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continuing...

The reader should recognize that this approach took the Signal Corps out of the purview of simple communications and put its leaders, and especially those who served the Signal Corps as researchers, in the seat of the war fighter in the field. The result of this was that in a de facto manner the Signal Corps not only insinuated its way way into the War Department rooms where strategy was set, but in the process placed itself in the middle of the field of combat where the tactical implementation of the strategies being developed would play out, via the actions of the war fighter that prowled the field in search of the enemy. The Signal Corps did this because it knew that from the perspective of these soldiers there was always a need for better ways to turn technology to their advantage… and the Signal Corps in the late 1930s not only knew how to do this but was determined to help get this technology and the arms that go along with it into the hands of the soldiers who needed it.

One can see an example of this belief at work if one considers the role the Infantry normally plays in looking at newer forms of technology that might help a ground pounder fight better. Where Infantry commanders of the time might consider the pros and cons of the (then) newly emerging trend towards using tanks in support of infantry, the Signal Corps looked at the question from a more holistic viewpoint, paying attention to not just what the infantry might do with a 30 ton steel box on tracks, but how the people inside of that tank were going to communicate with the world, aim their weapons, correct for target errors, and otherwise act as part of a fighting whole instead of a lone wolf in a tuna can prowling the battlefield.

By stepping forward to take on the role of trying to guess what the future needs would be of the tactical users that would occupy the next war’s battle space, the Signal Corps was taking on a strategic role that had not been defined for it… but at the same time had not been well defined in the 1920 National Defense Act either. For whatever the reason, the principal concern of the War Department throughout the 1930s was simply maintaining the manpower needed to fulfill the military’s peacetime missions, not worrying about what was over the horizon or what war might come next. That being the case, someone had to step up to the task of pushing the envelope of strategic thinking as it applied to the use and application of new technologies to prepare for the next war—new technologies in both communication systems, improved methods for command and control, the forms and types of arms that might be developed with the new technologies that were becoming available, and the means for manufacturing these and bringing them to the field.

          Getting the Job Done

Recognizing that the War Department wasn’t interested in these areas but was leaving it up to the service Chiefs to worry about it, the Signal Corps stepped forward. In particular, it charged itself with either coordinating or directly leading in the research, design, development, preparation and production of the technologies, systems, equipment, logistics, training, and in many cases the actual arms themselves that would find usage in the next war.

For the Signal Corps, four key tasks had to be managed if the kind of arms new technology was making possible would prove useful in the next war. These included 1) developing and fielding the signal equipment and systems needed to enable the war fighters to communicate, 2) restructuring the policies and procedures that underwrote command and control so that they would work when executed by means of the new communication systems being fielded, 3) developing the non-communication technical and mechanical systems that would enable the new arms being brought to the field to be effective (think: the fire control systems that enabled Coast Artillery to function), and 4) in many cases researching and developing the new arms themselves (think: airplanes, radar, etc.).

Without the Signal Corps addressing these issues many of the newer forms of armament used in WWII never would have made it to the battlefield. Worse, if they did, their tactical users would be unable to do anything more than stand around talking about what they wish they could do with these new arms but were unable to because they had no idea what the unit next to them was doing, had no idea what higher level headquarters expected them to do, and in many cases could not even use the weapons themselves because the mechanical systems that needed to be controlled to make the weapons effective could not be controlled without the Signal Corps’ input. All in all, if it were not for the Signal Corps preparing these things between the wars, America would have found it a tough row to hoe to hold its own when WWII rolled around. What we can say then is that because the Signal Corps took it upon itself to research and develop many of the technologies, systems and hardware needed by its sister branches, when WWII came to pass the U.S. was able to field superior technology, and use it effectively.

Just who were these sister branches that depended so much on the Signal Corps to enable their fighting capabilities? By far the biggest branch beholding to Signal Corps support at about the time WWII was appearing on the horizon was the Infantry, where not even the lowly but essential man of the hour the Infantry platoon sergeant could do his job without Signal Corps support in the way of the provision of equipment for his tactical use in the field. This was followed by his equivalent in the  Artillery and especially the Coast Artillery (think: heavy artillery), where, for example, searchlight stations played an essential role and the Signal Corps, in the form of both men and material, enabled these units to be integrated into the whole. Then there was the Army Air Corps, where the nine-man crew of a heavy bomber could not fly a mission without the Signal Corps’ support across all elements from communication to targeting and navigation. Finally, there was the  regimental  message center, the essential nexus that glued so many of the other elements of the military battlefield together.[1]

As to what exactly the Signal Corps did to enable all of this war-fighting capability, much of it fell into the roles of research (the study of emerging technologies and what use they might play in combat), development (design, test and acceptance of equipment to improve all manner of fighting capacity from communication, to command, control, and use of the armament itself), and manufacture (selection of and oversight of the means of production of the resulting products). And of course, along with these three key roles the Signal Corps also performed administrative duties, training on the use of the systems involved, logistics (distribution), and the classic field duties of acting as the combat arm responsible for assuring that the message got through.

In terms of how the Signal Corps succeeded in doing all of these things, it had a trick up its sleeve. Its trick involved employing the practical approach of assigning a group of researchers from Ft. Monmouth to scrutinize new commercial product releases for those that used emerging forms of technology and, while keeping in mind that the devices were designed for civilian use, look for those that might, with minor modifications, be repurposed for military use. Through this simple expedient the Signal Corps was able to leverage its own research efforts by piggy backing its goals on the shoulders of those captains of industry that caused the United States to not only lead the world in technological development but produce leading edge, workable, reliable products in the process.

This approach helped streamline the Signal Corps’ operations between the wars such that it became a branch with a mission that was largely administrative, where the administrative work it performed was focused on turning out superior military equipment based on either commercial or near-commercial products that had undergone modifications to meet the military’s needs. This caused the Signal Corps to develop deep skills in not only research, as a means to determine what was needed in the way of new technology and systems, but also procurement—including the elements of planning what equipment was needed, searching out where within the commercial sector there were companies with products that most nearly met the defined need(s), and contracting for the modification and production of the required devices, including making sure that enough units would be produced and made available so that it made sense to standardize on the new devices. Of course, coupled with this the Signal Corps took on responsibility for training in the use of not only the equipment but also the systems, processes, procedures, and protocols required to make the new equipment and arms effective in combat... what the military calls command and control.

          The Signal Corps Refines Its Efforts

As the 1920s wore on and drifted into the late 1930s, the effect of the Signal Corps’ efforts began to reshape the look and feel of the armed services. By the time 1940 arrived the bulk of the equipment the Signal Corps had introduced into the military fell into two categories: 1) straight off the shelf civilian models and/or equipment only slightly modified from their civilian counterpart to meet the military’s specific needs, and 2) completely new releases of technology not seen before, and designed for the military’s specific use. Of the two the first type was by far the most prevalent, with only a few truly new scientific breakthroughs falling into the second category.

It was at about this time that the Signal Corps began to worry about assuring that all of the equipment and hardware delivered met the standards the Signal Corps set for each system it was designing. Thanks in no small part to the efforts of the researchers working at Ft. Monmouth’s laboratories, the concept of MIL-SPEC (aka MIL-STD) began to take on meaning and become the norm throughout the military. Today the concept of “defense standards” has blossomed from those early days to include MIL-PRF, MIL-DTL, and at least three sets of standards that define the standards themselves (MIL-STD-961E[1], MIL-STD-962D[1], and MIL-STD-967[1]).

These three steps... that of determining based on internal military research what technology and systems might be needed to fight the next war, seeking products to fill those needs from the civilian sector, and assuring that the products delivered fit a common set of standards... became the norm for the Signal Corps in the period leading up to WWII. After all, with the military between WWI and WWII operating on a greatly reduced budget and with an even greater reduction in manpower there were few alternatives available other than turning to the civilian sector. Given these facts, it was only logical to put the manpower available to work figuring out what was needed, primarily by researching what could and could not be done with the emerging technologies of the times, and then seeking off the shelf products that, with minor modifications, could meet the stated needs of the military. Rather than have the military try to build the systems themselves, it made sense to partner with American industry and have them do it. It was logical, cost effective, and it worked.

Not to be missed in all of this however is the fact that the Signal Corp's discipline in establishing standards, processes and procedures for doing all of this pushed American industry in the direction of bettering their own internal controls. That is, in order to do business with the Signal Corps and reap the reward of profit that being a supplier to the military promised, an American company had to greatly increase its own level of performance to match a set of higher standards than it had ever had to work to before. This forced an increase in the ways and means by which a company managed both its production and itself, with the result that across America companies began to work to an American industry standard that was far and away better than that of most other companies elsewhere in the world. Looked at from the distance of today, what happened back then was almost as if the managers of American companies in the 1930s experienced a simultaneous crash course in industrial best practice, with the result that within a span of some 10 years American industry became the best in the world. In terms of those factors that helped make America the world's first Superpower, this was among the most important... and it was the Signal Corps that fostered it.

Whether this improvement in the means of commercial production was planned or not, it happened; but it wasn't the only good thing that happened from the Signal Corps' initiatives between the wars. One of the other benefits that occurred but was unforeseen was the extent to which this new approach to sourcing better war fighting systems would permeate the military… all the way down through the years to today’s modern Army. If one looks at the progression of this “outsource phenomenon” one can see an insidious but nevertheless necessary progression beginning to take place.  

It began with the Signal Corps taking on two research roles: 1) conduct research whose purpose was to find military use for advanced but commonly available off the shelf civilian products, while at the same time 2) conducting additional pure research for the sake of the research itself, as a means to move the science of technology forward.

In the former case the intent was to find ways to, for example, employ in the military arena civilian forms of radio communication such as that being used for normal civilian radio broadcasts. In the latter case the intent was to push the envelope of known science, such as was done by the Signal Corps when it developed one of the world’s first thermal infrared indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) detectors (used in early radar detector circuitry).

If we consider the sourcing of civilian produced product solutions “Path A,” and the research for the sake of research “Path B" we can see how these two initial efforts set in motion a series of fundamental changes in how the U.S. military sourced its equipment; changes that are still in effect today.

Under Path A it quickly became evident that the quality and reliability standards to which civilian products were being made at the time were not up to the kind of rigorous use the military imposed on them. Because of this the Signal Corps found itself having to not only research what kind of civilian systems it might be able to bring into the military as a means to modernize it, but also how those products could be made more reliable. This of course forced the Signal Corps to develop close working relationships with the civilian manufacturers of these products, with the Signal Corps slowly and incrementally finding itself acting as the research arm for its civilian “partners.”

One can see this at work in the way the Signal Corps researched better means of manufacturing vacuum tubes, going so far as to actually design production line test equipment to assure that the final finished goods met the new MIL-SPECs the Signal Corps set. Thus, in the late 1930s and early 1940s the Signal Corps found itself getting into bed with commercial contractors, helping them by not only setting specs that they could work to, but showing them how to meet those specs. While a necessity at the time, the reader can see that the Signal Corps’ effort involved nothing less than it becoming the de facto research and development arm for a number of civilian manufacturers.

On Path B the Signal Corps found itself racing to stay in front of the developing needs of the Path A product selection researchers and their manufacturing partners. To help make sure that the theoretical research the Path B boys were working on stayed in front of the military’s need, a new group called the Signal Corps Laboratories (SCL) was formed on June 30, 1930. Officially it was part of the U.S. Army Signal Corps, and was located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Unofficially, while it may have been on the Monmouth base, it acted as though it was an independent research institute, not necessarily governed by military dictates. Over time this proved to be a good thing, as the independence that the SCL took on for itself served America and the military well. Most notably, the country and military benefited from the many, many technological and scientific breakthroughs that SCL produced.

Among the more than 17 labs that made up the SCL group were the Signal Corps Radio Laboratories at Ft. Monmouth (including the Eatontown Signal Laboratory, Toms River Signal Laboratory and Squier Signal Laboratory), the Signal Corps Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio, the Electrical and Meteorological Laboratory (Ft. Monmouth), the Signal Corps Laboratory at the National Bureau of Standards (Ft. Monmouth), the Subaqueous (Sediment) Sound Ranging Laboratory at Fort H. G. Wright, New York, the Radio Position Finding Laboratory at Ft. Hancock, New Jersey, the Camp Evans Signal Laboratory (including the Aberdeen Field Laboratory and the Fort Fisher Field Laboratory), Camp Coles Signal Laboratory, Florida Field Station Laboratory, the Radiation Laboratory (more usually referred to as the Rad Lab) at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), an automatic target tracking laboratory located at Bell Telephone Laboratories, and later in the 1950s a large laboratory complex called the Hexagon, that was built at Ft. Monmouth. Through the years the SCL had a number of name changes, including being called the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratory (SCEL) group, and eventually simply the Evans Signal Laboratory (ESL).[2]

Of interest to us here is the mention above of the early relationships developed with MIT and Bell Labs, as well as with Harvard University. With these three relationships Path B for the Signal Corps began moving in a new direction, as the researchers at Ft. Monmouth sought and built close associations with engineering schools and universities across America… schools with the capacity to bring to the Signal Corps leading edge expertise in every field of scientific, technical, engineering, and mathematical study then known—AND—as they also sought to build close working relationships with America’s most powerful captains of industry. In this latter category companies like RCA and Western Electric stand out as examples of businesses that developed close relationships with the Signal Corps. These companies, and many others, had their own research labs and could help the Signal Corps with their tasks, but also manufacture the systems and equipment the Signal Corps had its eyes on.

With this dual effort to build close, strategic relations with both the source of scientific knowledge and the companies that commercialized that knowledge it was inevitable that the U.S. military would drift towards outsourcing not just military equipment development, but also the research that determined what kinds of military systems, equipment and technology would be developed. And from there it was just a short hop to outsourcing the military’s manpower needs itself. After all, if the commercial sector can handle research and development leading to product selection, then why can’t they handle cooking, cleaning, transportation, security, installing and maintaining the military’s equipment and systems, and all of the rest?

Where did his all lead? Answer: right where we are today… to a point where the number of civilian contractors, researchers, advisors, consultants, security people, and just plain workers working for the DOD outnumber the men and women serving on active duty. And we can thank the Signal Corps for this turn of events. [3]

Was it a mistake back then to go down this path? Has the military gone too far? Looking at how America’s military today is dependent on the support of civilian contractors to do everything from run the systems it relies on in combat to feeding the soldiers themselves and even providing security in many combat areas, one could be forgiven for thinking “perhaps yes.” However, from the perspective of America at the beginning of WWII, the answer was a most definite “no.”

Back then the Signal Corps’ move in partnering with those who ran America’s industrial complex, in a joint effort to modernize the U.S. military, proved to be a brilliant decision. It brought to the U.S. military systems from radar to radio direction finding, targeting systems, radio telephony, teletypes, telegraphy, improved cryptography as well as forms of automated cryptography, field telephones, faster and more accurate artillery fire, field combat leaders able to stay in constant contact with their commanders, bombers able to hit the targets they sought, air-to-ground communication, improved navigation, and much, much more.

While the relationship the Signal Corps began with America’s industrial sector paved a new road, the road it built brought few if any negative consequences. Instead, it brought two very positive advantages: first, systems acquisition was sped up to the point of being almost instantaneous, as the Signal Corps learned to trust its industrial sector partners when they recommended use of off the shelf equipment nearly indistinguishable from that which they sold to the civilian sector for their daily use, and second, for those systems that pushed the envelope of technology and found use only in war the Signal Corps’ industrial partners were able to deliver solutions that tapped the limits of what was then called “electrophysical knowledge.” These two benefits brought positive results of the widest consequence, both during and after the war. During the war they caused an exponential lift in America’s war fighting ability, and after the war they spun off peaceful by-products that not only helped war weary America return to the good life it had lost when WWII started, but the economic value engendered by these product spin-offs helped make America the world’s first Superpower.

Is it too much to claim that the strategic thinking of the Signal Corps’ leaders between the wars had the inadvertent result of America becoming the world’s first Superpower? Perhaps. But it is not too big a stretch of the imagination to credit the Signal Corps with these important benefits:

        ● Helping America field for WWII the world’s best equipped fighting men, prepared with the most advantageous and effective arms and equipment ever brought to the battlefield,

         ● Creating for America and its armed services a technological advantage over the world that neither its Allies could match nor its enemies could catch up with,

         ● Initiating and fostering a partnership with academia that pushed the knowledge of science and technology further than it had ever been since the dawn of time, and continues to do so today,

         ● To the consternation of President Eisenhower, building an alliance with America’s industrial complex where the product development and manufacturing efforts that ensued out-produced, outperformed, and outlasted all of the world’s other players,

         ● Established a tradition of spinning-off the benefits of military technology to the civilian sector, a trend that has helped make the world safer and easier to live in (think: Cell phones to GPS, sterilized and prepackaged food, etc.).[4]

While others may dispute our conclusion, we would close by saying that the Signal Corps between the wars, not singlehandedly we grant you, but surely as the leader of the pack, made America what it is today. As to how it did this, it did this by recognizing back then that the challenge of life… in war and in peace… is a challenge for the mastery of science and technology. Master these two and you will master your world.

In our next article (to be posted on next month’s August Home Page) we will look more closely at how the partnership  between the Signal Corps and corporate America resulted in some of the claims we made above. To make our point we will begin by looking at how the simple expedient of wire was turned into a solution that helped win the war. In the following month (on September’s Home Page) we will pen another article where we look at how the Signal Corps did the same with radio, turning it into a form of communication that brought a level of control to the battlefield that had previously been unheard of. Finally, we will close out this series with a fourth article on our October Home Page, where we look at how the Signal Corps partnered with industry to develop radar and not only help to decisively win the war but launch the world towards a safer, more peaceful existence.

 

         

Footnotes

[1] Note that later in the war the size of the B-17 crew was being driven by new releases of Signal Corps hardware and systems. Thus the 10 man crew of a  B-17G was increased to 11 men when the Signal Corps introduced radar to the airplane. The B-17G was a low-wing, all-metal monoplane powered by four 1,200 h.p. Wright R-1820-97 air-cooled, turbocharged, 9-cylinder radial engines. It had a wingspan of 103' 9" and a length of 74' 9". The normal crew was ten men, excluding the radar operator. Empty weight was 32,720 pounds, normal loaded weight was 49,500 pounds and maximum weight was 60,000 pounds. Normal range with maximum bomb load and normal fuel was 1,100 miles. The maximum speed was 295 M.P.H. and the service ceiling was 35,000'. The B-17's ability to operate at very high altitudes created a significant tactical problem for Axis interceptors. In all of this from air-to-ground communication, air-to-air communication, navigation, radar, weather forecasting at altitudes, bomb targeting, and more, the Signal Corps was needed. Without the Signal Corps the B-17s of WWII would not have flown. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[2] For a chart showing the organization of the Signal Corps in 1943, click here: . - To return to your place in the text click here:

[3] The 2012 budget documents of the DoD state that there are 801,000 civilian employees plus another 776,000 contractor personnel employed by the DoD, for a total of 1,577,000 versus 1,429,995 active duty military. - To return to your place in the text click here:

[4] In 1943 the Signal Corps and MIT became active in developing ways to irradiate food to reduce spoilage and pathogens. See for example: Physical Principles of Food Preservation: Von Marcus Karel, Daryl B. Lund, CRC Press, 2003 ISBN 0-8247-4063-7, S. 462 ff. - To return to your place in the text click here:

 

Additional Sources

Acquisition Streamlining and Standardization Information System (ASSIST) – the official source for specifications and standards used by the Department of Defense.

DOD 4120.24-M, (2000), DSP Policies & Procedures, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics).

1936 Annual Report on Research at the U.S. Army Signal Corps Laboratory.

U.S. Department of the Army; Historical Report: Signal Corps Engineering Labs: 1930-1943, Government Printing Office, 1943.

Camp Evans photos courtesy of National Archives.

Additional information and history of MG Joseph Oswald Mauborgne, Chief of Signal Corps from October 1937 to his retirement in 1941:

 

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