This is the continuation of a story begun on our January 2014 Home Page. To go to an archived version of that page, click here: January 2014 Home Page Archive. To return to this month's actual Home Page, click on the Signal Corps orange Home Page menu item in the upper left corner of this page.

continuing...

By November 1918 MI-8 had grown to consist of 18 Officers, 24 civilian cryptographers and cryptanalysts, and 109 typists and stenographers; or seen another way, it was now beginning to show up on the radar screens of many in Washington who were beginning to ask questions about who these people were, what the group’s function was, what purpose it served, and where it got its money. Yet while those seeking power began to circle around the group, like vultures at the site of a new born coyote not yet able to stand on its own feet, the group went on about its job… decoding the messages sent to it and creating ciphers for use in the field.

Those of you reading closely will have noticed by now that while the work the group did was praiseworthy, from today’s viewpoint it was severely circumscribed. For example, nowhere in the list of duties the group had was there mention of responsibility for conducting radio intercept work, as a source of raw material for cryptanalysis. The reason for this was that radio intercept of fixed station broadcasts fell under the auspices of the Army, and the Signal Corps in particular. Part of the reason for this was that during this early period in the evolution of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communication interception (COMINT) the amount of radio traffic able to be intercepted was fragmentary at best. Another reason was that at that time large governments preferred to use cable and wire communication, because they felt it was more secure. When one adds to this the simple fact that regardless of the circumstances radio as a means of communication between widely separated fixed stations was then still in its infancy, one can see why the crypto guys stuck with crypto and left the radio stuff to the radio boys in the Signal Corps.

The Signal Corps on the other hand, while responsible for communication interception, found itself able to do only a rudimentary job at best, primarily because of budget limitations. Nevertheless, to make sure that what could be vacuumed up was, the Signal Corps set up a series of what were called “mobile tractor” or “radio tractor” units.[1]

These mostly wheel (not tractor) driven trucks with radio vans on their back were stationed along the southern border with Mexico (during WWI), in Cuba, the Philippines, and even in Houlton, Maine (set up in late 1918).

Operated by the Signal Corps but officially designated as the Radio Intelligence Service section of the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Branch, the Mexican border operations represented both the military and the country’s first attempt at radio interception. In the case of Mexico, the concern was to validate whether Mexico was moving towards siding with Germany in World War I or not.  

One of the things we were able to learn from a declassified portion of the NSA’s own Regional Section History was that they take credit today for this effort of the Signal Corps back then… implying that this effort helped make the case that an NSA like agency was needed to conduct this kind of work, instead of just trusting it to a branch of the military like the Signal Corps. In this case they discussed the placement of Radio Tractor Units 33 and 34 in McAllen, Texas, as though the NSA did the work... decades before it ever came into existence. It's always interesting to note that within our wonderful government and the many agencies it has spawned, when it comes to claiming glory, it's amazing how quickly the lines between different agencies become blurred.

In an interview with one of the service men who manned these listening posts it was disclosed that the Signal Corps’ McAllen listening post had the task of tracking radio communication emanating from Chapultepec, Mexico. Chapultepec (its local call sign back then was XDA), it turns out, was in near constant communication with both stations in Germany and German submarines in the Gulf of Mexico.

For the most part, because everything was being encoded, all the men in these Radio Tractor Units could do was collect data on what time of day Chapultepec “came on the air, who was being called, and what the code was.” As the NSA’s declassified documents reveal, “There was an awful lot of code that came out of Chapultepec and… a lot of it was copied and passed to Washington. [T]he material… transmitted back to Washington… was very valuable.”

The NSA’s report went on to say that the Chapultepec station was an extremely powerful station but that regardless of its strength the Signal Corps’ Radio Tractor Units were fully up to the task of collecting the information they needed. Since all of the radio listening equipment was already installed inside of the vans, and connected, all the men had to do to go online was raise the umbrella antenna the system used. This they did by taking the spikes out and hoisting it. After that a tent was set up, a field strength meter was hung on the wall so that signal strength could be read, and finally an “audibility” meter was set up too. The actual work the men did in listening in on the target radio station consisted of taking readings on a station’s signal strength until a transmission pattern could be detected. With this pattern they were then able to estimate the size and direction of the signal lobe, from which they could then reverse track and pinpoint where the station's signal was coming from. This was done through basic triangulation via having two or more Radio Tractor Units working together, each rotating their radio signal detection loop antennas around until they could pinpoint the transmitting station’s strongest and weakest signal points. All of this was done manually, with the antenna being turned by hand. To identify signal strength azimuth(s) a disc with degrees marked on it and an arrow able to be set at particular points was used.

By itself the radio receivers of the radio detection equipment the Signal Corps supplied were not regenerative. To improve on their ability to receive the signals being tracked the crews usually built their own ‘Armstrong regenerator circuit’ and attached it to the receiver.[2] Consisting of little more than two coils, of which one was fixed and the other moveable, Hams of the day could easily put one of these together so that the moveable coil was fastened onto a piece of wood that let the user push it in and out until optimum signal strength was found.

While a little bit of ingenuity was required to do the work, duty on a Radio Tractor Unit was not tough duty. Men were assigned in shifts, so that the station operated twenty-four hours a day. Supplies of extra tubes and other equipment were kept on hand and generally speaking the equipment was never shut off unless something went wrong and the only way to fix it was to shut it down.

Security wise, the units stationed in the U.S. were assigned at least one .38 caliber handgun, intended primarily to protect the men against rattle snakes.

In the end, as we know today, while Mexico got pretty cozy with the Germans in WWI they did not form an alliance with America's enemy. If they had then the Signal Corps, via its Radio Tractor Units along the Tex-Mex border, would have been the first to know.

The Radio Tractor Units set up in Houlton, Maine, on the other hand were responsible for copying trans-Atlantic radio traffic. Supplementing these were listening posts manned by the Coast Guard, as well as a few more Radio Tractor Units that were set up as part of the Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF) efforts in Europe, and one or two more that ended up in the Siberian operations. Both the AEF and Siberian listening posts turned out to be a disappointment to the guys in MI-8, as they failed to provide much useful intelligence, although they did furnish a large quantity of diplomatic traffic that the State Department delighted in reading. Unfortunately, while the MI-8 team and the Signal Corps both thought it useful to proceed with this effort post WWI, as soon as the war was over the budget for these activities was yanked and the majority of the sources for radio intercept in Europe were closed down.

By 1929 the flow of messages furnished to the G-2 at MI-8 had dwindled to a mere trickle… with most coming from Coast Guard intercept stations, the one remaining station in the Philippines, and a couple of other radio intercept locations that the Signal Corps was able to keep operating with its decimated budget. What the budget hacks failed to see from the information that was coming from these radio intercepts was that, fragmentary as it was, the quality of it was good enough to warrant a serious attempt be made to obtain better material, by building both more and better placed intercept stations. Unfortunately, this chicken would not come home to roost until Pearl Harbor, when it would become clear to all that there was value in signals intelligence, communications interception and crypto and cipher activities. At that time, as in so many other cases—after the horse had left the barn—Congress would make the funds available. Until then though it was up to the State Department to keep reaching into its pocket to underwrite the War Department–Signal Corps’ MI-8 efforts.

In terms of the road that led to the creation of the NSA, 1929 proved to be a pivotal year, for although the formation of the NSA was still decades off in the future its foundation was being laid in 1929. In the summer of 1929 Major O.S. Albright, a Signal Corps man, was assigned to G-2 to serve on the staff of the Acting Chief of Staff, to supervise and coordinate the cryptographic and cryptanalytic activities that still remained as the great military efforts of WWI were being wound down.

In typical fashion for an incoming Signal Corps Officer, he mounted a detailed study of the situation as it stood, appraising not just how the existing cryptanalytic bureau was doing its job, but most especially what jobs it should be doing but wasn’t. In quick order he came to the conclusion that not only was the structure of the organization not suited to the task it was performing but that its mission was amiss too. One of the things that concerned him most was that the daily publication of the results of the analytic work done, something known internally as the ‘bulletin’, while of great interest to the State Department, held little value for the War Department. As far as the War Department was concerned the only thing it was getting out of the entire MI-8 effort was the ability to train personnel towards the goal of developing ‘war-time effectiveness.’

As Major Albright saw it, if that was the goal the War Department wanted, then that was fine… except for one thing: there was very little if any training going on. Further, if there was any thought of using the people already in the group to support War Department efforts in the event of another war then that too was out of the question, as all except for one clerk were beyond the age where they could be drafted and/or serve a useful purpose in an actual war zone. When this was added to the fact that the unit was being run like a civilian corporation,[3] one hidden away in an office building in New York and beyond the most basic of military supervisory capabilities, it all began to look more like a country club than a section in the War Department. This, plus a few conflicts of interest between the MI-8 unit and the people who ran it, especially with regard to their ability to divert its work towards projects that helped them pocket money of their own… as well as a propensity to disclose some of its secrets in order to earn civilian contracts that were then done on the side, caused Major Albright to become apoplectic.

Being the good Signalman that he was, he detailed his charges and recommended to the Acting Chief of Staff that the bureau be taken out of G-2 and its functions transferred in full and permanently to the Signal Corps. In support of Major Albright’s recommendations Lieutenant Colonel W.K. Wilson of the War Plans and Training Section of G-2 prepared a memorandum of his own on the same subject, and essentially but unknowingly endorsed the conclusions reached by Major Albright. The result was that in April 1929 G-2 and the Chief Signal Officer implemented Major Albright’s recommendations, at which time the U.S. Army Signal Corps officially became responsible for all SIGINT, COMINT, cryptanalysis, code, and cipher work, as well as the printing, storage, distribution, and accounting of codes and “in time of war the interception of enemy radio and wire traffic, the goniometric location of enemy radio stations, the solution of intercepted enemy code and cipher messages, and laboratory arrangements for the employment and detection of secret inks.”

Or so that was the plan. Unfortunately, before anything could be done to actually transfer the activities of the old MI-8 unit to the Signal Corps another piece of fruit hit the fan. In November the country held its 1928 Presidential elections and in March 1929 the administration that was elected took office. In that administration was a certain Mr. Henry L. Stimson, who became Secretary of State. No pacifist dove, Stimson served under President Herbert Hoover (Republican), where he articulated what became known as the Stimson Doctrine. The Stimson Doctrine loudly proclaimed, and in strong terms, America’s opposition to Japan’s expansion in Asia.

Not willing to let these laurels be the only conservative ones he rested on, later in life he went on to serve as Secretary of War (1940–1945) under Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democrat), where his true hawk colors emerged as he called for war against Germany. In this capacity, as Secretary of War, he personally involved himself in the country’s effort to raise and train over 13 million soldiers and airmen to fight WWII, oversaw the spending of a third of America's GDP in an effort to rebuild the Army and build a new Army Air Force, helped formulate military strategy, and took personal control of the effort to both build and use the atomic bomb. Stimson was a dynamo and a true blooded American. Unfortunately, he was also a blue blooded American, whose ethical roots stemmed from an erudite, Brahmin education that left no doubt that the world should be ruled by gentlemen, and that gentlemen should at all times be gentlemen.[4]

In May 1929, to help ease his transition into office and assure that he was not overwhelmed by the amount of decision making that he needed to make as the new Secretary of State, his ‘handlers’ decided to forgo giving him copies of the daily ‘bulletins’ that the cryptanalytic bureau in New York was producing. They felt that after he had had sufficient time to get up to speed on the important issues they would then introduce him to these lesser matters. And so it came to pass that late in April he found on his desk a series of decrypted messages that originated within the highest levels of the Japanese government. When he asked where the information came from, and was told about MI-8 and its activities… and when he heard the story... he went nuclear. Not just nuclear, but violently nuclear.

With no equivocation at all he characterized the activity of secretly capturing other gentlemen’s mail as being highly unethical and declared that in his State Department this kind of activity would cease immediately. His famous quote rings down through history until today, “Gentlemen don’t read other gentlemen’s mail.” One can only wonder what he would make of our beloved NSA’s activities, trawling through every communication of every citizen of America… and the world when it can… for interesting tidbits. One wonders too what he would think of the ethics of the President’s that lead our country, listening in on the cell phone conversations of the wives of many of the world's leaders. By Stimson’s measure, would they qualify as gentlemen?

Immediately upon declaring that these activities would stop he gave clear instructions that no funds from the State Department would henceforth be spent in support of the SIGINT, COMINT, or cryptanalysis work being done, nor would they be made available for either the MI-8 operation or the planned replacement operation that the Signal Corps was setting up. To be fair to him, within the next few weeks he softened his orders somewhat when he came to understand that if followed they would put out of work several people who, in the middle of the recession that was then raging, had no employable skills at all… except for an uncanny ability to break Japanese and German codes. It's interesting from this period of time to look back and see that while he held firm on his principles, he wavered in his actions in order to keep people employed during the recession. And as for his famous quote and its clarion call to civilization to make this a better world, he later allowed that while he held his views for moralistic reasons, he understood and did not deny that in time of war certain practices that might be morally wrong and even repugnant in peace time would prove necessary then.

In the end, even though he tried so save their jobs, Stimson’s decision to pull the funding from the signals intelligence program and the War Department’s decision to move its operations over to the Signal Corps eventually caused the people of the old MI-8 to be given three month’s pay and let go. Looking at this too from today’s viewpoint, especially in light of the wobbly ethics that people hold these days, the decision to fire the MI-8 people was both brave and stupid. It was brave in that it showed our government at a time when it did what it knew it needed to do, regardless of the consequences… surely something that would not happen today, where every decision is weighed against the probability of its impact on politics or someone or some party’s prospect for reelection. And it was stupid in that it failed to take into consideration the risk of alienating the civilians involved.

What risk of alienation, you ask?

Consider if you will that while the three month’s separation pay offered to the cryptanalyst staffers was generous, all involved knew that these people were not likely to find another job when the money ran out… and further that since they were civilian employees they had no civil service status. This meant that they had no unemployment benefits to draw on, no retirement benefits, no health or welfare insurance, and didn’t qualify for government aid or help. And while you are considering all of these things, consider too the secrets they knew. What, pray tell, would an Edward Snowden do if he were put in that situation today? Most likely he would neatly wrap up his penurious situation and take it to the Russian, German or Japanese consulate, where in all likelihood he would, back then, have found instant and gainful employment—if only reporting on what he knew we knew about what they knew.

But that was not the case in 1929. In 1929 people like Secretary of State Stimson had ethics, as did the civilian cryptographers, cryptanalysts, typists and stenographers of the old MI-8.

- - -

With that MI-8 became a part of American history. The State Department too, being out of the data analysis business but still an avid reader of those bits it could get its hands on, took a back seat to what was going on in order to make room for the next group of players on the scene. The transition was quick and simple for the War Department and its Military Intelligence Division—by the end of 1929 their MI-8 brainchild was only a memory. In its place stood the new Signals Intelligence Section (SIS).[5]

Officially formed in 1930, its purpose was to consolidate all military cryptologic functions and signal intelligence efforts under the U.S. Army Signal Corps. A fully integrated section with authority to get involved in any area required in order to do its mission, the SIS soon found itself caught up in not only producing the Army 's own codes and cipher devices, but attempting to capture and decrypt the communications of America's potential adversaries… including those within allied governments that America had its suspicions of… this latter point being a task left over from the earlier days when this kind of work was being done at the behest of the State Department.

One can only wonder, sitting here today, if this early blurring of the lines between friend and foe is what led to today’s idea that if you can hear it you can record it and listen to it. Putting the matter of Uncle Sam listening to all of us American civilians aside for the moment, was the early blurring of the lines that caused the U.S. to listen in on its ally’s communication back in 1930 the progenitor of the NSA’s effort in 2011 to convince Australia’s Australian Signals Directorate agency to tap the personal cell phone of the wife of the President of Indonesia, or George Bush’s infatuation with listening to Chancellor Merkel of Germany’s personal phone calls?[6] Didn’t anyone at any time along the way stop to realize that while all would decry the treachery of someone like a Snowden leaking SIGINT and COMINT secrets, the damage to America’s reputation would be far worse than the crime committed by him if he exposed to the world the fact that America was listening in on not just its own allies and friends, but its own citizens? Didn’t anyone realize that by our country listening to its own friends and its own people irreparable harm would be done to our image? And while we are at it, didn’t anyone realize that no amount of top secret security clearance checks was or is going to keep out of the woodpile that one Indian that will tell the world what is really going on inside the NSA? Didn’t they know that this secret of us listening to us was eventually going to come out? And didn’t they realize that once it did, from that point forward it would be America’s ethics that would appear wobbly on the world stage, not those of the Edward Snowden’s of the world?

Damned them and damned their kind… hypocrite bureaucrats more focused on power than principles. Becrie the stupidity of humanity! What has happened to this country when for the sake of a few tips on what the wife of the President of Indonesia is thinking, or whether the President of Germany is for or against a new trade agreement, our leaders are only too happy to sell down the drain the integrity of this country… our country… MY country!

Profanity and histrionics aside… let us return to our story…

As the calendar turned from 1929 to 1930 and a new decade commenced the U.S. Army Signal Corps found itself firmly in control of America’s SIGINT and COMINT spy business. Organizing itself for the road ahead it promptly published a series of influential studies on cryptology, which it then used to pioneer the development of machine ciphers of unparalleled sophistication and security. From a military standpoint at least, the Signal Corps’ efforts brought true security to military communications for the first time in its history. This, plus the training courses it began to put in place, the effort it began to mobilize a base of Officer leaders able to lead the charge if a call came for wartime expansion, and especially its establishment of a network of radio intercept stations around the world… something the Army had never had during peacetime, placed the Signals Intelligence Section of the Signal Corps in position to give America what it needed most: effective ears on the world.

Let us stop here, in 1930. In our next article, Part II – Intelligence, we will continue the story of SIGINT and COMINT—from 1930 through to 1945 and the end of WWII.

To pique your interest we will begin with one of the greatest accomplishments the Signals Intelligence Service ever had: the breaking of the Japanese PURPLE machine cipher, in 1939, using purely cryptanalytic methods developed by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Want to know the true story of how the PURPLE code was cracked, and who did it? Please join us in Part II. 

 

 

            

Footnotes

[1] This author believes that the terms ‘signal tractor unit’ and ‘radio tractor unit’ that have come to be used to describe these vehicles are in reality bastardizations of the more correct term signal or radio tracking unit. During the WWI period it was common for military materials to be moved around a battle space by tracked vehicles that were called tractors. This was especially the case with the Signal Corps, which placed much of its communication equipment in trailers for movement to various field locations. Since most of these combination tractor–trailer vehicles were referred to as 'tractor units,' more likely than not when the vehicles designated as ‘Radio Tracking Units’ began to arrive in the field their name was shortened to fit the colloquial expressions of the time. As a result they became known as radio ‘tractor’ units instead of by their rightful name of Radio ‘Tracking’ Units. Notwithstanding this, there is no doubt that on Army unit lists of inventory they are listed as Radio Tractor Units. Thus, one can find listed as being assigned to McAllen, Texas, in 1918, “Radio Tractor Units 33 and 34”.  - To return to your place in the text click here:

[2] The Armstrong coil was named for Edwin H. Armstrong, an inventor and a major in the U.S. Army Signal Corps during World War I. He is most famous for having developed a new method of modulation that reduced the effect of ignition and other noises encountered in radios used in military vehicles. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[3] The unit listed itself on the office building’s name plate as the ‘Code Compilation Company.’ This name was allegedly chosen for security purposes.  - To return to your place in the text click here:

[4] The term Brahmin is most normally used to refer to a member of Boston's traditional upper class. It has nothing to do with India. Members of the East Coast’s Brahmin class are characterized by their extremely discreet, out of the limelight, inconspicuous lifestyle. To a true Boston Brahmin people like the Kennedys are just upstarts, and noisy uncultured ones at that. Members of Boston's Brahmin class form an integral part of the historic core of the East Coast establishment and are often associated with the distinctive Boston Brahmin accent (… Baaaastin…) and Harvard University (… Haaaavaad…), and traditional Anglo-American customs and clothing. Descendents of the earliest English colonists (i.e. those who came to America on the Mayflower or the Arbella), these people are often considered to be the true elite of 1930s America. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[5] The Signals Intelligence Section (SIS) and its acronym are also often referred to as the Signals Intelligence Service.- To return to your place in the text click here:

[6] Allegedly at the request of the NSA, the Australian Signals Directorate tapped the phones of the wife of Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono. From the Guardian (U.K.) newspaper, article titled Anger in Indonesia over 'illegal' Australian phone tapping attempt;excerpt – "Former Indonesian vice-president says: 'We don’t expect that our friend will be tapping our personal communications' " … "The Abbott government is trying to calm the angry reaction in Indonesia to the revelations that Australia's spy agencies attempted to listen in on the personal phone calls of the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and targeted the mobile phones of his wife, senior ministers and confidants." Link to Guardian article:   - To return to your place in the text click here:

Additional Sources

Special Research History # 134, Expansion of the Signal Intelligence Service from 1930-7, December 1941; Herbert O. Yardley, with titled documents including The American Black Chamber, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931); David Kahn , The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967).

Allied Expeditionary Forces (AEF): Active May 3, 1917 - 1919. Click here for external link and information:

Additional Special Research History unpublished documents:

       William F. Friedman, The Friedman Legacy. 

       David Kahn, The Reader of Other Gentlemen's Mail. 

       Henry L. Stimson, On Service in Peace and War. 

       Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber.

 

  Like this article? Let us know by helping us with our scholarship fund efforts. A $30.00 donation
to our Scholarship Fund will help us get one step closer to helping another deserving High School
graduate attend college. Your donation is tax deductible and your kindness will go father than you think in making
it possible for another young American to fulfill their dream of a college education.
Thank You!

This page originally posted 1 January 2014