This is the continuation of a story begun on our September 2013 Home Page. To go to an archived version of
that page, click here:
September 2013 Home Page Archive. To return to this
month'sactual Home Page, click on the Signal Corps orangeHome Page menu item in the
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continuing...
As for where these “obsolete, less than ideally designed”
wireless systems found their most use, it was in tactical
environments. Typically the Infantry Divisions, with their
need for supporting ground and artillery backing, found the
most need for these systems. Later, as Patton and others
refined their tactics, the Armored and Cavalry divisions
began to focus in on integrating radio communication into
their plans. Last but not least came the coastal defense
sites, and the new air groups and squadrons.
As to what pieces of equipment made it to these services,
strangely enough they were thought of as the three oldest
communication sets in the logistic network, while in truth
they were not much older than most of the wireline gear
being used at that time. Even so, because the research
engineers back at Monmouth thought of them as representing
old technology, they were referred to that way.
To be fair to the both sides, the early radio sets brought
online were more than adequate for the purpose intended,
although the Monmouth engineers were right when they said
that these systems wouldn’t make it through the entirety of
another war unless
improvements were made. Still… the reader should remember
that at the time these decisions were being made, no one yet
knew that WWII was on the horizon.
The units that first hit the tactical front line proved to
be the SCR's 131, 161, and 171. (To read or download a
copy of the 1942 version of TM 11-237, which covered SCR-131 and SCR-161 click
here:
TM 11-237.)
Anyone who served in WWII will remember the astonishing
SCR-131… not so much because it saw service in the actual
war, but because it was ubiquitous in the wartime service
and training camps of the time. Together the three of them…
the 131, 161 and 171… saw extensive use in training and
introduced the concept of radio communication and basic
electronic circuitry into the heads of thousands of G.I.s.
Based on continuous wave, short-range, loop antennas, both
the portable and “semi-portable” models were quick to be
taken onboard by the units they were sent to. Mostly used at
the regimental level, the 131 was sent to the Infantry and
Cavalry. The SCR-161 found service with the Field Artillery,
and the much heavier SCR-171 ended up with the ground-to-air
control people, and occasionally up and into Division level
Headquarters.
Supporting these three base level sets the Signal Corps
introduced a second group of radios intended to be used on
the ground, in more mobile environments. Designed for
point-to-point and ground-to-air communications, they
employed superheterodyne receivers, something new to the
military. Known by the designations as the series 177-78-79
and the 188, they were primarily meant for mobile point-to-point ground use
but ended up being used for stationary ground use too. Their
benefit over the 131, 161 and 171 was their longer range.
Their detriment was that moving them from one place to
another required a Jeep or Three-Quarter ton, or, as with
the 179, a horse would do in a pinch.[1]
Of these point-to-point systems, the SCR-177 was quickly
picked up by the Coast Artillery Corps. Used in places like
Hawaii, where it was spread liberally along the island’s
coastline in support of the many 16 inch guns installed to
repel a seaborne battleship attack, as well as in Cuba, the
Philippines, Panama, along the coast of the U.S., and a few
other places, including as far away as Tinian and Fiji, it
proved a reliable and effective set.
The 178 found its way to the Field Artillery and the
SCR-188 became the baby of the early Army Air Corps. For their
purpose, all three sets worked well in these rather stable
and non-mobile environments, with the transmitters pushing
out up to 75 watts of power. With this much power, sustained
Morse code could be sent by either continuous wave or tone
signals. Best of all, the code could be heard at distances
of up to one hundred miles. This proved valuable in those war
environments where this form of signaling provided
communications that could not be obtained with normal ground
receivers.
Yet while the Morse capabilities of these early sets was
good, their voice transmission capability was just so-so by
today’s standards. Mostly limited to twenty-odd miles, it
proved useful only in non-fluid front line environments and
the obvious rear echelon areas where men and equipment
didn’t tend to move too quickly or too often.
This was because voice communication on these three sets
used the upper reaches of the middle frequencies and the
lower reaches of the high frequencies. In other words, they
operated primarily in the bands just above broadcast… except
for the 188. The 188, again, an Army Air Corps ground set, was
tweaked for its intended use by re-calibrating from its
original range between 6,200 and 7,700 Hertz, to extend this
range both up to the 1.5 megacycles area and down to 1,500
kilocycles. As such, it had an impressive range and could
easily find a way… one way or another… to communicate with
the fly boys who needed most to know what was going on.
In terms of being portable… at least as we know the term
today… they were not. Each weighed in at a hundred pounds or
more. This, plus the need for gasoline powered power
generation, a dynamotor, and a rather large (up to 30 foot
mast level) signal antenna made them strictly ground borne…
even for the newly arrived Army Air Corps.
As a check and balance on whether this was a problem or not,
the reader should remember that prior to the start of WWII,
the soon to be enemy was in no better shape. The problems in
terms of reliability, range, and portability that the U.S.
sets exhibited could be seen in those being used by the
Germans too. The German 80 W.S.2, for example, suffered the
same limitations, although the U.S. did not know so at the
time.
Regardless, the Signal Corps was riding herd on
communication development between the wars and meant to
leave no stone unturned until it had what it wanted for the
troops and sister services it supported.
While the Signal Corps pressed on with research and
development of better means of radio communication, the
SCR-177 and the SCR-188 found themselves becoming part of
the military teams they were sent to for many years to come.
Yet while their base capabilities changed little, their use
did see change as the Signal Corps introduced to the
supporting services more effective ways for field tactics to
be adapted to make better use of the type of communication
these sets made possible.
For example, with the Army Air Corps, while the sets were
principally intended to function in support of air power,
the Signal Corps recognized that the real need was for
mobility. Knowing what others did not… that newer sets were
on the horizon… it began laying out better strategic uses of
communication to the Army Air Corps even before the next
generation of radios were ready. Some in the Air Corps
complained that the new processes being introduced by the
Signal Corps didn’t fit the units then existing strategies
and tactics, but the Signal Corps knew well that once it
brought to the field more advanced and more portable radio
sets, the Air Corps would find itself in just the opposite
position… where its strategies and tactics couldn’t make use
of the power these new sets brought to the unit. To
forestall this the Signal Corps swallowed hard when
criticism was leveled at it, listened to the criticism, kept
its head down, and kept pushing for the introduction of
tactics, strategies and processes that would be able to take
full advantage of the capabilities of the newer radio
systems being readied for launch.
The reader can sense that while the landscape of the radio
communication systems in the field was stable, dramatic
changes were underway behind the scenes. In synchronization,
services like the Army Air Corps pushed the limits of what
the Signal Corps could provide, while at the same time the
Signal Corps challenged the fundamental tactics that were
being used by the Air Corps at the time, as it sought to
achieve that one impossible answer all engineers face when
developing new products for their customer: does the
customer know enough about what is possible to be able to
tell us what they need, or do we need to learn enough about
how they operate their “business” just so that we can then
explain to them what is possible in words they will
understand, so that together, we can then figure out what
they really need?
What few in the services knew at the time was that on the
horizon the Signal Corps was readying exceptionally portable
sets, mobile sets, crystal-controlled sets, and
frequency-modulated sets… all of which would revolutionize
the U.S. military and push it far ahead of the rest of the
world’s militaries. As the Signal Corps drove forward in
pressuring the Army Air Corps, Armored and Infantry arms to
upgrade both their strategies, tactics and operational
control processes to make use of the new features and
capabilities soon to be introduced, the others fought back,
saying that everything they were doing was just fine.
Or so that’s the way it was until the Signal Corps brought
online equipment that made possible excitingly new tactical
concepts that could be supported by what came to be known as
the 500 and 600 series. These new radio sets were brought
online between 1939 and 1942-43. They replaced almost the
entire range of the older 100 series, filled in (where
needed) around the edges for the older 200 series, left most
of the 300's and 400's as they were but ready for
improvement later in time, and otherwise made possible a
whole new form of battlefield communication unheard of until
then.[2]
If you ask an old soldier or two today, a few might remember
something about new radio communication sets coming to the
field in the early days of the war, but most won’t. Where it
was noticed the most was in the rapid change they brought
about in airborne operations. Then an almost wholly new
branch of the armed forces, the fly boys that populated it
were open to any kind of experimentation, and being
technically sophisticated, they absolutely loved the idea of
newer forms of radio communication. In fact, after the war
when HAM Radio operation became popular, there were more
Hams from the old Army Air Corps than any other branch. Most
were former bombardiers, who also operated the radio sets on
most missions.
It’s because of this that while the old SCR- 131 continued to be
used in many parts of the military, its colleagues the 161
and 171 soon fell from grace in services like the
Army Air Corps. In trying to understand what caused this, it
should be remembered that while today the military lives and
breathes integrated service operations, prior to the WWII
this concept was foreign to most military men, and
especially the boys in aviation. For them, the thinking was
that aviation was far too different a beast from the other services
to be able to get by on hand-me-down equipment from the
Artillery or Infantry branches. The Signal Corps new this,
and being responsible for the successful birth of the Army
Air Corps, was determined to give its new child everything it needed.
In doing so, one thing that that became obvious was that the radio equipment
of the 1920's simply wasn’t up to the job of supporting
effective ground to air communications. The old 134, the
liaison set the Signal Corps had initially assigned for
bombers, quickly proved inadequate and had to be replaced by
the 187, which in turn required further modifications before
it would serve its purpose. When the 187 was finally
modified sufficiently to operate well it was re-designated
as the 287. Because many of these modifications were done
after the device left the factory, while internally it might have been a 287,
externally it still looked and usually carried nomenclature
tags that branded it a 187.
At the time this was not a problem, but it sure proved
troublesome as time passed, the war ended and military
surplus began to appear on the streets. Prior to and during
WWII the morphing of the 134 into the 187 and then the 287, with barely a thought being given
as to how to
distinguish one from the other, what labels they carried, or
how they were designated was of little interest or
consequence to anyone. For the commanders of the time the
objective was simple: get the
communications working! It was not: be sure to create an
auditable historical record of what was what, what it was
called, what other pieces of equipment it worked with, when
everything was introduced, and in what order.
That could be sorted out later… if these early systems were
even around by the time 1945 arrived.
Unfortunately, as time passed and military historians began
to look back on these years and investigate the equipment
used during them, they ended up having a devil of a time
figuring out what was what when it came to Signal Corps
communication sets.
The kind of “loose labeling” of systems and equipment that
occurred in the late 1930s, something that was an acceptable
expedient at the time, is what led to the mess we have
today where historians and technical-obsessives scour the
world for old U.S. Army commun-ications gear and try to
figure out what it is and what it's called. This inability
to accurately tell what a piece of WWII communication
equipment is, we now know, comes from the fact that the name plates
frequently said
one thing while the guts inside, which were likely upgraded
in the field, said another. And it's because of this that military historians
of today have fallen back on designating
early Signal Corps radio sets on the basis of their manufacture date.
Since manufacture dates can usually be found on a place
somewhere on the chassis, most people think this is a safe
way to classify these signal sets. Yet
we know it is not. Yes, it might tell you when a particular device left the factory,
but it certainly does not tell
you what the military of the time thought it was or how it was
used. For as we now know, the majority of the SCR-187s that
are out there today, collecting dust in some hobbyist’s home
or military museum, are in reality not 187s but 287s in
disguise.
As to how valuable the SCR 187-cum-287 was, and why there
are still so many of them on the market today, its first use
(as a pure SCR-187, not as a modified 287) was at the first
inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. There it was used to
provide a nationwide broadcast providing an aerial view of the
ceremony.
The next year, if anyone had been tracking it, they would
have seen an SCR-187 aboard the pioneer 1934 flight of
Army Air Corps’ bombers to Alaska. There, as a platform for
long-range airborne communications, it proved sound and
capable of the task. Its transmitter was so dependable that
it was employed for ground use as well, acting as a base for
communication with early military vehicles.
It wasn’t until the early days of WWII when modifications began to
filter through to the field that the SCR-287, or as it was
known in the Army Air Corps, the BC-375, began to appear. At
that time GE set about manufacturing tens of thousands of them.
As to where it found its most prevalent use, it was on
B-17s... the plane that led the war effort.
When used in B-17s the SCR-287 consisted of a complete set
of equipment, including what was called the BC375
transmitter, a BC-348 receiver, and usually a Lionel J-47 telegraph key.
For ground use, the BC-348 was usually replaced with a
BC-348-Q receiver, which had its own dynamotor, that in turn
was driven from a 24 volt battery supply. This wasn’t needed
in the B-17s, as power could be harnessed from the four
1,200-horsepower Wright Cyclone Model R-1820-97 engines.
Massive and powerful, the engines were nine cylinder,
radial, air-cooled, with a 16:9 gear ratio. The propellers
they drove were three-bladed Hamilton Standard propellers,
11 feet, 7 inches in diameter. Finally, to top out the
SCR-287 package, in the air headsets were used, while on the
ground carbon microphones and speakers were most common.[3]
One interesting element of this was that when it became
obvious towards the middle of the war that technology
changes were needed and the older chassis then being
manufactured should be replaced with new chassis and
component configurations that allowed ease of modification,
no one thought to stop production of the older
chassis/equipment configurations. The result was that by the
end of the war thousands of BC-375-E (the Army Air Corps
designation for the GE manufactured SCR-287) transmitters
sat around unopened and in pristine condition in their
original crates. These then were the source of many of the
SCR-287s that made it to Radio Row in Manhattan.
It was at this point in time when another point of
confusion began to set in for future historians. Overall the
SCR-187 was a fine radio. With modifications it could be
used on the ground, in the air, for long distance communication,
short range, with batteries and a dynamotor, or without by
using local power. If the modifications were built into a
production run of the chassis it might received a new
designation, then again it might just get a letter
designation added on to the old name. Sometimes a
manufacturer added a new name plate, but only when he had to
buy more because his older inventory ran out. Other times he
just didn't bother. Thus, by the time what we call the SCR-187 hit the
field, it could be designated based on who manufactured it,
what modifications it had, what it was designed for, or left
up to the devices of the Army Air Corps to call it what they
wanted (which usually depended on what other equipment it
was packaged with), or even the Navy... who usually wanted
no part of any letter-number designation system invented by
the Army. This, plus the problems caused by our earlier
discussion above, makes it nearly impossible for anyone
today to truly know what they have in their possession
unless they were able to read electronic circuit diagrams
and cross reference them to what is actually installed in
the chassis of the set.
Regardless of all of this however, whatever it was called, underneath
it all it was still an SCR-187, and while various
designations appeared and faded along the way, in the end
the basic SCR-187 continued to see long use well into the
war, no matter what armchair historians tell you.
For example, while late into WWII the SCR-187/287 started to
be replaced with newer designs for use in long-range
aircraft, the original receiver stayed in use. Here we can
see clearly that while the designation changed, the basic
receiver and all of the associated equipment that made the
core system work stayed the same. As for the reason the
receiver was not upgraded or replaced, its ability to
support changes in frequency band usage meant that it found
both tactical and logistics utility.
Specifically, realizing that the Army Air Corps frequently
wanted to switch to new frequency bands, the Signal Corps’
Aircraft Radio Laboratory guys decided that rather than
design a new system they would simply modify the SCR-187 so
that it used plug-in tuning coils. The same could not be
done with the transmitter, and so the transmitter was
replaced while the receiver was simply modified. With this
simple step it was now possible for the Air Corps to remove
one coil assembly and plug in another and get the frequency
band they wanted, while the military in general could avoid
having to logistically manufacture, supply and retrofit the
thousands of units in the field. Remember, the Signal corps
was responsible for much of WWIIs logistics management at
the time, and so issues like this were important.
Yet while this need for long-range communication and band
switching prevailed with long-range bombers in the Air
Corps, that was not the case with other aircraft that
depended on short-range communication systems. Because of
this the 187 was modified again so that it provided more
effective short range communication, and was re-designated
as the SCR-183. Working well, and without any real need to
be upgraded as a communication device, other evolving
technologies came along that forced yet another change in
the underlying technology: the 12-volt batteries that were
standard in aircraft at the time began to be replaced with
24-volt batteries.
With this change the SCR-183, which operated off of 12-volt
storage batteries (as the 187 did) needed to be modified one
more time. This time it was called the SCR-283, and sent to
the field to replace the SCR-183, a perfectly good radio
system that was set to pasture by changes in other
technologies. In the end however, even this change did not
meet the needs of short-range aircraft, as the SCR-183/283
still clocked in at only a bit less than fifty pounds. For a
pursuit pilot heading into aerial combat, light weight was
more important than being able to communicate. The result
was that most pursuit aviators simply yanked their radios
out of the plane, replaced them with an equivalent amount of
machine gun ammunition and/or bombs, and headed up into the
skies.
Other technological changes came along that finally forced
the SCR-183/283 death knell to be sounded. That was the
introduction of pursuit aircraft with the ability to fly
beyond the range of the radio set. Because the SCR-183/283
used continuous-wave transmission, its maximum range fell in
around forty-five to fifty miles. Newer pursuit planes
proved able to pass beyond that in just a few minutes of
flight. It was because of this that around 1943 newer radio
sets began to be delivered. Even so, let’s remember that
underneath all of this the SCR-183/283 was still basically
an SCR-187 at heart.
To help make sure that as newer associated technologies
advanced (aircraft) radio design could keep up, the Signal
Corps established an Air Corps Technical Committee to chart
the way forward. These folks were the ones that proposed a
fundamentally different approach in the core technology used
to support command and control communications (referred to
simply as Command Sets, when the topic was about the
equipment itself), and it was at this time that the old
SCR-187/287 saw a tombstone put on its production.
What the
Technical Committee decreed was that going forward both the
transmitters and the receivers in the new sets were to have
crystal control instead of tuning coils. Heresy to many
radio operators of the time, the ability of this approach to
preset a frequency range via a crystal nevertheless allowed
for not only the automatic finding of frequencies but the
easy selection of what were called “channels.” Those readers
who can’t live without their remote control TV channel
changer firmly in their hands (versus their wife’s) should
stop here and thank
the Signal Corps for making the remote control possible, and
especially for bringing the word channel into
everyday usage. However, little did anyone at the time know
that by doing so they were creating the single most
important daily point of
friction and argument for every family in the world today. Hoo Ah!
Thank you, U.S. Army Signal Corps, for adding this most
important word to our daily vocabulary and causing as many
family arguments as you have over what channel Dad will
designate that the family will watch.
Returning to the main topic, with a few other changes thrown in to extend the range it
was not long before people were talking about a new radio
set, to be designated the SCR-240, being made ready for field
use. Traditionalists aside, the Army Air Corps was ecstatic
about it, because it promised to relieve the pilot of the
delicate business of tuning a dial to find a frequency.
Remember, in a pursuit aircraft the pilot was also the radio
operator. Giving him the ability to simply press a button
or flick a DPDT switch would let him focus on the real job…
shooting down the other guy.
And so everyone in the Air Corps waited impatiently for the
SCR-240s to appear.
Over time, a few did make it into service, in the end
however the process of standardizing production dragged
along and it wasn’t until two years after its announcement
that contracts could be let for production. By that time
other technology improvements in voice radio communication
had been discovered and it made more sense to shift to an
even newer platform.
As a result the SCR-240 (a 12-volt
system) and its partner the SCR-261 (a 24-volt system) were
put out to pasture and a newer crystal controlled Command
Set called the SCR-522 was designated as the new standard,
and began to enter service.
[4]
The Navy on the other hand, wanted a design of their own
that appears to have been based on developments made by
a Dr. Frederick H. Drake, the Chief Designer at the Aircraft
Radio Corporation of Boonton, New Jersey. A member of a company that
worked in close partnership with the Signal Corps
lab/research and development and/or production system, he may have
been the first one to conceive of the idea of independent,
miniaturized, modular, plug-in transmitters and superheterodyne receivers. Notes from various sources refer
to his work having taken place during the winter of 1934, far
before others began to promote the idea.
The Navy took a liking to the idea, and so the Signal Corps
standardized a design from its own Aircraft Radio Laboratory
(a different organization than the Aircraft Radio
Corporation mentioned above) that was based on
high-frequency models, and set this into production for
Naval aircraft use. It was called the SCR-274-N (with the
“N” standing for… what else: Nancy. Snicker, snicker..
actually, it stood for Navy). With little fanfare it became
one of the most widely used Command Sets of the war.
Strangely, the Navy preferred the SCR-274-N (see picture
below) over the SCR-522 because they thought it had better
range. Reaching out to 150 miles, it may have met their
needs in this area, but it still weighed in at seventy-five
pounds, something the Army Air Corps would not stand for.
Production was awarded to the earlier mentioned Aircraft
Radio Corporation, as well as the Colonial Radio Corporation
and Western Electric. Western Electric, not one to sit on
its laurels and count its war profits, built over 100,000 of
them by the end of 1944. By the end of the war over 1
million were built by the various contractors.
At this point radio development and design for WWII pretty
much came to an end. Certainly, within the Signal Corps’ lab
system research continued and improvements were found and
made, but few of these resulted in new Command Sets being
introduced to the field. One in particular that looked
promising was a unit designated as the SCR-264. It was
intended to move radio usage into the very high frequency
(VHF) range, and while it was given a designation of its
own, only a few made it into use. Nevertheless, as one can
easily see from the “6” in its designation, later day
historians would end up swearing that it had to have come
before the SCR-274 mentioned above. Well, it didn’t. It came
later, introduced a new VHF approach to Command
Communications, but barely made it into production and/or
use.
As an aside, it’s this latter point that makes the SCR-264
an interesting facet to WWII radio equipment sets… that is,
it introduced use of the VHF ranges. As far as the Signal
Corps was concerned, this was a necessary step that would
have to be made, whether then, or after the war, as the high
frequency ranges were simply too crowded for continued use,
and so it was necessary to find ways to move up into the
then nearly untapped very high frequency range.
Radio Direction Finding
In the end, the Command Sets (again, designed for short
range use) and their associated Liaison Sets (again,
developed for long-range use) not only met the needs of
WWII, but set the U.S. out in front of the rest of the
world. Even so, the Signal Corps’ development efforts were
not over, for along with improvements in radio voice and
code communication came the obvious knowledge that literally
dozens of peripheral areas in warfare could be improved upon
by taking the basic technology involved in radio sets and extending it
into these areas.
What areas did this peripheral environment include? Two
examples will suffice: radio compasses and radio navigation
equipment.
Radio navigation began in World War I when radio direction
finding was introduced. The basic technology involved soon
began to be used in two similar but divergent areas, and
these were developed further by the Signal Corps during the
years between the wars.
The first was for the collection of signals intelligence, to
locate enemy radio stations. The second dealt with looking
at a transmitting radio station from a different direction…
from the direction of using it to help in navigating to it.
As a means to help both ships and planes navigate from one
place to another, radio stations, or beacons, held great
potential; and so it was this second area that the Signal
Corps focused on.
In particular, they worked to develop both the radio
compass, which would be used inside the airplane itself, and
the navigational aids that they would “communicate with” on
the ground. As we all know by now, this resulted in an
instrument panel device in the form of an airborne compass
that, while it looked like the well known magnetic compass,
was not homing in on the North Pole but the ground
transmitter it was tuned to.
On the radio navigation side, to support this form of
communication a unit designated as the SCR-242 was
developed. In the case of the Navy the capabilities of the
SCR-274-N were expanded to include both short range voice
and RDF, accomplished by adding multiple transmitters and
receivers.
Each individual SCR-274-N in-aircraft transmitter or
receiver weighed in the range of 6 pounds, and thus by
itself was relatively light in weight, while the entire
assembly could top 75 pounds. Unfortunately, back in those days when you
sacrificed weight you also sacrificed capability. The result
was that the radio navigation equipment’s transmitting
signal strength was weak. One need only think of Amelia
Earhart plaintively sending out weak signals as she searched
for Howland Island to see this phenomena in action.
To make up for this lack of signal strength, ground
navigational radio receiver sets had to be built to be able
to detect these weak signals. This meant that while the
radio navigation equipment in the aircraft was light, the
stuff on the ground was big, bulky and heavy. The ground set
that the Signal Corps standardized on at that time was the
one they developed for the Navy. A cumbersome apparatus
mounted on a tower, it employed a large H-shaped Adcock
antenna. Lack of adequate power at most receiver station
locations meant that the
Adcock antenna had to be rotated by hand, to search for
incoming aircraft. Notwithstanding this excellent solution
to the need for better aircraft navigation equipment, when
it came to the SCR-274-N, it was put into only limited
service.
All of these things… from radio compasses to radio beacons,
radio ranges, and other types of navigational equipment,
eventually led to the development of instrument landing
systems. Without them, today the global commercial airline
system we all know and hate for its terrible service would
not exist… another example of how the U.S. Army Signal
Corps' work between the wars changed the world.
With instrument landing systems pilots who were otherwise
blind during low visibility weather or light conditions
could line up precisely with an airstrip and control their
decent down a glide path… yet another term introduced to the
world by the Signal Corps… to safely land. The equipment had
to be accurate beyond measure, as well as highly mobile so
that it could be shifted from one runway to another as winds
changed.
To answer these needs, the Signal Corps’ Aircraft Radio
Laboratory began work on finding ways to improve upon
earlier forms of this equipment, with a particular focus on
improvements on the detection of and locking onto the angle
of descent, as well as means for detecting and controlling
aircraft deviations to the right or left.
Microwave transmission held the most promise in this area,
but unfortunately due to budget constraints and other
factors development along this route could not proceed until
the Signal Corps’ program for design and development was
approved by the National Academy of Sciences. Since it
proved impossible for the Signal Corps to convince the
Academy of the urgency of their making a decision, this route
was abandoned and the Signal
Corps and its prodigy the Army Air Corps elected instead to go with
a commercial Sperry Gyroscope system developed in
collaboration with Stanford University and MIT
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
In the end, the various branches of service got what they
needed, although as the between-the-wars period morphed into
the middle-to-late WWII period, more and more influence was
placed on Signal Corps decisions by outside forces,
including the Signal Corps’ sister service chiefs.
While we have provided an overview here of the Signal Corps’
efforts to develop both air and ground communication
systems, primarily for “heavy” tactical use rather than for
use in light, mobile, lower-echelon environments, the reader
should remember that communication demands fell upon these
areas too; and it was the Signal Corps that addressed them.
For example, it was in this area that the sets many of
today’s Signal Corps officers are familiar with can be
found. The vehicular radios SCR-193 and SCR-245, the first
walkie-talkie SCR-194 and its protégé SCR-195, and the
SCR-197, which proved to be the last long-range ground set
before the introduction of coupling range to motion
communication. So too could be found the Signal Corps’ early
frequency modulation (FM) units, like the SCR-293 and
SCR-294.
These light tactical mobile systems aside, in the end as
regards radio much of the credit for the development of
Command Sets and Liaison Sets between the wars could still
be tied back to the original SCR-187 and SCR-287 sets. These
two systems provided the foundation of everything that
followed.
- - - - -
Let us summarize what these three articles have taught us to
date:
● Having started in Part I of this series with a
look at how the Signal Corps reorganized itself at the end of WWI to focus
on instituting sweeping changes across all military services, as well as
important sectors of America’s civil industry… changes that would allow
the United States to leapfrog all other nations in everything from research
to design, development, manufacture, quality control, and logistics
management… for the purpose of developing next generation combat systems…
and therein set the pattern for America becoming the greatest nation on
earth,
● And in Part II proving the Signal Corps' claim to this honor
by looking at the specifics of how these organizational and institutional
changes worked to take the lowest common denominator of
communication at that time: wire based communication, and make it the
reliable, dominant system it proved to be in WWI,
● And then in this, Part III, extended our
analysis up the communication food chain to radio communication… again as a
means to show that the Signal Corps’ focus on improving the nation’s methods
of research, design, development, manufacture, quality control, and
logistics management was the primary cause that catapulted America to the head of the pack as a global
powerhouse, it is only fitting that we end with an analsys one of the most important Signal
Corps developments of all time: radar.
In Part 4 join us again, when we will finish this four part
analysis of the Signal Corps’s efforts between the wars by
looking at radar.
Footnotes
[1] The 179 was originally designed for early use by the
Cavalry, and thus was horse transportable:- To return to your place in the text click here:
[2] Variously:
(1) Signal Corps Information Letter, Nos. 1-16 (April,
1934-January, 1938), passim under Development of Equipment.
(2) SCL, Annual Report, 1941, p. 71.
(3) R&D history cited in Vol. VIII, Pt. 3, Projs (823)
10-11, 833-A.
(4) C&E Cases No. 3, Purchase of 1500 Additional SCR-288
Radio Sets, 15 Nov 41; No. 6, Substitution of Radio Set SCR-284 for Radio
Set SCR-290 for the Coast Artillery Corps, 14 Nov 41; No. 55, Tab D, Signal
Equipment Suitable for Standardization Within and Between Corresponding U.S.
Army and British Commonwealth Army Units, 18 Nov 42. SigC Files.
(5) TM 11-227, Radio Communication Equipment, 10 Apr 44,
passim.
(6) Interview cited in SigC Hist Sec with Capt W. W. Van
Winkle (formerly assigned with com systems in Panama), Signal Corps
Sidelights, Vol. I, Pt. 1, pp. 222-26. SigC Hist Sec File.
(7) CSigO, Annual Report, 1945, p. 398.
(8) History of the Philadelphia Signal Corps Procurement
District, III, 627 ff. SigC Hist Sec File.- To return to your place in the text click here:
Additional general information gathered from Signal
Corps Technical Letters: No. 38 (January, 1945), p. 24.
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