in the field and enabled them to win the war. Think of the
Signal Corps' research facilities at Ft. Monmouth and you'll
easily see what we mean. In our minds,
the introduction of systematic, institutionalized innovation
is what brought new weapons to WWII, not industrial might.
If you can accept this principle then you can see that what
has changed in all of these years is the pace of
technological change in the modern world, not the rate of
development of new military technology. That is, Human
Agency works its magic on emerging technology at the same
pace that it always has, but the pace at which emerging
technology is being brought to the fore has increased
considerably. The result is that newer forms of improved
military technology (hardware and software, kinetic and
non-kinetic) is presented to the military at blinding speed.
The upshot is that today’s career Officer expects to see the
arsenal at his or her disposal change continually throughout
their career.
That was not the case in WWII, nor for that
matter in Vietnam. During the WWII era a commander fully
expected to retire with the same instruments of war he took
up when he came in as a shave tail. Even in Vietnam
technological changes were few and far between as far as
Company grade Officers were concerned. Today however, what
we see is a sustained hothouse of military technology
development.
Is this good or bad?
We posit that it all
depends on the pace of change of a nation’s strategic goals.
If the need this year is to, as Secretary of State Clinton
says, “pivot” towards the Asia Pacific, then this rapid pace
of development is good as it lets the military bring on-line weapons more suited to the mission at hand. In the case
of a new century of
Asia Pacific focus
this may include an ability for the Navy to more effectively
project itself over the horizon when encountering China’s
evolving navy, or in the case of our beloved Signal Corps
interdict China’s short haul military communications with
radio transmissions from northern Burma.
Regardless, what we know is that modern military technology
is different. And one of the ways in which it is different
is in its pace of change. Why do we care? Because unlike in
the good old days that difference means that both Company
and Field Grade Officers must be prepared to accept and
embrace an ever changing array of technologies and weapons
if they are to get the job done and earn their pay. And, of
course, what this means is that just as much as we need
brawn in our military we also need people—Officers—who are
bright and smart enough to keep up with today's ever
changing technological infrastructure. In fact, we would
posit that if you have a Company grade Officer today that is
not fully conversant with today's social media platforms as
well as the rudiments of HTML and TCP/IP he may be nearing
the end of his "use by date."
A second way in which today’s military technology differs
from that of earlier times is that whereas WWII era military
weaponry reflected an improvement on preceding forms of the
same, today’s technology reflects weapons being brought on
line to fill voids where no weapons exist at all. In the old days
the best way for a country to improve its war fighting
ability was to improve on its existing weapon systems. Got a
missile that works well? Then make it fly further or make it
carry a bigger warhead. That was the thinking. Today it is
expected that such improvements will be made simply as a
matter of course. There’s nothing special about improving an
existing weapon system. What is special though is filling a
void where no weapon exists, in an area where no one ever
thought a weapon system should exist.
Take as an example the
STUXNET and FLAME malware programs that are in the news
(see video at right; right-click to see full screen). These software demons
have done something no nation, regardless of how strong
their military is, has been able to do: bring Iran’s uranium
enrichment centrifuges to a dead stop. A part of cyber
warfare, they provide an excellent example of how Human
Agency layered on top of emerging technology can bring a
new weapon system to bear almost overnight, creating a new
taxonomy of weapons in the process. Definitively speaking, this gives us a second means of differentiating modern
weapons from those of the past: pre-modern producers of
military instruments were “improvers” while today’s are
“innovators.” Modern weapons reflect innovation more than
improvement.
As you watch new technologies appear in the news, look for
those that will be acted upon by Human Agency to create
tomorrow’s post-modern weapon systems. They will have the
attributes described above: the pace of change in the
technological area will be close to light speed when
compared to traditional technologies, new technological areas that seemingly have no
relation to the military will open up windows of opportunity
for weapons to fill voids where no weapons currently exist,
and the weapons that are developed to fill these voids will
reflect innovation more than improvement.
Why all of this focus on emerging technologies and Human
Agency? So that the military can wage effective warfare. What government leaders must understand is that turning
loose a nation’s Human Agency to work its magic on emerging
technology, for military purposes, is as critical in being
able to avoid wars as it is to winning them once they get
started. As important, once these new forms of modern
technology are developed these same leaders must guard
against supporting policies and plots that limit their
application. If Human Agency can leverage a new technology
that will shut down Iran’s centrifuges, let the military use
it. If Human Agency can leverage an emerging technology to
create a missile shield for America’s cities, those of our
allies in Europe, or
anywhere else, let the military use it.
Having those in charge understand
how Human Agency works its magic on emerging technology to
produce military solutions that bring a greater prospect for
peace to the world is important. As we have seen, more than
just heroics on the field of battle, Human Agency enables
the warfighter who displays these heroics a chance in hell
of succeeding. It does this by leveraging technology to
provide a battlefield hero with the nutrients
he needs to sustain himself. Nutrients like the time to think, superior
weaponry, real time knowledge of the battle space around
him, alternative means to fight, smart weapons, and much
more. Without Human Agency enabled emerging technologies our
battlefield hero of today would be no more equiped to do
battle than if a Hoplite warrior of the 8th century BC
appeared beside him.
While the tools of war have evolved
slowly throughout the course of human history only in the
modern world has there been an institutionalized and
rationalized means for continuously, methodically and
analytically innovating and improving military technology. When government
leaders stand in the way of that mechanism they put more
than their
country in jeopardy, they put their warfighters in jeopardy
too... and for no good reason.
The thing about war-changing weapons is
not that they change the course of wars, but that they
change the course of history. War is inevitable. And as long
as it is here it will impact the evolution of technology.
Technology is not going away either. Enabling it to be
applied to change the course of history for the better means
letting loose Human Agency to work its magic on evolving
technologies, in ways that deliver more effective kinetic
and non-kinetic weapons to the hands of the military. Most
importantly, not being afraid to use these post-modern
weapons will make all the difference in bringing kinetic
wars to a quick end, and in avoiding kinetics in the first
place.
Footnotes:
[1] The Open Door concept was first introduced by historian Lynn White, Jr.,
in his study titled Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962).
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